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"'V ; ' ■' A B' S T R A G  T ,V/' , /. " ' 'V ' , ; i ; •
: ■■•iMs'. study' is divided’’dft$b'--'Tiy,e'-. Chapters with an
/A/t;intro duo tioh, and ahote on the end of the reign*
vV; \ . i;The first.-of these--Chapters points : out some of the 
; .changes which tools: place in. the; array; and administration 
.under Ma^muh;,and discusses...his/policies of succession, 
v 3 , of the Inquisition (Mi^tna-)-..;ahd;:.ofvthd;rrenewal^'of war . 
t^-h/agMnhf Rysaritiumi /.f ;";i I ; -
;.■/ ; . The second- is 'devot^d';Jto*-"%he’fe’ariy >iifd\ofl Mu^.ta^im,,.
:v'/:4hiso foie in Abb sis id politicsi^ill^his accession and t h e . 
problems which-’lie had to face .afterwards* - 
;-v .* Chapter: Til deals with tile recruitiheht; of the so-
- called;' "Turkish" slaves, ■theirvdrigins , arid numbers, ?the 
: ‘ role :.they played under M u f:ta§inf and^the/.circumstances/. • 
r which favoured their rise to high-positioris* . ;
Chapter * iy-.discus-seaithe- .seasons 'for. the’,- ihpve from 
Baghdad, 7 the - founding of Samdrra arid the ; settling of, the; i 
„ , various groups there*, - •=. \ v ; “ h,;
, Thepiast Ghapter is . a .survey of ! the, magor , events, of/ 
the reign bringing out their .Similarities and;differences: 
and their.significance in that/period* ;t.  ^ : - 7
No separate survey of the sources ,wah.'made as
. these have been; the sub j ect of ;a- number Of /studies (cf.
/Bibliography: Barthold,' Duri, Gibby Lewis R o s e n t h a l  and 
> .Wellhausen) • It is to be pointed, out /that the lack of 
information oh. the court and .the administration, so*
/ - noticeable in.this period (e.g. Tabari says very .little 
• about. ;Muft;a§im "dnd includes npllist of governors, for. his. 
reign) might not only have, been due 19 th^ fact that in 
the newly founded Samarra-neither the court nor the city 
./was the centre pf; the cultural activities of Iraq but 
/also/to .a general lach of interest in. what happened to, 
the Caliphs, who, were then isolated with;their troops 
in; the ;garrison capital. . / / ^  ' v >/ /
A C K N O- W L E D. Ct E- M :E N T
; 7 ; : • Iv am/ greajbly indebted to Professor Bernard liewis 
Of the University/ of :London' for-' Msiteind attention; and 
invaluable adviee throughoutthe preparation of this
/study. ri, f 7 / 7 , / ' ' \ . ■;/. ■ •. :
■ v 0.8.A. , Ismail
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%•. • . Introduction - '7;/ ; ; ,/;; . /
•;.vMu1 tasim the eighth Abb.asid caliph -came to power . . 4^ r 
two centuries; after, the' death of the Prophet in 632. > A\. 
great deal had taken place ;wi:thih:_:.thosb^^
In the reign of the first caliph^; A b u • B a k r (632r^3^4? the 
/.• - Umma of Medina had conquered; Arabia and . started thecon- 
quest- of Iraq, and Syria.// .By the end. of the reign of-.the 
second caliph, 1 Umar, in 644* the Islamic Empire had 
/ .almost reached what can be called its historical frontiers*~^~ 
What was added later was little compared, to the conquests / >/
Of; these 12 years of the ■'reignsBpfthe /first twocaliphs* / ■//
Moreover the migratory wave of the Arab nation, caused by ,
. the pressure of population/in, Arabia and led by Islam, ' / > /;■
; had also; spent .itself b y . the/bhd.nf these. 12 years* What ■,.-///■
/ ;.remained of it was soon ,to be; spent in two great civil / ,
wars, the. first ending the period.of the Patriarchal 
/ 1 '.://(£feliphat.e ,axxd; establishing^ the Umayyad dynastyunder
;-/MUtpwiya, 661-680, and the second cohfirming. the.same //
:// V. ^dynasty under ’Abd al-Malik b* Marwan, 685-705 • These // /
two wars saw the triumph: of the practical politics of 1 "■-/
. 7 1 > h e - the maj0rity of the Arab tribes / 5 /
-,/ /br orfdal-At 1 a-s~-oP~-~‘the-lMusl-im^Peoples,
■*Z'V. 7\//;//l©ndon^7L9^ Z; /;/' V;/Z: 7 7 A ' /  / V . ■ ’/■•A/ ■ a 4 A' ;7.:
; oyer thetheocracyof Medina* / They saw also the last 
v 4 a V tfeKf6rta/pf ^Medina,.td; establish; its powefoyer the empire 
, // '■ :,7-?;4;whieh;ll_.together/witfc Arabia, hadv created* ■
a/7774 The PatriarciialJGaiiphatevWas replaced by a - secular , 
staten ruled by an *!'Arab Caste"*‘ Hi jas; together/with 
/ //a v' y/the/rest;4'f ^ Arab|n;were/'relegatedito' a .secondary/./ 
v / ./, AI>1acp> /and bui 1  o /holy7places/of Mecca /and/Mbdiha
//; they wbxildvhaye' meant- nothing to the .1 slamic Empire and *
/ A ; / ,  / / / ^ h p '  M U s l i n r ; W p r l d A ^ / / ' ^ r  ‘/ V Z , / 4 ////,; a  /  , a a 4 ’- a /  7 ' A a 7 / : / ‘/ a - ; ; / A 7 7
74//7 a/ a ; /Yet/if/Medina ;phd/Hljaz^were defeated/by Damascus
// / / . and Syria, the/spirit/’p f !Mpdlna> lending the,;powers in
A A : Iraq and Khurasan, and benefiting from the/political ■
/development Under the Umayyads, /was soon to/ensure a 
7/ 7////;finalvictory-dvbr its //opponent s#''/ ■'/Ah tArab, Gasteu was 
777/// not to 3?uip/ the/Islamic Empire* The Arabs have/ spent
/; / / their ener^es7in establishing; the; Islamic: Empir.d /and 7 :
ihhefiting:; its pule on the basis of anArabState* It
was now the turn of the Muslims to e st abli sh; an 11 si ami e"
state. Yet another .civil war/ was. in store. / The. wars 
of conpuests had scatferedthe Arabs far and wide*
While Arabicizing andlslamizlng the conquered peoples^
/ they themselves;:had‘ not^ remained uninfluehced -
new environment .7; /The;; time/ when a 1 Muslim1/meant an ,
’Arab". was soon rep1 aced by. a; time when it;, meant mostly
otherwise except, in Arabia proper. . The majority of ' 
the Muslims were now not of Arab descent (though many 
of them pretended to be.) ’ Nor were thbse of them ;
Who were Arabs, all* supporters 0f the Umayyad.rule*
These factors, coupled with the existence of social 
and economic injustices to: the non-Arab Muslims in a 
pbriod of great; .economic and social 'development.,-' . ; 
resulted in the AbbasidReyolution ..of /750*: It is;,
true that the /’Abbasids .were/an Arab dynasty^/ But 
this time it had come to, power on "Islamic" idpals*
It was no longer the rule of an Arab ;Gaste. a a
However, t hi s was by no me axis the end ofv the c i vi 1 
wars which took place -in, these two/hundred year s • preceding 
the reign of Multa^im. There w a s , yet a f  ourth 'one, close 
at hand (not to mention;the;.1 Alld.^/jQiari.jit'e ■ and other 
revolts which continued to take, place) * ., ’The/ absence 
in the '.§ur and Tradition of 'a^ciear; and-'definite.' rule 
regarding succession was a great factor in. nearly ail . 
the crisis which took place in this period.; Problems , 
did-arise even when the consensus of opinion meant that 
of Medina,. Damascus.’ or Baghdad and when these expressed 
the opinion of; the community, at. largb.; ' Indeed this 
could only be said of Medina alone and that only till 
the death of 1 Umar I. in 644. Afterwards it was power
which: decided-succession,; power often expressed in civil 
..wars* ; And 'thUs;-.w&s' the/Civil.. War betweenAmlni and Ma’muh, 
the,: two sons :ofrHaruh’al-RashTd and brothers of MaTtasim* ■
The .Victory fell to Ma'raun who, although the eldest /and . 
ablest of . the two > was put,, second by Efarun* . /BUt/.his .
victory meant rib :change of dynasty nor a victory/of 
Persians oyer Arabs.; , The Abbasid dynasty/continue4to\ 4 -  
rule. Military iPpwef based on human resources5 was far easier 
to &C‘quir4 ,ab44$Q- tehage in the eastern prbvlnces than, in .
. Iraq, settled ahdy urbanized. ' •/ /.
•*; -//Uhpeacef u‘1 as these two centuries were,,they were very 
much, like the !- two centuries of peace" of the Roman/Empire, 1 y 
a'.witness - to great development in all respects, of life. . -
Suffice it to say that. Baghdad then, reached the height of. 
its. greatness./; ^ cpnsidering the Islamic empire at large 
one sees a number of great cities,', x»anging from Qairawan in the 
we s t 10 M ar t// i n t he e a st* ;• T he s e ,c it i e s ha d already bee ome 
centres of iearhing and. administration,, .developing gradually ;. / 
local ‘.characteristics' and local traditions/ Five of .these; 
cities had bepn capitals of the Empire:... Medina, Knfa, 
Damascus, Baghdad/and Marw. ,, Looking at; this'/from the angle/ / 
of urbanization and cultural development with preylo.ua and/ 
later history in mind, /one has to: see them a lap : in the context
of a*swiftly acquired large empire with, inadequate 
means of transport, the distribution of Arab tribes and 
their ‘ ratio to local population and the spread of 
different religious sects together with other quasi-- 
religious movements* These were the causes of the 
regionalism which had already started to take root*
For by now the Umayyads had been restored^ in Andalus, 
the Apchlabids had established an independent dynasty in 
North Africa, and the ^ahirids were already paving !the 
way for their hegemony in Khurasan. Moreover, the 
effects of urbanization and economic development visible 
in agriculture, trade, crafts, and town life, not only 
resulted in the creation of a relaxed and tolerant society 
but changed the .nature of the relation between the caliphs 
and their subjects. Their interests were-not the same. 
•Urban and settled'centres were, not the sources of human 
power which-the caliphs needed to secure their power and, 
fight their wars. Nor were they like their predecessors 
to whom the Caliphate meant a great deal* State and 
Society were indeed moving in different directions governed 
by interests o f ;a different even opposing nature^
■ 4  CHAPTER : I . 47-/; Z.7- 7'
The Legacy1 of the Previous Reign
The reign'of Mu^tasim, was in many ways a Continuation, 
of that of Ma^rauh* , / M u ’ tasini .h^d/to conteni w i ®  a; number; 
of problems bequeathed to? him .by his;' predecessor. In his., 
religious policy, In; his relations with the sVAilds, in his 
dealings . v/ith his, secretaries and to a great extent/ in • his 
policy of succession he was a faithful follower?of: M a ’mun. 
The latterV* jreigii has been the subject o 4  general /as/well 
as., special^studies.V Certain aspects of hid , poilcies , ; 
especially;those relating to the army and admihistration: 
and/to 'the. significance of certain events .aiid/polibies' in / 
relation to the • position of the Abbas id Caliphs, are 7 :
worthy of/further,consideration. / : %
M a1 mud's reign /began, with a civil war* It ended in r~ 
a frdsh7seri:es of campaigns against Bysantiumv -/ In/ between 
it-saw the;advbht of: the M u1 tazila with Ma * munrsattempt 
to create/soraething like' a state doctrine, the /introduction’ 
of hew elements in largo numbers in the army and/a/hew. 7 
approach td/theZproblem, of. /succession. < it/' was ' k l D ^ /  
reign -/^bout.twenty/years; 19&r218/813-833 ~ but throughout
-. 7 7 ;it was., turbulent with /uprisings and revolts i n ;most. of
Z/gfche Abbasid provinces*: ■ These/; were/not, however, • the , -’// /-7-
4  7  'pr6bidms?' QfAa-“sihgle reign,.but the-'prqbldms of the Caliphate/7 
; in general*: / /In, responding to them M a ’iirun seems consciously.
1 ; to. have boon searching for a permanent solution*/, Hence >/
the significance of the events and the policies* vWhile • 
the ..Abbasid- dynasty was faced with .the-.problem of succession 
. within itself and with regards' to the; *Alids:V the Caliphate 4  
/’/;/. as such was/faced with the problem; of Imposing its paver
/ . - in a large empire oi* sharply delineated, regions /and a
' ' . / '■ ■ Z 7‘ /■ - ’ . / 9 / ’ -■ ' ■ ‘ “ * Z
: . fising ..urban/s.opi.ety* . / Meanwhile;Islam itself and Arab- ;
’ / •.Islamic culture were threatened by, the -spread of perso- ■/
7" ' .7 • /' ■ 7; 3 7 . ' ‘' •'v
ar.amaic culture and other religions* - :
.; These/problems were, perhaps. Inherent in the
nature ata development of the Islamic: Empire which rapidly
. found itself embracing within its boundaries a variety of
regions,; religions,/peoples and cultures* Perhaps, too, .'that i
: . oniy-af ter, the Abbasid Revolution with ,all/that preceded and
•7// ...foilowed^'it; 'in':the economic and/:social developments and
7 7  7 the conversion of large numbers of people to Islam it was 7
4*: £abari, events of the years 198-218,;7Bal*ami,IV-same 
■m.7'7v ,years*/: //.. 7. ./ ' ‘ 7; ' : ' Z7; 7  . 4 7 7  77//- 7
/ 2* /F.O-abfleii: dl-Ma1 muh~V^1 jgll.t;Aildi passim;,;Gibb: The
Evolution of Government-: idem, Government and I si am *,.,- 
7 3•, Gibb: The Social. Significance; Goldziher; uMuh*Studien*,V 
;//_ 4p* 176-20^ '■ 7 : •// ■ * 7;;/;-/ ' Z'-/~ I ”  '
/ natural that the/clashes, betweehvreligions;,. regions and, 7z'4V/Z7
7 cultures should have come / to/^ the.\fbrC*^ '* Maimuh .was-7 :7-. - , V 4 7
•;v known f or his awareness^/his"^ share/ in hhd/his contribution^ :;4 ‘7 4
‘4  -to the intellectual life of h i s a g e B u t  the problems .
;; * / that seem to have concerned him/most/were those relating
to .politics and power.. In/his experiences/ in the Civil
7 ' 7 4 4 4 4  ••//■/ 7 7 7 7 7 ; / "  , 4/: T ' V ' ' ^  '. 8 '
/ v ;yyar ;and»/iinmedi^ t.e:ly;- af terwards : could not be ignored. - , - .
,.y / : y_r . , The; causes of the Civil W a r l a y  partly in HarUh' s / /
unwise pqii.cy, of . conf erring the succession on his three
sons AmTn, Ma’mun and @asim consecutivelyi partly in
=^//:'th‘e,-ambitibhsZ of f he-two elder sons; and their respective
parties,.^ It was; possible/because the: ruling province
/-y;7yyp7 means1;thq> strongest. ^  In / 7 ,7/7/777
:/ '■ . fac i the; distribution of v/eaith and power wi thin the .4
7 Abbasid Empire was1 such /that: *nof Zone/-province... was *
, 7 powerful: over/ the others., . One/ is/tempted,/beeausey/of y 7,:- v- , y;:;
t this fpct, to think that perhaps al-Ras hT& was thinking
,y. / of this when he f divided the empire;/amongst his. three-sons, 7/ yy ;y/y
7-7;. the idea being to securo the provihqes osy#e;ii;^ 7, f - 7 7 7
7;/ 7:/admihis;trative centre within fhe family. ’ /But that could /f, / 7
7 / i*7 Becker; Islani otudien\ p. 1 3 Durif:7 *At fA . 4 A C7pp«5-40;
77777 // /7t it.I.r.. s,v*/Abbasids.* .7/-- ' 7 7 7 /  7;./- / -v * 77.7'‘1 ■ ,77/7 7 7 7 7
. 7  77'277 See s'^A^FtBif 7 7 * 7  * As-r al-Ma1 mun. . 7.' 7. , / 7 7 7  - 777
/7 y3,/ B e e S i d q i  gamdi , The Civir War between AmTh and MaVmun;
7"7. : 7’;;7. ■ ^ Gabrieli, Ft/la S uc c e s s iohf- / 7 7774-,. -77 7 .4,7‘//- ,-./■* •7.7/7;
; : 7. /Tabari:/ p.653, it/1£ reported that;/a poet declared that
7 ‘ !th® ■ good king Barun 7:Tnpde/ the wo.r^ /
7 7 ' 7  7,. dividing the Caliphate -and the Empire 77 V7  ; yy7 . :
• hardly have been the sqlutaon. Moreover Harun al-
Rahhid, as Ibn al-Athir put it, had not learned from his
7  7 - ' . . 7  . 1 1 7. . 7 y  . ‘
experience with his brother al-liadi. v
The struggle between Amtn and Ma’mun which had not1
failed to manifest itself in the days of al-RashTd
became acute soon after, his -death* Immediately after
his accession Amin showedsignsof neglecting his father’s
Will and the pledges which he himself had given.in the ,
4 / —  - . ■ /’ ■ 2 . ; -■ , . Z
famous document of the Ka’ba. The contents of that
/document were nothing less, than giving M a ’mun full control
over Khurasan and- the sole right to settle the succession
' 4- " ' ■ ' " r 4 ' _  3
even to the extent.of removing from it his brother ^asim.
;Ma’mun and his party in Khur’asan were .not at -all taken by
/surprise by Amin’s moves.; /The struggle between the two
^brothers started with a ;war of letters lasting for .a period
of two years 193-5/808-11 then changed into a military
conflict - 195-8/811-13• It ended in thevidtory of M a ’mun
over Amin, of Khuras*an over the ruling province of Iraq.
Z7 It is, clear that the issues, involved were not. merely
/the problem of succession but the territorial integrity of
1. Kamil. VI. , p.65. 4  Z
2. Tabari, pp. 655-60; M.as’udi ,7VT, p.326. •
3. yabari, pp. 658-9 , 699; .'Maszudi, VI, p.328. .Curiously
enough this presupposed the survival of AmTn by M a ’mun*
the Abbasid World, the unity of the Abbasid, Caliphate 
and the position .of the Abbasid Caliph within those 
domains. AmTn1 s attempts to settle those Issues, .
though contrary to his own pledges were but the. endeavours 
of the accepted Caliph to impose his will and that of his 
ruling province* In this respect it is.essential to 
remember .that although the war started two years after 
Harun’s death the division of the Bmpire took place 
almost immediately after it* , Ma ’mun was not only the 
independent ruler of Khurns’an and, accordingZto his 
father’s will, the successor to: the Caliphate and the ;
• maker cf the successor to be,, but was in'fact acclaimed
' V • '■ 7 ' - 2 ■ -
as Caliph during the life-time, of A m m .  Thud there 
were two Abbasid Caliphs within the,Abbasid domains*
Khuras’an was then for the first time since its .incGx*pGX*atiqn 
within the Islamic Empireindependent, under a rival Caliph* 
This period^'beginning.-with its independence from and hostile 
relations with, Iraq arid followed by its victory to become 
,./the • ruling; province; df the, Abbas ids for the period in which 
-Ma’mun*s capital was Marw - 198-204/813-20 - was very 
signifleant fox^7he future development in that province*
.M a ’mun. was but the fore-runner of the Tahii’ids. His career- ..V , ' - * . , ,.■
; 7  'yakaPtf4pg*- ?65-6.
2*. . . p . l l 7 r  Mas’udi; V I I * p . 2 i
■ in Khurasan confiriiied. the regiorialv. tendencies and
:,pbssibi^^ independence-nlr eddy seen in the time -;v
of-al-ROsbTd in Nontb. Africa^iSh^the nise, o£ the • •
. ; Aghlabi ds and; in Khurasan: itseIf wheye, the problems \ ’ ; ; • : £
that had f bded 1 Ali b . fTsa ■ b # ^ t h r e a t e h e d r t h e  . : 0
• r  position'bf / thev:4bbbsid governors' there.. The implications /  J  
of these, regibnai; tendezicies were.vnot .to'limit themselves , 
to i:he .Pbiilioal: sphere alonb*5:’:cSimuitaneously. they - w e r e , d :;\- 
ter; affect; the. admihistrative , the:;• fdha nbis I, and "cultur a lo- 
fields* r Althpu^ the centre - Iblg - was later to suffer 
froni these, the rise of regional .courts, was beneficial, to ,  ^
culture and commerce* Thb<>;bonc.ent$S^^
, ; cultural iif e in Bh^hdad tos .to be vSuperSeded. by, the local 
retentionofHwealth :and the spread of culture - inf luenced 
by .-the BaghdadT schools through the rising regional cent res 
which, ; \ w h l ‘i ® x  maintaining unity, gave Vent’ to local f ■>. V v
:.V"' - ’ variations. ’ ■' '7' •„ r; ' ■' 4 ■* '
■ ' : Perhaps more importantthan 'regionalism'."was the} w a y ;
• in which this Qivil. War was conducted and the light it
throws on the ; developmeht of society in that period* t d,
. . ..Though, the tissues involved were , vital their importance seems - v ^:?
>; to have been a:;guesfion of concern for the ruling circles '
alone. ^Beside^ the regional aspects - in this the material ,■ v ;
1. G-ibb: An Interpretation* , p.39« • -;v-;L:j
benefits which accompanied the fact of beirig a ruling 
province or otherwise - which made the Khurasahis in 
general support M a ’mun, and the populace of Baghdad 
shoulder the.burden of its defence against the attack of 
the armies of r|*ahir b. al~Husayn, the war was primarily 
a dynastic struggle between AmTn and M a ’mun. Compared 
to the previous, civil wars in Isl’am there were no 
religious, ethical and social issues* -It was a war of 
professional soldiers and careerists. M a ’mun*s ■ liberal 
f inancial policies in Khurasan secured for him./the - 
support1 of the population;. his regular pay for the armies 
kept, them for liis cause. Money also kept loyal the 
soldiers of AmTn, but the foolishness with which he 
distributed .it bedevilled his cause. The-’ dominance of 
this, matei^ial issue becomes very clear in the 'opposition. 
..of Baghdad to Tahir * s -armies* Realising that; the power 
of the city lay in its trading and commercial activities
1;.. Ma * mun’s 'policies in KhurasTn were, in contrast t o those 
of ’All b., ’Tsa, b. MaEan under whose governorship a 
number ,of hpf^isings^took place, the most^important of 
which was that of Rafi’ b*' al-Lay.th* Ma ’mun cater echfor; 
the Support-of such rebels as ;RTflT. ' The.civil war . 
started only after his having settled these, problems* 
Barthold; Turkestan - pp,200^8*. Tabari, p;il42, reports . 
that a Syrian Arab addressed Ma’muxi once saying- ”0 
; Commander of the Believers.be the Arabs of J^yri.a as ' 
you were . to t h e ./*Agam of :Khurasah.11 Tai^uf, kltab Baghdad 
VI, (kawthari) pp.l44-*5: reports the same-story*
2 -|-‘abafl, 1^865.; M.O* al^Rayas ; a1-Kharadll v pp.443-51*
' • ‘ ... . ■ /  ,, - * ’ '
.more than in its walls and defending troops T'ahir- 
decided to beseige' it. During the long siege of 
the city the burden of ..defence lay mainly with the
population of the city and within these chiefly upon
- ' ’ : ■ - 1  ' . .■ ' . . 
-tfte. -fUrat and ’Ayyarun. . Tabari related that one of
these declared that uwhen we find it easy to live..we 
- 2 - , _  
do. not care who becomes Imam.11 . If Baghdad was to
retain its position as capital and hence continue to be 
the place of the. court and, the centre of commerce the 
question of who became Imam was, indeed, beside the 
point. . - . ' *
It is true that; there was no threat of a change of 
dynasty here. But the causes of"this glaring indiffer­
ence to the matter should not be sought in politics alone. 
More than there these lay, perhaps, in the economic and 
social.developments of the age. , The evidence is that it - 
was an age of x^elative material ease and worldliness*
The flourishing, of agriculture, of commerce and trade and 
of crafts, points to this* 80 does the rise of hew 
towns and. expansions in the already existing ones. The ;
IV Tabari, pp. 867-908; MasUdi, VI,_p.452; Qahen: Mouvement.. 
■ Bopulaires * pp.. 34-6. P u r i : Nushu1 al-Asnaf * p• 1431 S 
. s.v. Urat* .
2. Tabari , p.890*
3* See X. de Planhol; The Muslim World; al-Fakhri,pp.201-2 ; 
Goiteto; The Rise; B.Lewis, An Bpistie ; Puri; op.cit.
abundant description of town’s r e g i o n s , peoples, trade 
routes, products and crafts in the literature, of the Buldian, 
in itself an indication of those, developments, is yet a 
further indication not only of the relative affluence 
but. also of the sense of belonging to a large world 
united despite the differences and variety of its regions*
The writing on K h a r a , an important feature of this 
period, shows where the interests of the rulers and. the. 
learned circles met on a subject which had become the 
basis-of the relation between the rulers and their subjects.
It is .worthy of note that this subject was approached 
from two different aspects in this period. : The administra­
tive is to be seen in Abu Yusuf1 s al-khar’a.i which was, more\ 
or . less a manual of rule according to Islamic law written 
for and at the. demand, of Harun al-RashTd. The z*eligious 
is to be found in the worlc by Abu al-giasim b. Sallam under 
the title of Kitab a 1-1 AmwaI. - Ibn Sallam had .no connections
with the. ruling circles. Neither of these works limited 
its scope to the financial fields but tackled subjects 
like external relations - specially with the Byzantine 
World - and the treatment of non-Muslim subjects in the 
Islamic,World. Where the underlying confidence and 
feeling, of satisfaction in the former work had caused the
writer to call theCaliph the shadow of.. God on earth ; ~
'; .;;; f ’ v and; inf 1^ ,freese: tacitly the principle,
h^ :hA.-;h a c h i n g  thbrdhy a peace treaty with the 
;v* ' E m p e r o r  and exchanging friendly relations .with 
/ rVhiin,- the'spirit of the. latter is in contrast^Sa.: reminder 
of t h a t p r  inciple and a re statement of the secondary\
! :* v"V^ Pos'ttionvOf ':thehon-MusliBis t n  the Islamicy st The
> 4'; importance of this-difference was to he\aeen; in some of /
V::.- 4 ; hMa’-Mn*.^ ‘di sou sped, here • t 4- • -
’• ^''-:;,W;;4''::;/;VThS- image ofthat society, of its habits and the
:v,i ;; '; >d i f f ereht prohTerns- that occupied its attention could be
seen in the: writings/bf. a contemporary writdr , like Jahiz#^ 
'.'■';'‘V:y'-;in::''poe-t?*y pne.fihd tbs iiiipact of this prosperity on. ■ r
l i t e r s  o ^  expressed, in their acquiring h e w ’
\w- 7 criteria/for/things, mate^ social, and. intellectual,
. which ^ hdd. not< attracted /their predecessors^^'.?v:://'lTpr!- -were . 
the; chronic1es >of the period devoid of information on 
. that., side. The^ casual references like the :one in Tabari
1." Vasiliev, I,p.90.; Canard:. Quelques "A-Cdte11, p. 103*
• "• 2* Qudama. b. Jaf f ar* s Ifliaraghi is on the .others-hand a
collection ;p^ ihfwmatipn on state PbPylbcial budgets 
v. with geographica 1 and historical information. The 
v - V juristic aspect comes by chance* ^
3* "Bor a list of his works see BeIIat:JEs:sa'i D ’Invehtjlre* 
h* Cf* Muniaqayat■*■• b n 106-7. Abu T.aimnamy •;.'-pesdription. V 
\3pi*lngf; .p .135V Bi *bil, ’Pleasure of vLivingt;. pp * .
- 2d7r-il,-;Buhturi> : ;’Description of the Palace, of:
.-v I-'- .://’';'-.’'Khosr6s'’:V..-- ' i / ■ 7, ,\ ■. ■ / V O . 7
on the ri se of the price of vvheat in Baghdad> . Basra, . ..; 7/7 • 7;
. and: Kuf a ;.in the year 207/822-3 is 7 a good indi cation 7;.,' 
of the .stability of prices :on ihe: whole,; a fact which 777'.,
is supported by recent' research.- y * ■ .;.7'7.7-. Th". 7-7, ’ 7 ; 7 -/.; 77 •
. : Thi s development w h i c h  amongst other things had ' .7 7
lain behind ;the Abbasid Re.yolution itself V was not 
threatened, so to sp.eakj b y . the ’ dynastic struggle in 7 .:/7.:; 7'. 7
;the-Givii War save foh ^ thp ; narrow; regional ;and personal;; ; t , . 
aspects. ; Hence the lack of interest of the main body . 7;/. 7 7:77;
of the community in .that.;Affair*,'7;7,ftith', Isianii'.zation; 7 . 7
and Arabization, coupled to benefits from the .egalitarian 
nature of the Islamic society under Abbasid rule, the 
. communi ty was pur suing the basi c . day-t o-Tday p.rdblemsof •
. life and giving vent to its bther7energies in the clashes j
of cultures and ways of living:bf : which: the.VM u1 tazila 7 
and the Shu’ubiyya were e x p r e s s i o n s '7 The se two — 7 
leaving aside the part piayed by;.some of the M u ’ tazila .77 7;/j
. in the Mihna - ref 1 ect on the: who 1 e a tolerant society, '7,7 . . 77
7 flexible and7giyeh7to. argumentation rather than to rigid., 777
and - hostile confrontations * .'\''-77 ..-7;.:-.; ■ :.,.;77'-.
7 I.7 Tab ari, p .1066.7 T ime :and pi aces are significant as the . 7: 7
7 ; 7 wheat-grapinage areas in7the north, in. Syria and Egypt; 7 ;
7y 7 were at the time disturbed by revolt. These-cities in 7* 77 /
7 ,7 Iraq in the South suffered from a shortage of supply.:
7; Bor prices and salaries cf. E .Ashtor: :Essai sur .1 es Prix 7 ,
et les Sal ai re s. 77; 777,.,. 77 :' /••.. 7 7
7 2. For^ therMpi^ubiyya/sep': G-Oldziher* s .views in. his Ivl.Studien 7 ':| 
; pp,>- 147“77 1 ‘ and GIbb’ s . yiews7ih his: The Social. Significance
777,; of the Slm’ubiyya* -77 7; 7 77/ 7 :.77;'^  •
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The application of racial or national-criteria to 
these problems and to the victory of M a ’mun not only 
neglect these factors - decisive in my point of view - 
but also disregard the elements which further Ma’mun’s 
cause. It is sufficient to mention here that the 
Khurasanis whc> supported M a ’mun and won his victories
were Persians, Arabs, Turks and a mixture of all these ..
groups, that Hijaz, the heart land of the Arabs,
supported Ma’mun and that the Arab tribe of Khuza * a
• - 3 ' ’* . ■.' ' . '7
also was proud, asTDi’bil put it-, to have been the
killers of Amin*
M a ’mun’s ,reign proper began 198~2i8/8.T4~33 withy
the end of the Civil War. His success over Amin gave /
him the opportunity to reunite the Abbasid domains and 7
the Abbasid Caliphate* But it placed on his shoulders
the problems of/that unification* One of these was the
army which with the gradual widening of the gap between -
the Coinmunity and its rulers had become, together with
the administrative bodies, the real basis of Abbasid
rule. Up to the time.of al-Rashid 193/808,- the ;army
1* Goldziher: op.cit. > p. 149 ; M ♦ H .Ahmad: Al-Khi 1 af a 
w a ’ 1-Pawl a*
2. Tabari, p.861. Tabari reports that they supported
him because he was unjustly treated - in the:religious 
sense - by Amin. ; \ 7
3* Tabari, p.1155; Muntaqayat, p*121*
- ,/ v , . iAbb&sici C<htf*Khot S*h° . , ; ‘ \
v^ ;: was notmerely, the- instrumeht^o^fe
 ^ . (bawla) • With tile ."war betvvbehAmTn'and; Ma vinun^  .in v
h w h i c h  that baUse ';wdbnot;^involved, the situation changed. -, .
;";;;; The army bad “been ;c aught up in a war of succession. :
1 It. tecame clear during the war ;that'theal;legiahcd of 
:,v* ■ ,'v I ;th^; soldiers was ;not .iohthe1 caliph' br":;ruier , not even ; !
to the region, but to the direct cptimand^r^;^ d  to good H:, - ^ •; 
;:1;V5.ipay^'* 'Moreover the Veteran soldiers weie committed .
: ^either way in , the war so ;thaf: their. uitimate loyalty K; V
■ : .. to the Caliph was,doubtful. / . O n .the other:hand the 
' ;v; /} v;hisinfcerest in. the dynastic ^ dispute showed'; by the main k >.
; A ; ■ /built - of th^iiblD adid sub j ect s emphasized the dependence ,. ^
. of the ruler bni,phdiessional military support.^ These '/->r 
?■ / ' v factors,^a^ many, uprisihgsvwithin. the V-, /
H M b a S i d  Einpire : and; .e the
: .policies i which :M a f mun adopted for the army. , This was .
'.:h‘-hv the incorporation inrthe army of new. elements,. who, h . -"v
5 : having been -coliected 'mainly .from^the eastern provinces,,;; \
'were called i t i s  essential to distinguish -i'.'-i.Vv-
V between Turks who came with these Shew; elements and those  ^v
i \ who had already been in Ehurasan and Transoxamia even
vl* Tabari, pp.. 782-5* ;\\i; -V-
' 2. Goitbin: A Turning Point ,;n;122. ■ ; i
before the conquest of/ the Arabs. of those lands. - ' V yyy ;y
. While .the 1 at ter could .be taken as r ep r e s ent a t.i ye ; ;
’ of the Islamic World there at that time the former ■" %
A; ;'' were on the whole, new., -comers to i t *- : This;: distinction . :> -A-
is very, clear in Jahiz s essay on the Turks.. That 
he compares these to the khawarin is very significant.
. Here lay their danger, as became- apparent in the fbllow- ;
ing reigns.: : They wer'eyhurriedly introduced at a time , ■ A. - 
' when the; admini strati on was. lacking in able men and 
sound policies. The danger , was- the mor e serious as . . . 
y it was the caliioh who, in order to guard against region- A.y
AAy; alism and allegiance to direct commanders, had to rely , : hi;
more, and more on:these new elements. Their.threat 
y A. would in time, be directed against the Caliph h i m s e l f . ^ '
1. A C. Cahen: The; Turkish: Invasion, ypp. 135-7J, Barthold: ^ ’
. Turkestan,pp.180-203; Prye and‘/Say 11i : Turks in Khurasan .,
; : A..; and Transoxamia.AppwAi80-203; V; : - _ A ' y_ v
: 2. Jahiz: Manaqib: also Tabari, p.l067j Taffur: Kitab: Ay : :' ■;
' .; C Baghdad V I . yn .12 (Keller), p -i80 (Kawthari) .• It is inr
tune with this ;change to professional soldiers that 
;. the discusslons here’ Were about efficiency - not . simply ; A,
y 1 oyalty as was__ in the. past.' (Ibn al -Muq af f a: . Sahaba) '
y y; 3* A;'. To-eliminate Tahir bv. al-HusaynyMa’mun. had . to resort y;;
A t o  hi s being secretly poi soned despite the. fact that
yyyA y • Tahir y had op enlyy defied Ma * mun by omitting hi s name;,A . :v,
A ; from the Miutba. . The killing of Harthama b. A 1 yan 
, by M a 1 mun was the. cause of a number of hevolts. Tabari, 
r > p p # 1014-2, 1062; Y a 1 qub i A Buldan, pp. 90-a>>Balat mi ,1V,. - 
A . p p .30ii:-6, 521. A • , V ; : ,h.A;
: B.I. ; s.v. Mutawakkil. . , a - ^  /A/:; a vy.
' h The dependence: ,on the military elements>-more precisely ;
/ - HAythe'introdubtibn Apf theATurkish elements into the army, ,/y ■ /AAAA-AA 
\ ; -rib c ominorily he Id as Mu’ t as i m f s gravest mistake.—  Yet ,
:A;A A/ all • the evidenoe show that the .whole change as well. as 
• • -the introduction:.,bff the Turks in the army had .taken?'-A’ bA- ’ yA^ -AA^ '
; place under , Ma1 mun.^ Prom the description of the y AA y;y^ AA"};A-a /A
: : ky writers, of the period the Turks seem to have been the
best elementb for the purposes of the ..Qaliph at/thetime*>- y:v.^ Aa/a/ 
A; A Jhhihf S; essay mentioned abGverefers to a discussion -
“Ah',;- Aprbvoked by;.a question posed/hy Ma’mun to a ,group of
A ,militaryrcommanders, as to whether they would prefer, to 
A: ; ; A; meet a hundred , Turks or ; a hundred kh&ri .jitlf in war* r \ A ;y
They al 1 agreed on the form eh exc ep t for HumaidAb. (Abd 
al-Hamld who preferred to meet. the kh&ri ,1i t o : • The 
A essay then; goes oh to enumerate, the merits of, the Turks - y A y
Ay\ AahAsdldiers* Most revealingAin'y connectibn with the. AM:Ai
ques^ rule ,ib :the passage where 3ahiz ' : A A A
says that rule, al-Mulk /needs pov/er which would augment A A; A: AaAa '
yvAvvA:i3AA:i^A y add .to-its . stability and splendour and defeat all
A;AXAAAAoAA • -A' - y ■ -’A ■ , ' 'A-A; X ■ . ■.-:'A',y - ■ ’ : ^'Ay/AAAy/
yy/-yyA--y ycauses encouraging to cove^ting it* This-was more or -a-‘A' ;.:A’
;A-' A .less:the;prohlemyconfronting Ma'mun. ,. ■ AAaA
'":;AA-^-i'*y : Khudari: Muhadrat:. p . 2hl; H.I.Hasan: Tarlkh II,pp. A v :AV; A ‘A
A : A -A^ y^ A a: 171-2; cf. Chapter III below. —  AvA'Ay a /A ' A : - '
AAa'-A'AA vA2A:yy'h.'.^.buge2habpve - : ' .• '-A'AA-.' a;. : ' ' A//-a A' ■ -tA^AA
yyAA AAA/XhA.Mahaqib *' p.h-5. AAa-AA- -/aAA.. . , A:;\ . ; • a-aAaa;
A This move away from veteran soldiers is clearer 
in the high, ranks. Here M a 1 mun was looking for men. 
whom, he -could, trust.. The, way was prepared by,;eliminating 
; the old q ommander s • Hart ham a b • A 1 yan; wa s ■ ki lie d.
J\b u . al-Saraya whom: he had left in command of, his troops 
; in/lrad' defected ahd; was eventually killed too* Tahir 
h.. ai-Husayri who had been given the governorship of , , 
khurasan,died i n .dubious circumstances. / I n  their 
plapes there were Mu*tasim.. the Qaliph*s brother and; A ;
1 Abb*as the Ga 1 i p h f s son* . There were Af sfcTn and. Maziyar A 
. who was a new convertAt o ■ Islam and who owed personal . A , , 
allegiance to M.afmuii* It is perhaps not so strange 
to find that the only survivor of these veteran 
Acommaiiders, 1 Ujaif b. ’iuibasa, was to meet the same: A •:
fate under M U 1 tasim. Yet even more of the men who were 
to dominate the scene in the reign of M u ’tasim had begun 
.their careers; iii, the days of. Ma ‘mun. Tabari mentions.
in this period the names Bu^ha and A£hirias together with
‘ A ■ ■ AA?A;" A  ,■ ■ : A . A - AAAA--- ' ■' A 2 ,
/ that, of MuVtasiit who is often mentioned v/ith his /Turks. ,/
He; re ports an incident when Iviu * tas im with hi s Turks me t . •
!• Acf;*. E.M.Wright j B*abak of Badhdh; see chapter V below
2. Tabari, p.1067j T a jar lb al-4 Umam , VI, p. 437* :r ' .
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; some Kharij ite rebels. In the - engagement that followed 
M u H a s i m  was about to receive a mortal wound from one of 
^ h e  gharij.ites : had it not been for. the intervention of 
one of his Turks who, running ' to lu* tasim1 s r e s c u e s a i d  
in his native tongue mara*; It is toldAthat, mare; meant 
>; Mknow me11 and/that the person who said it was no less a/.
. person than.Ashihas the great general of Mu*tasim.1 A 
The story could be taken as ah illustration of the relation 
between M u 1tasim'and his Turks, as a tribute to their 
- S.Ip.jralty-. and .valour.* as a projection of the later career 
of Ashinas or even as a dedication from ^ ahari to; the ;
Tatter having; been his contemporary. But for the. /
student of Abbas id history it. illustrates the fact t ha t ;
;; thev;advent of the Turks had already begun, under Mh'rauh* " 
f / If the introduction of new elements in, the army by : ;
M a 1mun and in greater n$mber s by *M u 1tasim, was thus a
necessity,, their preponderance in state matters later 
ban .not'.bcf explained without analysing the serious 
problems which had beset the Abbasid administratioh in r
previous reigns.. In taking this into consideration,
I . -  ' S e e  .'abp.V:©., , ; pv’jiS^ h .
;AAA:h;;y:yy;Ay;A;;;A‘;y^ A/-/A A / T 4 A
. a ttent i on mus t be drawn to high ranking /off icials , . '
• the wazirs axid those v/ho rose, to ' similai* .status •, /A 
A A The influence • of Sassanid traditions together with the . .
• A. ;-;A-; sup p o rt they liad. from -the religious circles gave the //A :
A AAfe^ .power than that of the Umayyads.^
A./. ; : j / .Ain’//practice ,/howeverthe. secllieionof the Galiphs y , -
A .from direct contact with, their subjects gave;,the wazTrs A A; :
A v, :■. /' tremendous .power in; day to day matters as well; as in
A;/;' state/ affairsh v This/ was the cas e even under, caliphs AA A
A- like, a 1-Saffah’ and. al-MansUr• The wazTr s were not. .*
. .merely the heads . of sex^gices but the initiators: ofpolicies. A
/ : Iii certain cases they seemed.to have made their, power felt -A--"
: /. more than that of the caliphs. . It was .this that made
A A, Bashsliar b .; Burd call upon the Umayyads to arise against A: AA  ^://
. al-Mahdi declaring-..that . the caliph was Ya1 £ub b. Dawud, 
a 1-Madi* s Wazir *. . The splendour of The Abbasids is v :;Ar; . A . 
A ■ always connected with the/ period of the Barmecides*^
..In f act; Ibn al-Tigt^cja uses the same word Daw la in 
A A .relation to both Abbasids and/ Barmecides. - . For the A a
former it meant the state or Caliphate, for the latter.
/ ' A 1. Gib by interpretation, pp. ‘45-6. A ; /
2. Tabari ,/ p.508._ ‘A\
. 3• A&.I* • s.v. Bar*amika. v / A'A'-v,' .A •••• Av-'
4^ ai-gakhri , pp. 201, .269* ' A A-a A ;/AAtA A :'\.
.it meant the period of office and influence.; Yet 
even so the use is significant for the suggestions it 
provokes: because of this the decline of the Caliphate
should be traced from there*
Commenting on al-RashTd.’ ivias'udi relates “his 
state-affairs deteriorated after -.the Barmacides; his 
poor administration.and,bad policies became obvious to 
the people*”1 The same opinion is expressed by 
Jahshiyari** It could be asserted:that the affairs of 
the state had-in fact' depended more <on the calibre and 
devotion of these' men, the wazTrs. than they did on those 
of the caliphs.1' Yet despite their influence and power, 
or perhaps becausev, of them.y the careers of the great 
wazTrs had ended,in', disgrace or death or both. This had 
been so since the time of Abu Salama al-Khallal whose 
death underi/a|-Saffah-evoked the cynicism of the poet who
declared, “let only him who~so: bears malice towards:you — :
'4 1
or one - be, wajTr.”1 The death of Abu Salama could
1. TanbTh. £.346.’ '
2 • wa fT^Kuttab, . Jahshiyari himself
belonged to the Kuttab class .and■••'might-•■■R'av.fi-iKfffl h-i q 
reasons for saying this. Mas,udi was. not of the
The opinion expressed is. thus . not lackinp* 
m  support*
3 • Ibn gutaiba, , VUyun al-Ak_hbar, I , p.45
4. Tabari, p. 60~ :
perhaps be explained by the necessities of the 
revolution or as a result of his alleged pro-’Alid 
tendencies when the-Abbasids had yet to make good 
their claim for power. All the same the prophecy of 
the poet' was fulfilled in the fates of Ya’qub b. Daw|£d, 
the Barmecides, al-l'adl b. Sahl and others* , In each 
case there were the court intrigues, the struggle for 
.power by those who were possible alternatives to those 
already in office and the fear of the caliphs from their 
too.efficient and powerful wazTrs. But this was all to 
the detriment of the administration. It suffered from 
the loss of able men .and the interference of. incompetent 
caliphs like al-RashTd. Invariably there was the .change 
from' the able to the mediocre as was the case in replacing 
Yahya. b. Khalid by al-Fadl b. al-Habi* • The. change of 
men was followed by changes of policies ■ and power . 
groupings.* It had its effects on administrative efficienc 
aiid. on the unity and general cohesion of' the state. These 
problems became clear after the fall of the. Barmecides 
whose disappearance marked the. end of good and unif ied 
^administration :ixi the Abbasid state. Their success was
1. see D* Sour del, Le Visirat Abbaside. I &  II*
due to their ability, their loyalty and devotion to
the Abbasid family. It had,also been due to the
fact that they were a family which had almost all the
.administration under its control. The members of
the Barmecide family were loyal to one another^ to the
Abbasid state in general and to the caliph in particular.
In the name of the. latter two they attained pov/er and
glory. This aspect of the family is very important*
Again and again it played an important part,in the unity
of the empire, the unity of its administration and in the
fates of Galiphs and minor dynasties. ; Up to this period
one sees this with, the careers of the Barmecides, the
Sahls, and. the Tahirids. Later - it will be seen with the ■ *
S*amanids, the Saf far ids and the Buyids • (On a different 
plane it was to be so with the Seljuqs and the Ottomans.) 
Sourdel points out that Fadl b. al-RahT.’ could not alone 
replace the family of the Barmecides. Jahshyari
indicates the negligence of provincial matters in Baghdad.
-A 2under. a l-Raj^id following the fall of the Barmecides.
In .the post-al-RasbTd period the problem was aggravated
by the growth.and consolidation of factions during the
1. Le Vlsira-h Abbaside . I,pp; 183-4*
2. al-Wuzara’. p.265*
period of the Civil.War* The war brought :the Under­
lying differences to the fore as it was also a war 
between the party of Padl b* RabT1 under Amin and that 
of Fadl b* Sahl.under M a ’mun. More important was the 
fact that they were virtually two independent administra­
tions fighting.each other. It was a period of an indep­
endent regional govemiment in Khurasan. A precedent was 
set for later times* The end of the war did not bring 
with it a return to- the earlier situation* The central . 
government never did regain that position* The same ,: 
reasons which made; M a 1 mun look'f or hew elements in the 
army made him do the same in the administration* His. 
mistrust o f t  he Khur'a s a hi elements is revealed by the 
fact that his move to Iraq, was accompanied, by a search 
for new men.1 It is also revealed by his statement in 
a discussion with Tahir b. a1-Husayn, reported by Tabari , 
that the. Rhurasinis.looked after each others1 interests*.
The unity and efficiency of the administration seen 
with the Bax^mecides did. not continue after them. The 
only hope was / that the Sahls. who had, been their proteges 
and trained under them, would carry on. But.the
1* ~ lie Visi^rat Abbaside. I, p.240.
2., p. 1042 , Taifur , kitab Baghdad, VT, (kawthari),, pp. 18-9 
3* al-Pakhri . p*304. \ """ — — -
' . ; ' " ' ; ■ : , , ■'// 'V.; ■ : 34
. same fate ...that befell Ma * mun • s v eteran c ommanders
befell his veteran administrators.. Pad! b. Sahl, Fadl b. .
.. al-Rabi * / Hasan b. Sahl, ’Ali b. Visa b. Mahan and . •
Tahir . b.. al-Iiusayriall die d. i n t he p er i o d o f M a 1 mun, .
,. some of them through his connivance. Thus in all 
respects It was a period of new men with nev/ ideals. : . . ■ y/
M a ’mun’s dilemma is best refleeted, in the fact that he 
used so many persons for the office of chief katib 
without getting any one to fill in the gap left by the V  / ;
death of Padl b. ■ Sahl•.***■ : On the death of Pad! b. SUhl-■ . v . .. . ■_ , . . .  1 ... '• .... . '
M a ’mun offered the post of wazir to Ahmad b. Abi Du1 ad;
but the latter refused saying that he had not known of . :
". s;:; r. ,.. ■ /. . V ' 2 •
. / any one who had. had that office and a safe life:.
: ^ 1-sUli .relates the .story of the quick and frequent.,change . ; ; : 
of secretaries in a very telling way. “The duration of 
; : the office, once a life-time, came to be; a year y a. month, . .
• ■' • ■ .•. - y  / . _  ■ 3 ■ ■ ■ y^--
a day and finally an hour” commented Suli*s informer.
It should be remembered.that the bureaucracy as such did ;
not suffer. On the contrary it was growing into a ' ;;
. distinct class of prof essional clerks (kuttab), who had
a 1-Fakbri , .p.304; Mas’Udi :' TanbTh, p.352 , also see H... /
Sourdel, op.cit. /
2. TanukhT: Hishwar ’ V 1 8*> P*29j; A.AmTn: 'j)uha,.,-p.l35* :;Y. ;■,,/•
, : 5. . Adab al-Kutta’b , pp. .185-6. " ’
their distinguishing attire, their* own training and 
literature, all with a marked esprit de corps*?'
St at e service in the army;a nd'admini stration had. 
thus.he come an open field for,career-seekers. The 
statesman administrator of the past was greatly missed*
In the beginning when there were great and influential 
wazlrs one finds most of Ibn al-Muqaffa’s writings,
especially his Kitab al-§a&aba, all dealing with :state-
■ : 2 ' • ' ■ ' ' ■ ’ . ; : . ■' . / 
craft. Later when the state service became a profession
for earning a living the literature produced was mainly
for satisfying the requirements of the routine of the
different Biwans;..^ By .far the best illustration , of
this development is Jahiz1 s treatise, where their.(the. Uuttafe
education, their dress and their manners and attitudes
are very ably described.^  ^ 1 '
• :• :'Th,ese problems of regionalism, of' the army and of
1. .Jahshiyarir al-Wuzara’,■ p p . 3 »• 126* 166;. dahiz£ D ., ; 
Dhamm Akhlaq al-Kuttab; \Gibb, The; Social Significance.
■ ■ TO. 106-7: D* Sourdel: Jahshi.vari .!■ no. 288-9s TanukhiV 1 
al-Faraj, p.100. They also /used to have Thursdays as 
free shopping daysj, This practice was stopped under 
Mu’ tasim. Jahshiyan, op.cit.,p♦166♦
2* Goi/tein, A Turning Point.: t o •/ 120-9, M.ICurd , ’All: ;
V ; Rasally pp., 117-34* r"' •/
3 * ’.See al-suli, Adab al-Ruttab; Ibn al-’Abbar; I’Tab al- 
/ Ku.ttab, Jahsh&yari, al-WuzarX’ w ’ al-Kuttab .Khowarazmi,, 
Maf atih al-"Hjlum. Tbn Abd Rabbihi al-I * Q.d . II. 
k* Dhamm Akhl aq al-Kutt ab, also hi s; M adh at-$u 3 3 TO wa-
amm *Am aT a 1-Sul t aii.
Y Y Y / / . & /  Y : Y / a ^
■ the administration, acute and urgent as they were, were./ 
not perhaps of the importance and magnitude as; the main ; . 
problem of which ■' they were partly the, results and not ■ 
the causes* As seen in Ma*mun’s policies that problem .
/ was on the: one hand the restoration to the Caliphate as;
the instrument of Islamic rule the power and influence . - / /: ;, ;.
; that- it/had before,?and on the other a solution of the _ 
question of succession in a manner which would secure 
for the caliph the maximum, if not complete, support 
from,his subjects* In attempting,a solution to this
/’•• problem -Ma’mun followed two distinct;policids;>; possibly- .
• three* The; first of these was an: effort to solve the 
problem of succession on a Hashimite rather than an '■‘■-/•Vi
’Abbasid basis. The choice of a successor was to be 
based on a selection from both 1 Abbas id and ’All d / / ":
./ - : f ami 1 ies, the two f ami 1 ies being t he representatives
of the Ahl al-Ba.vt^ , That this was the; first policy to 
be followed after the end of the Civil YiTar/ns significant, A { ;
since the war itself had been waged largely on the issue 
.-.•/./ of succession* Considering it with the other two policies : '
• / 1* see Gibb, An. Int erp ret at i on, and Government and Islam* / m 1
2 . Qalqashandi: Subh, IX,' PV3&5* : o- ^ : .T. Y
; V , ■:;,/3•.■■!/:! /'"v.-  ^ 11 / . " ”, E.I. s.v. Ahl al-Bayt*. //-'V :•/Y; f
■ •• ' *
- Y; Y M
. it also; shows the growing awareness -of Ma*mun of the /.-.
V.' real problem :of the Caliphate. The second policy
, ; //'.-'was the attemptat the ;creati6h of a s^ate ^-Pgma and ; : : ;
its propagation by persuasion, sanctions, and- sometimes fS
force. Coupled with the second policy was the third, . ■
which was the renewdl of the war against Bjrzantium. ..
The first of these policies has been the subject 
of a number of studies#.'1' But in these it is either 
; limited to the relations between Ma’mun and the fAlids:
■/ or explained on the assumed grouping of Arabs/ versus v ;/1 / //;; ;/ ■' 
Persians. , Duri in p artful ar treats it as such..
His conclusions, though hot very clear, are based on //:;/ / ,
the acceptance of the idea that the whole move, w as a v //:
result of the workings /of al-Fadl b. Sahl whose main 
/ /// move was the retention of power by the Persian elements /
in the Caliphate • In selecting his evidence to prove 
/ this idea, he overlooks .the fact that the sources he used 
were mainly Iraqi sources or influenced by such sources. /
As such these r e® re sent an Abbasid/point; of /view; , In 
/ Duri Vs work there is, no mention of M a 1 mun* s religious 
. / policy or an appreciation of his other policies in > Y. ;
1. P.Gabrieli, M a f mun e all 1 Alidi : Duri, ’A. 1 A. ’A .
PP. 202-10; A.Chejnf^^Succession to the Rule in Islam.;
, M.K.M.Ahmady; al-Khllafa wYai-Dawla. ;:_ / ■ /-/,:// •;
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, ; relhtiQh/\to7th^ ..of succession# It is /because
were hot all embracing :
or convincingY/ti^t:/ one^ia fbreed to look for other , /*///;;.
Y7Y:Y/ ■ '/explanations. YY J?hb;Choice by ,Mafmun of ’Ali :b# Musa . ■
Y  Y //dl^Hiffi^fory the/-suedessi6x1} could.be taken not so much YY;
c ;/. as. a strictly;pr0-’Alid,policy as a pro -Iiashimi te one, v
■//,.>; ^ designed; tp. r a X ^  state- ail/the, elements which in
7a77 Y. defeating:; th Umayyadshad brought the Abbasids 1 in power*2. .7, 
7/ 77 :,a Clothing ycohld^ reminiscent of the whole; anti-/ ’// V Y
7/.-. ! Umayyad movement than the name al-Rida which. MaYmun had Y'Y
YYY' ? deliberately -bhbsen for;-Ali^-b# ; Musa/, /; . in'full the name YYa
7' 7/ - / was blYRife mlhYdMYalYBayt - the. accepted one from
■ amongst the house of the Prophet - which had been the 
v. : / ;;; - rallying po int for . the / ant i -Umayyads b ef or e the dec 1 ar a t i oh 
: o f t h e  Abbasidfirst Caliph al-Saffah*^ Not only had 
Y v YY,;,. /theYcivil"War been af/ war'of. succession; . its end was . -;.:Y-
77:/ ; Y ; :f0^ 0^ e<^ Yby- a serie s of ’ Alld r.i sings * M a ’mun must ,
7 '  1 'h.av;e,->t/s'eh,/art,Iyr.,'/resp"oiidin.g to these in his first choice
1# Tabari ♦ p . 1013; Ta.iarib .VI, p.1735 y^IqashandX: / gubh* Y  
7/./, /■^ ; IK^pV362-6yBal * amh,IV,pp*3p8-10 / s.v.. 1 Ali b*. 7
,';..S-kY; :' •-.Y.Mffsa'Yar^i^*'''' Y- Y'Y' ' Y-Y- ' -'7 ■' Y  7-.■ . 7 ' ,  Y  
77;7 V 7 2* It is significant that, Ibn Khaldun calls the Abbasid 
r Y'Y Y ; ^ tatevaYShiYite/State* cf* ’ibar, III.pp* 170-3* ./ /
3* : E*d.(:2) ; sYyY^hbbasids & .’Allds; Duri*- ’A* fA * 1 A # .pp.l8-bQ* 
//AY ft*, T a b a r i t h e . ,  years .198-20U; also BaTami, IV, /
Y7;/ ; same vyears*;/o;/dn /p*507Y Bai- ami reports that Padl7b* 7
Y /Y ' Sahl/ told,/HMa’mim; that/■'all the uprisings were caused by '/
77/ 7, . /the YAlids and'their.; supporters*/ v - • ///7\ *’7 /'" ' ' ’ ;
of a successor. Butlvla’mun's relationswith;fhe//*Aiids 
'; were not merely a question of policy •• His prp-’Alid 
feelings seem to have been very genuine.^ , He/ maintained 
7good^relatione with the, .Alids throughout his reign-afth 
advised his .xtltimateAsuQcessor Mu1 ta§im to. do / the same#
: Tlius if the pro-1 Alid policy of succession was;/the /mark 
//bf/the^Marw-..-period'-the•’fact that Ma’mun had been consist­
ently pro-’Alid - irrespective of the succession/should 
: not be ignored* Nor ought i t .to. be ;ignofed tilat/Khuras an
was the real centre of the unti-Umayyad,/ pro-Hashimite
■ , ; ' /? A-/-/; ■ , ; A/ . * ■  ,• / ,/./-■"
feelings and allegiances. .''\$n-.his.' policies/arid/:speeches
in Khurasan. at the time of the Civil War Ma* muh was. 7
, hitting upon the problems which had in the first, place
roused |(hurasan against ther-Uma-^ada.-^Y-* • 1- 7/; : :
M a ’hun must have seen that while the ’Abbasids had
coke to power in the name of Ahl-al-Bayt;/. they had in
fact maintained-thelr position by their bureaucracy, their
armies and the reii^ipns colour which/they-gave to/ their
1* Tabari> -p-» 1102» Kamil, VI, pp* 309-10. /
2. ” / ;,/p*1139. - -/. v::-Y //7//, 7;/////,-- ://.:
3♦ , In /this; it was perhaps, more pro-’Alid than/Abbasid.
/ /// The frustration/of the ’Alids in. I r a q ;must have driven 
. themto Khurasan as it did to North Africa,// Al so ~ /
the frustrations of some of the Khui^ahis after .the 
f  ate .of Abxi Muslim must have made them/Susceptible ;to . :
/. "Alld prbpaganda* , See Ibn.; I§f aniyar, , Histofy of Tabaristan 
7 : and al-Qummi, Tarlkhi ffiuin • /., Even in Ir aq./ i t self v Ma ' muh 
relied o n  p r o - f Al id suppor t er s lif^his/fight//against; Amin*. 
D i ’bil’s/poetry makes /this clear / and illustrates some of 
the p r p - ’Ylid^ feelings of the time.  ^See/ his /Diwan or 
. : Bustani * sy Muntaqa.vat» pp . 120-3 . 
h./••’ Tabari, pp."~77h, 796. ' , h  - "'-7';///
rule .through- the /good relations which they maintained 
with the ’ U 1ama * class*^ ;7.,He must have seen too.thaty *
. n otonl y did their political rivals, in the-hlaim to 
Ahl al-Bayt develop into a religious sect hut that even 
/t&e:\-U:mhyya4s had/at the time some following, as', there was 
talk of the I m a m a W  of Mu'awi.ya. It was this surge of 
p.ro-Ukayyad feelings which made MaVmun proclaim against.
Mu * aw i y a?. and thr e a ten., all ’those who spoke; i n hi s f avour.
• 7 A . ' X ■ • ' ' v- 7'"' '■/
;with severe-punishment* All these factors with the
-•••■'Civil’ W a r  in tHltackgpouni and other development s in 7
his reign .must have awakened Ma’mun to his precarious
dependence; .upon the bureaucracy and professional armies/
and made him search for a more solid and lasting basis .
/ for the Caliphate♦ ■ Y  ? / • ' ;7
Thq. pro-’Alid policy of succession failed* It
Aqlashedwifh the/very powerful allegiances .which the
7"TAbbbasids h a d  already .established. Abbasids ,,and pro- 7/
Abbasids elements had naturally seen it as .a/preference
for the ’Alids to themselves* Peeling that the
realisation'^of this would rob them.of their vested interests
1. A.AmlhJ'/Duhui', 'Xf :'V»37kl GIbb: An: Interpretation, p*ft5 7V
2. , see JahizT.Nab it a : Pell at, Le Quite . de MU *‘ik wl vavwl y a *
PP *53-67;H* Zayyat, at-TashayvTO'l'i .MtY awlya* ~ ~ ^ " 7
3. ^Tabari, p.*1098; ;MasTudP/Vf j *: PP• 90,93; Taifur:'
hi taMBaghdad ,VI * (kawthSirI) h b . 45-6/754*7 7 .. :/
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f hey/btobd against the move 'to . the:‘fextbhtAp^/;puttIng ; ;
up/a/riyal/chliph in the person of MaVimnYs^unele, - ,
l6rahim:h*\: ai-M'ah'd/i.*^ '^  - Although Mas’udi, reports that - 
Ma*niun ,hadmade a; census of the members of/the: Abbasid 
•family', in . the;; year 200/815-6 and' found1 them to number 
33000'persons, the caliph seemed nevertheless .-to. have 
misiihderstoddhlieir power/and influence.,2 It is ;
essential/here vto remeiiber/that^^ the/real - opposition/ to 1 
the move centred; around Baghdad and.- the 'Bakhdadis. /•-■.-* /  ^
3esides hein^.',thb/hentr<e of Abbasid power. Baghdad .saw ’ /-
in , the mo ve , t he; p o.s s lb llity. o f  the, f in al t r ansf er of 
, the/capital to HarwwheiBMa’mun was /at/the. time*?/ /
-Ihe/climate. bf religious, opinion was, moreover, influenced 
by/; the ’U l a m a ’ whose/power, and influence' were/much en­
hanced by the Abbasid Caliphs.; Their interests, and 
teachings were .against, M a 1 mun* s policy which/might have., 
had;:;,lt /succeeded^ fostereh/Sffl fI . interests in all fields./ 
//,/ ; The opposit ion of Baghdad made the dangers of the 
attempted changb/of t h e ;ruling .dynasty /and the ^ possibility.
>1* .Tabari, p .I0I3 / ^ hnd events of the-years 261-4; Mas.’udi , 
/'/ VII, pp., 6Q-1;/Bala1 m i . IV, pp. /5IO-5. / 7 , . / . ■1
’2. , Mas’udiyiIY/p;.59*7 rSrobably. that was the number of 
. A' the Abb as /and not thb Abbasids;/such a'big number
must- havo; Thcluele'd the descendants1/ of al™1 Abb as and,
.Ay their" c'lie3atsl/;/V;;, •■/.*/:'• ;/:7y/, ..A. A/// • ■ /•""
3. / 8$ehpagg: l^A above,/for fhe posit ion of the. Abbasids/
/ /• in/Baghdad^ bee/ Ya* qubl: Buldaru a .4. ./; < ,
of the change of the Abbasid capital very clear to 
M a ’mun* The result was that he had to abandon both..
The death of 1 All b. Musa al-Rida: in 203/318-79 relieved 
him of the former problem. The problems in, Iraq with 
a rival caliph made him hasten to Baghdad, which, besides 
being the real, centre of Abbasid power, was cbrtainly 
a better capital?than Marw, so far away from the centre' 
of.Abbasid domains. What is important to remember is 
that Ivla*mun did not- nominate a successor after the death 
of'*All b.' Muea/al-Rida. A nomination was, made almost
at, the last possible moment when it was imperative for 
him to name- a successor. Moreover it was made not so
much in the interest of his family as in that of the
■ • ■, , 1’ ‘ ‘ 7 * *v h
State. / A  7 ' ' *
Thus Ma’mun’s policy of a succession designed to1 
rally to the Caliph and the Caliphate as the central 
institution of government for the Islamic .community, the 
necessary support failed. It had indeed made the 
position of the Caliph more precarious, owing to the 
antagonism which it had provoked. One notes that,
Ma’mun died without.even succeeding in rallying to him 
the bulk of the Abbasids,* as his;remarks in his last
1* See Chapter. II, below. , A  4- *■
: 7  ' - ; ,, ■ 7 ' / ; -  ' ' 4 3
days; show. , Nor was he to win over the other elements 
antagonized by that policy, esoecially the *Ulama1 
class hith the .influence they held, upon the people. In 
point of fact his second.policy,;the Mihna, /was to 
alienate, these even more*. Hence tlie question as to 
why he should do so if it were not for his awareness 
that the .Caliphate was * emptied of. its meaning*
The word Mihna is derived from the verb mapana, 
which means to test, 4to smooth, to purify, to scourge 
or to force one to confess to something which one did 
.not do or did not believe in.^ Applied to the religious 
policy initiated by Ma’mun and ended by.Muiawakkil the 
Mihna meant all these things. "Because of the two , 
latter conriotations it was. described as bid* a ( sinful 
innovation) ..^ 7 . . . '.
The problem upon which the inquisition centred 
w a s . the dbctrine of the citation of the Qui^n. / This 
in itself was a.corollary to one of the Mu* tazila five 
principles,^ which, based on. the transcendental nature
1. Tab ari, pp... 1139 *> . • - A . / ; A /•
2. . G-ibb; Government arid Islam, p. 120/
3* Lisan s.v* m h n. ’ 7/ .
4* Ibid. , this was of course-a late addition to the meaning
of the word Mihna reflecting Hahbalife attitudes. '
5,. B.I*(l}-,. s.v. M u 1"tazi 1 a. v
: ofGod,heldythat : God* s attributes were nothing, but. God
A,/-.. ■■ ' q/' //// . . * ‘ , , ./., \ / A  ' ‘ ’ /\: * ; ■//■ -
himself./ , All things except God were . created/ and 
/therefore/not eternal. Thus;was, the §uran. F o r -  
the Mu’ taziI&» to define, God1 s /attributes as something 
..other than God or to eleVate any of God’ s/ cPeation/to 
the level of/being coeval. with God;was' heresy. It was 
tashblR/( dhthro'Domorbhism) as they-called it. To - 
c.ail7t4e'-.Qurlin./e ternal, to c dll/it the •uncreated; .word.
v -.of. ;&pdf >was/to' subscribe to something analogous to1 .
,s y. v . .■ o  . " •  -- ■
’ Chfisti.ah be.llef s as well.v . (Jesus,- the. word of God,
, was utepnal.) /. The/principle of propagating the tfue A / 
"faith or of ..correcting wrong beliefs wad held, to be v . ;
;.the,^hty Of every Muslim/end. Jhe'more so of the Caliph"
. by virtue . of. his po si tion and/.the/mbans \; at,; his disposal../ 
/■This -was/ opnimpn/to .■••all .'the. different schools of •Muslims,. 
But neither/the ;&ailph/h6r....any.1' in,stituted:bo dy had b e e n 7 
-•given/the right -or/ claimed to haVe thq:;right;/to' deterniine 
what true faith was 1et alone force people to/accept/it.?
I. 4 alAfeayyatr ;kltab al-Intisar, pp . 13-4; al Ash’a ’rT :*/ 
A"" Maqalat. p p . !69-70; al-Shahrastdnial-Milal »p .28: 
7/ /; : MaB'Xudi/ VI/pp*.. 2Q-1 / -Ibn : al-Muf t.ada: Tabaqat ,p ♦ 2..
, / , Z.ii. Jar Allah:* ul-Mu’tazila, pp# 27-8-7 A. Amin:, Fair;< , /  v i - im**— ><up -rtf ruinw r ^ * r *
/ J »PV343 * Trltfon:/;Muslim< Theology, p.79*>
>2* Tabari , p.1118; Becker; Islam Studfen/ pp/ 442-3*
• 3* .Some/of/the,’ Shi’ a ‘ such as the IsSS’ilis did,/cf *>*
'/;/, B/Lewis/ Origin of Isma’lllsm. ,v , 7. ‘ • v :
Moreoy er/the; prThe iple of /tbhcreation of the §urfan /;// 
ran contrary to. the; accepted belief of by far the /V
greater number of. the Muslims/ learned and lay alike•
These had so far faithfully followed the traditional 
school of learning, which embraced the/majority of 7 
the /’Ulan®1 : class. For them /: to declare that, the ' ■/. 
§ur-an was created was in effect to limit the validity 
of. its message. /... 7 7 //77:-/■/>. 7
; ? Like the: Yest of 'other Muslim religious' schools the 
M u ’tazila based/their teachings on the §ur1 an and the 
Tradition,.- 7 / ih-which they : were .very well versed. But 
unlike them they were not an inward looking group - 
they did not; seek their proof s.: from wit hi n t he § ur1 a n 
;and7Tfh4i-tIbh*...;:7 The y had knowledge of Bib Xica1 and 
Persian religions• What: is more they were amongst the 
first Muslims -to learn, use. and spread. Greek'philosophy 
and its sy stern, of logic. ; Here.lay their pride and ' 7
boas t . because' t he y c laiined t ha t f hey alone tie Id ftie ir 
belief no t . s im p 1 y on: Naql - Transmission but also on
1. E.l. (2)7cf ., Ahl al-Hadith/ 7a„7v /7?/Y' Y  '
2. To the Tpadition the Mu1 tazila app11ed scholas11c . .
; reasoning’/'ticcept ing or re j ect ing it. it is to be
; 7 .remembered t ha t : t tie T r a di t i. on i s t had already started
/7;; th'e; application;.of /the.: reliability ox^  otherwise, of : 
the Ishad - chain, of transmi11ers - in accepting or .
; rejecting Traditions. This was in itself a step
towards, the applica.tibn of sc tiolastie - 'reasoning.; which
// 7 the-Mu’tazila-: :used#/ ■■//':' :77//'//AA ‘7 7 /
— 1the rational use of Kalam» And by doing so they put the 
case of Islam in the same way as their opponents in 
other religions were .putting their own. It does look 
as if the development which led to the formalization 
of dogma "by the Mu1tazila was to a great extent a 
response to challenges from other religions, and not 
to other Muslim schools. . In this the nature of disputes,; 
the argumentations, and the then current religious
polemics show that it was.more in reaction to Christ-
'' • . p —
iaiiity than to any other religion. While Islam had
won its. way, against the Persian dualistic religions
and the Sassanid empire, the Christian world - Byzantium -
was still the arch enemy of the Caliphate. Within the
Caliphate Christians, through whom amongst other things
Biblical knowledge, Greek philosophy and theological
thinking found.their way. into Islam, prospered and
wei»e challenging the cause of . Islam. They held quite
influential places in the administration and .society
as secretaries,.clerks and physicians*^
1. Jahiz, Nafyyal-TashbTh, p.285;, al-Khayyat; Kitab al-• mm ■—  ■ ■    am w in ft II iW 3)BS— m  *  ” m  M
Intftsar. p. 15; of* Anawati and. Gardefc: Introduction a 
la Thloldgie. pp. 46-52*
2* Jahiz: Risala fi al-^Radd ’Ala al-Nas’ara, pp. 17-19.
3. Ibid* . .r~ — ; ~ ~  '
7/ In fofmhlizingtheirdbgmp and arguing/ t he ir case ; 
/against Christianity? the/Mu ’• tazila appear unconsciously 
Y^o/'tiaye been oarrying^^n-'ttie./reiigidus struggle which 
rZTObaatriatiism; had beeh; fighting Against the same 7 //■ 
religion. under the Sassanids: at a time; when the in­
fluence of the Biblical religions A n d  Greeki philosqphy' / 
thr eat e ned t he unit y of their state * . T he Cali ptia te
had inherited :the. position of the Sassanids vis-A-vis;
: Bysantiurn .in fhe, military and political spheres. It 
/is/AlsQ/interesting to note that it wastAbd Allah, b. al 
/MugLuhffa* ,/who, before the Mu’tazila , ha d pro pose d to 
al-Man^'ur to write something like a catechism f or the /. 
Khurasan! soldiers and that;the Sassanids. had resorted ■
. to7 Borne thing like the Mihna -then religious /differ enc eh 
Amongst their subjects threatened the basis^dnd power;. / 
/ ^  The principle of al-mangila bayn
ai-manzilata,yn. the, state between the two s tateC, which/ 
sparked off the rise/of the M u ’ tazila is in a way ; 
/reminiseeit/TO of the golden mean of the 7
ZpPoastriahs despite the differences in applicafIon and 
the purely. Muqlim /argument at ions put for the/ former. 7
/1///Za'ehherDawn and Twilight of Z o r o a sir i ani s m . p p. 17 7-8 
2* M.lC.Ali: Rasa1! ! , pp/217-134; D.S.Goitein: ;A Turning 
7 / Point:/rp. 1 2 3 '/-/:/ 7 
3* Zaehner , Dawn and. Twilight* p. 186. 7/*;
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groups are the stress on reason - a reasoned faith V, 
tlie intolerance "towards sin - evil uncdmproLtipihgly; / 
abhorred- v-:-,and the.- attitude to worldly life' common to: ; . ’ 
both despite their' extreme puritanismv|; ^But^thesd ; are i-'• . 
only analogies at once tempting and di^fiduit.^ 
substa rat'ia t e * ^
What:ci;S‘^ c ^  that; in inditing
Ahmad b. Abi Du^ad to carry on with" the Mihna^.-Jahiia: , r 
-•.constantly •refliind^dv-him of the time-when thcih^ opponents
used every means, they, could to stif le M u 1 tdzilite
3 * 1 1
views. Ihus the view that the Mu’tazalife: theology
represented the ^ official theology of: the Abbas id move­
ment is not only cl^aiidiiged by the-views that show where ; 
the religious baqti;^ i4y:* •..but also by
dahiz*s reference to former persecution of the Mu1tazila. 
Moreover the Mu’tazila were not all agreed on pnl i t.inai 
affiliations* : ..-.Wha 1 e -1 he pr 1 nc ip 1 e Imam ate doe s no t 
appear amongst their principles the, whole,tone of their 
teaching show that they regarded it as a means and not an
1- Ibid.*pp« 289-91. ■
>:suggests ; that the M u !tazilite school could; have
Shu1 ubiyya
^^IJcrdtU^c. i Q l b f e ; he.:-Bodia I fBignil* 1 ca nceihi 112 :
idem;: winterpretat . w  :
3. IMafyyal-Ta_shbIh p.265. ■
.4* ; :shoi;ter.^.K.4&• Muitazila. Tritten .does not aecept
this view arid points • .put that. the. Md* tazila were called 
:■? the Umawiyya; somet imes*.; Muslim Theology .pp* 60-1*
obligation* It is enough, to remember that for them 
;• even prophecy - itself was not necessary' as man was by /' ■-f
nature good' and hence capable’ of knowing right'from 
Wrong. • \ \
It is equally difficult to accept the view that the : :
. ;M u 1tazila were of political;origin.^ Because of their
attitude, to the Caliphate and because of the development 
' which brought them into being it is more; reasonable to , : V
see them as a school of thought springing up from the
V: strictly religious school of Traditionists which they .
so vigorously came to oppose. True that their du'at v'
(agents) were very active in Khur'as*an spreading Islam . .
and anti-Umayyad propaganda which served the Abbasid ;
, j c a u s e *  But it is to be remembered, that ^ that propaganda -t ' *: : 
v/as not so much pro-Abbasid as it was pro-ihl al~Bayt; 
for the M u 1tasila it was for .the just rule irrespective
... of who the daliph was to be. , M a fniun whose feign ' v^:
: marked the .advent of the M u 1tazila was himself ; pro~Ahi 
;■ al-Bayt and hot exclusively pro-Abbasid. It is also ...
1 ; clear that, .the M u 1 tazila held the princ iple of §adar,
'Free. Willy upon v/hich. they based their extreme attitude
. 1.. EwI. (1) s.v. M u 1 tazila• h.. ./■
V ' f  S V ; : V . V ‘ v;:v•'> v V V V V V " ;:h -':. v - > V ; V ' - V - . V , : ■ c V S S
' .' - to sinners (and. hence the; Jus tipe of. God , in punishing;. .
" / ' ; which ha^d:greht; influence in the revolts in
&icL the Zaldite Shn’a of fhnnJahmi-v^a 
; ; : ; who] as Muhhabbiha : (anthrdp'omofphists); were- regarded as 
V i heretics \b yV; t he Mu11a z ila»V : . VV; - ,. .;;VV"iV V
TheV eiiiergence of the Mu* tazila was not the out come 
■ V '; p f p o 1 it ic a 1 c if c um si a nc e; b u t V t he" r e s u It o f : f e 1 i g i o u s -
; V;i; ^  fnd; disputes* But their 'pise ,tb VhbwdrV;:
;;; ; ; V , u n d e r M a 1rathiahd then under Muf t a s im a lid Wat hid wa s : V V;- „
; Vpoiiticai* V M a f nrnn .declared his belief inthe prineipie 
;; ; of the cfdatidh ;of the ;gur^ ’ an- in the 2i2/I^7^&,V-the'- ypar*.
■ V ;,/■;ih;whf^ the cursing of Mia'ewiya :* But it
. ' was only lh , the year of his death, that
he tried to force that /dectrine;upoh;!the u^iama1: a n d  .
• V; upon all ^ Muslims. V; That policy earne at a :
time when M a rrnun;was facing serious, troubles in Egypt / ; V
and; unleashing vigor bus campaigns “against Byzantium# f ^ V; ;■
V;V;;-VV.;V Why: should M a ’rnUhVpursud ;sueh,; appolicy at; such, a time? ■
Why did doVeh^ corollafy;:rather, than a major principle
of the Muitazilites' for the Mihna? Why,.did he direct  ^ ;
theVoperatipbV;aghirst a certain .group of fUlfema1 and 
not.; all the .Muslims? Wao vif : a purely religious issue V' V
or a political':one ; in r e l i g i o n  MaVmun could V
have been a convinced M u ’tazilite but one notes that 
it had taken him six years to reach the extreme 
position.of using force to impose his: doctrine. The, 
outcome of that policy, had it succeeded, would not 
have only been the correction of wrong belief but also 
the wresting of the State of the religious leadership 
of the community. In fact it would have meant the 
discrediting of the class of the Traditionistsrwhp; 
had so far expressed that’ aspect - of religious ,: . , 
leadership - on behalf of the community. There was in 
fact no religious .crisis in Islam* There was a 
political crisis in the Caliphate.and Ma*mun chose to 
solve it through the only possible and effective way 
in a Muslim community religion.1 He wanted to 
add to the office of Caliph the prestige of the 1 Ultima* 
class. This may perhaps explain the choibe of the, 
problem of the creation of the §ur!an. /Difficult as 
it was to popular understanding it was the best to ; ‘ 
choose from amongst the MuVtasilite principles and by 
relating ,to Christianity rally popular support. There 
was also the possibility'of az*guing for it from within
1. Gibbj ^Sde his uInterpretation” and his Government 
- : arid Islam. / :
the Qur'an itself* Because of its connection; with 
Christianity one - can see its relation to, the Byzantium 
campaigns and, Ma*ni5n* s refusal to accept a peace
■ ; • . . . • 1 2 ' : '■■■ '"'■■■ ' ■' , - ■
treaty with, Byzantium. , ' • .
MuJ^tazilh themselves were not united.in their, 
attitude towards the use of power in the propagation . 
of their ideas or towards being involved In the. services 
of the State, an attitude which--was also common to 
some amongst the Traditionists., . The first Ivlu * tazilites,
' 3
noted for their piety, had refrained.from both.■ Some
- .. 5 - *■
of these near to M a fmiln had actually opposed the use 
of compulsion advising that it.was bad politics:to do 
so - a fact which may add to the supposition that the 
key to the Mlhna was politics* It was only those like 
Ahmad'b* Abi Du’ad and Jefhiz who were parties :to 
advocating and. practising the use of force, under M a fmun 
as well as later*
From:what one perceives in Jahiz*s writings, the . 
causes behind the attitude seem to have been; a mixture 
of religious zealvindictiveness , love of power and . 
added to this a certain amount of free-iancing ,in writing
1 • T-abar i ,p.1112; J a hi z .;Habita, p • 121. : v
2. , * !t , p*1109> Tabari reports some of the terms offered 
by the Byzantium Emperor ;Vasiliev ,uByzance et les Arabes11 
' I,pp.l22-3._ ' \ -V V w
3 * al-Shahrasfcani; al-lvlilali,p.34 ;cf .al-Murtada ;Tabaqat
4* E .IvX2) s.v. Ahrnad b. A M  Dufad; ' V ,
,on Jahiz’s own part. It, is important to remember - 
that, the nature of the miracle of the Qur'an:> it's 
ii'iimitab.ility - had .been a topic of great discussion 
at/the time. I  he M u 1 tazila themselves, held different ;'*■ 
’^-iews. ..on- -this.,:-- But it was one of their great leaders 
al-Hazzam, ‘who 'advocated that its miracle lay in what 
it contained of prophecy, that as.faryas. its 'composition1 
(Ta'iTf )and form (Hazrri), were concerned these mightt have 
b e e n ,within the power of human beings, but for the fact
‘ . • y. - - . ' * - v aV''.- .. o
that G6d,.had f orbidden ’them from that (mana* ahum).
From this arose the,, theory of the Sarfa (distracting of 
the attention) to which Jahiz had subscribed. These - 
ideas could nolrbut have been related to; the question 
of the creation of the gur'lan. The whole problem can 
be regarded in reference to the Muslim-Ghristiah 
disputes on the validity and truth of their respective , 
religions.' >, y= - ;
Mu'tasim, neither a rau'tazili.te nor a policy-maker,
carried on with the Mihna on the advice of his brother
M a 1 mud and the pressure of Ahmad b* Abi Du'ad., Muhammad :
b. cAbd al-Malife al-£ayyat.'and others:, all ofwhom MU'tasim
1. Bee his Habita .or his Hafy al-TashbTh.- Here he is
■ . more, the Vpo'lit'ical pi^opagandist than the- religious 
'■> leader.- - 'f":
2. ai-Ash'ari; Map’alat , p.225.
,y" h^ad; inherited'/frbm ihe> entourage of. Ma'mun* y -
y, ;; /those isubjected, to;,the. Inquisition the most important y- •
! personality v/as Ahmad b* Hanbal, whose unyielding stand /;
1 , , In the face of: Ihtimidati on and .physical hardship ./V. y V 1V
"; / bonf irme d i heasc endancy; o f t  he 'Ulama c lass and their I 
'y undisputed prerpgative in matters of religion. . Questioned*/; 
y y y imprisbned,.^^ chained and'threatenedwith. death unless-he / yy 
y ; “ accepted t^ h e; doctrin^; pf ^ the creation of the ^uf ran,; he , , y :; 
I V/v‘'■ V was saved only/by" the/death of Ma'mfuh; who. ;could^ per ha pd^ ; "■
r ,'V have afforded tb^gd; so far. - Under Mu'tasim/ ihh'VHanbal.:--
y -became^ the: centre ofy the /ibsue. : \ It . looks; adythough y/ y s
; : . ythe/ducoess or/f ailure of the Inquisition wdss;een
/; depend oh the■ dtandythat Ahmad would make’,/ayfeeling vify
y V > , -  ;  ;yqbmradn;to hothypehde^ and persecuted. y  'From the y  V y ;
V "y,:,1‘timey df/-hi-s arrest and. imprisonment under Malmuh^ vahd ' ■
y ’V hie ehowihg do s i ^ ; ’of fg:iying way despite thy hardships , y y.y
:v , y/^  which/he^.faced‘and despite’ the fact that a; good number y
y v • /of others had in;pne/ way. or another given wayylAhmad
..... . *’ybecame a'/popular hero, d  The. inquisition was1 conducted.at" y •
. , 1. Ya1 qubi ./TarTkh^p;2Qif t reports, that'A^ad^.yAbiyDu''ad y •
/ ' f -/ • was *very: influential with Mu'fasim. ,. Mas1 :udi . ■ Tanhih .p.356
H '  , says thbt; Mu.Vbasim followed. the*school of ial-Hasan’ al-Basii 
. , in religious; masters ", £ purious thing for^sorneonewho
applied the Milina .cf • :,h.4 P. ;■ below. SUyuti ,p;.l33 ^ reports 
: . tha t; iviu 'tasim dr dered" te_acher s t o. i nc ludeVt he: do ctr inn of.
v y I the./Gre.a’tloliyofitheV’Qur'^n.-'when. instructihg;/children..
' c f .B. M . , p-. XVII. /; y  ;. v • V . I y  l ;.. y Jy\Yy'" / :.'! y. " ,-I, 
y  % • Ibn Kathir;a 1 -Biclaya ,X. p .334 >Abu Nu * alm-;HUlyat a 1-Awliya'
V > / yy-V: y 1 ;pp^I97"2oS^^ylbn/ Kathir. reports ythat . Ishaq b.. Ibrahim said 
/ V/yy V yl; ’t d ;Mu:* tasim; tha;t Vit ^was hbt/wlbe to-free .Ahmad b.Hahbalyf cr ’
; yi; y that would-mean his victory over two GaiiphSvBbth*are ■ 
yV. . - ".; yy. Hanbali te s dur c es. V ; y / • i - y , . ;  yfy/y v./ y-;.; ■ .yy;
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the court in Baghdad in the preserve of the Caliph, 
the notables and the guards. The questioning.>was 
done by Ibn ibi. Iiu'ad and Ibn al-Zayyat with the
• i '
occasional participation of others. Mu1tasim him­
self took no part, - that was beyond him - although
■ . p
he had some share in the scourging of Ahmad;. It
'lasted fox* three days. With- great courage and
resignation to martyrdom for his belief, -Ahmad faced
the questioning, the humiliation and the scourging which-
nearly killed him and did leave him with permanent bodily
injuries.. He would not recant nor be persuaded by
rational or fheolpgical. arguments but stuck firmly to
the letter of the Tradition without even attempting to
interpret its meaning or implication.^ , Meanwhile
public interest in the proceedings of.the inquisition
was gathering momentum. Ahmad’s stand became the
subject of, admiration and popular sympathy was soon.
translated into an open attempt to use force for his
‘. ■ ' r . . ■ . . ;'
deliverance. Even in the court itself some of the f
1. Abu Hu'aim, .op.cit. pp. 198-206, see Patton: The Mihna, 
.■ yp. 147-50. ■ . ■' v.-,. ■ ’
2. Abu Hu ’aim, op.cit. , p.206.
3* Ibn KathTr: op.cit..p.335.
4. ■ Only , Ya’qubi reports that Ahmad declared
that he would profess'the Caliphs doctrine including the
creation ofv the g u ’-ran. TainTkh, p. 156.
5* Abu Nu* aim, Ilijfflyat, pp. 204-6.
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array men weije showing their .sympathies with him* while
the Turks - the most trusted of M u ’tasim*s troops - 
never learned what it was all about•
•! The instrument which had been designed to save the 
day for the Galiphate was gradually turning against it.
M u ’.tasim, never convinced or interested in the affair, 
could not go on with the popular threat before his
'r ' ' ■ I . ;■
gatess He abandoned it. Ahmad was spared. In 
order, to still the people who gathered outside armed 
and* angry in hearing that Ahmad’s life was at stake,
M u ’tasim had to produce him.- well dressed to disguise 
his wounds and sufferings - to the croY/ds. That was 
the climax of the Mihna but not its end. Although it 
was ^ continued under Wat hi q it seems to have been over-
■". p
looked in the remaining years of M u ’tasim.
Having begun his policy of religious persecution 
simultaneously with the attempt at a-new wave of conquest
1. Both Abu Hu*aim and Ibn KathTr report that Mu’tasim 
expressed his intention to g.ive up the Inquisition
declaring to Ahmad b. Hanbal that it was only " V
: because it had been startecL by M a ’mun that Ahmad was ■
being subjected to the Inquisition. cfi‘ Ibn* a 1-Mu nt a da: . ' /
Taba giat .pp. 125-5
2. Tabari mentions nothing on the Mihna in his account of the 
reignjDf M u ’;tasim. On the contrary he reports that the
, ; Pu^aha* , inclu&lng Ahmad b. Hanbal - who had been subjected 
to punishment on that question were released on,the nev/s of 
the death.of Ma'mun. He does not say by whom they were ' ,/f- 
released. Tabari,pp.1115-6,cf.B.M.p.XVI.
S., Persecution*Y/as not new - cf. B.I.(T) JSandaqa.
■ -‘V n \ ' . • • ; . •
in Byzantium . - the third, policy, the aim of which was 
the revival of the -principle of - Jihad, -and1 through that 
to rally the support of the community of the Galiphate - 
.Ma’mun was soon to die in camp on the Syro-Byzantine 
borders in the Badrun-Podenus. river in the year 218.
He was....struck by malaria which brought a. quick death 
but left him time to nominate M u ’tasim as successor and 
.dictate his will on him. As will be seen ih ;the 
.fp.lldw.ing chapter this move showed much insight op 
his part in the affairs and problems of the Abb as id 
S t a t e \  More than anything 11 reveals the < onerous 
legacy which he left,for his successor and explainb 
•the: continuity of his policies;, in Mu’ ta^im’s reign.
1. It is worthy of note that Ma ’.mun sent for Afonad b • 
f Hanbal * and others to persecute them while he was in
frontier campaigns against Byzantium* Tabari, pp. 
1115-6.
CHAPTER . II 
Early .Life and Accession of M u ’tasim
It is difficult to.ascertain the date of the birth of 
Mu*tasim the1eighth Abbasid Caliph* The sources differ 
not only on the day and the month but also on the year.
It is peidiaps. not so difficult to know why. The birth 
of Mu ’ta$im unlike those of his brothers Amin, Ma’mun and 
even al-Qasim, was not of such importance as to deserve the 
attention of those who were interested in the births of the ... 
caliphs and the caliphs-to-be.. It was sufficient that ; . 
M u ftasim*s name got mentioned- amongst the many others of 
his brothers and sisters,.the sons and daughters of Hanun 
al-Rashld. By the time he became of such importance as to 
deserve the mention of the date of his birth by chroniclers 
..and. the like when lie became 'caliph or more likely on or 
after his death - the time of his birth was far behind and 
difficult to be certain about* So there were the differences 
in the sources. But the differences, are neither great nor
as far ,as one can see; -" important. Mu*ts§im was born in 
al-IOiuldJ - Baghdad - in the; eighth or ninth month of 
the year 1.78, 179 or ISO / 79U, 795 or 7961 . Called
1* Jabari, pp*1323-4; B.M., p.12.7; Mas’udi, VII p.144; Ibn, 
Kathir: al-Bidaya, X,' p.295* The differences can be seen in 
sources which mentioned his;age such as: Mas’udi: Tanblh 
P*353;Ya'qubl* III, p.254; Binawari: Alchbar 0.401.
al-Mu’ta^im 'bi-Allah, his name, was Muhammad, his kunya 
Abu Ishaq.
The same difficulty arises with regard to the origin
of Mu !ta§imts mother* Somehow it appears to have been
accepted to be Turkish. It has even been taken by certain
Yirriters to explain Mu’ta^im’s relations with the Turks.
Because his mother was a Turk he came to know and like the
Turks, collected numbers of them - so the argument goes -
1and gave them positions of power and influence. For this 
he is - alone - held responsible for the influence which the
2
Turks had in the destinies of the caliphs and the caliphate.
But there is ho evidence to support such a claim for the 
origin of the mother of Mu*ta§im. All the sources agree 
that his mother was not of Arab origin. Bo source mentions 
that she was a Turk. In fact her origin as far as race or 
nationality are concerned is not mentioned at all. The 
nearest thing to that is that she was of Soghdian^ origin..
It is certain that in Soghd as well as in many other parts 
of the ’Abbasid empire there were Turks. But one is 
^justified in doubting, even in rejecting, the notion of
1. H.I.IJasan: Tai/hkh, II, pp.171/2; Khudari:Muhadarat, p*24l;Duri
*A. fA./W  p.228;, N.AsIl: Madinat al-Muf tasim, p.l62.
2. Khudari: Muhadarat. p.214.
3* The description ^Soghdian** could be ethnic and hence mean
Iranian or could be territorial and difficult to ascertain on 
ethnic grounds. But since she was born in Kufa.it is likely 
that the term was used to mean Iranian. See p.@0 *
Mu*ta§im?s mother being a Turk on the ground, that the 
sources do not say so. Had she been so their authors 
would have mentioned it because they^mentioned constantly 
Mu* ta§im and his Turks and were aware of their significance ; 
in Abbasid history* Tabarimentions in a very cautious way., 
that Mu’tasim1 s mother was Soghdian."**.. Later* Muhammad b,. .
al-Hashimi^ who was interested in tracing, the origins of
' "f. , . -
the mothers of the Caliphs who were ummahat awlad includes
Mu*tasim*s mother but does not give her origin. . For these
as well as for?,the rest of the sources Mu* tasim*s mother
was a slave girl (muwallada) from Kufa. Her name was
Marida.^ ' This much is certain and is significant for
even if she was originally a Turk she must have been of the
. - '■ ■s , ' ' ’ o
Turks who settled in Soghd .and were thus far., removed from
the nomadic elements who were the sources : of Mu* ta^im’s , /
5 . 3-/ ■' '. . , - _ ■
Turks. Moreover not only: was she born, and bred in Kufa
1. fabari, p. 1329; JUM.., p.132./
?• al-Muhabbar» p.43.
>3* ‘32.I* 9 s,*v. Umm walad; IS.I. (2) s.v. *Abd.
4. Tabari;, p.1329;. E.M., p.132,;. Y a ’qubi: III p.197; Mas’udi 
Tanblh: p.352 ; idem, VII, p.103.
5. B.I., s.v. Soghd, Yaqut; Buldan. Ill, pp.94-3* Frye_and
?, Ayidin: Turks in the "M .B.. , pp. 19,8-201; see also Jabis: 
Maniaib♦
"but her father too had grown up in the Sawad*^ Thus the 
explanation of M u ’ta^im’s acquisition of the Turks for 
his army by attributing it to his motherfs supposed origin 
is as unfounded as it is unconvincing* Is it possible that 
a person like Jatdz who knew MuHaigim so well and who wrote 
a treatise on the "Attributes of the Turks" would refrain 
from mentioning the origin of Mu'ta^im's mother had she been
a.Turk? Would that not have been a valid cause of praise, 
knowing that the nobleness of the birth of the motherb was 
no longer as important with the Abbasid Caliphs as it was 
with the Umayyads? M u H a ^ i m ’s mother was very likely not 
a Turk* She was probably of Iranian origin as she wasi
described as Soghdian when she was in Irag.* The obscurity 
of her origin like the uncertainty of the date of the birth 
of her son show their relation to the court life and the 
affairs of the state* At the time of Hanun al-Rashld 
she was simply one of his wives as M u fta§im was simply one 
of his sons,, neither with a claim upon the Caliphate* Hanun 
al-Rashld already had three sons who were duly nominated for 
the succession*
1* Tabari.: p.13295 E.M., p. 132; s.v. Sawad, see Duri: Eco. v
Life of Mesopotamia also. Ma^udi gives his name as Shalib; I 
Murudi VII p.103* Both names of father and daughter are
Arabic names. It is interesting to note that while Suyufi
Akhbar, p.132, says that she was the favourite of al-Rashld ;
Ibn al-Sa*! does not mention her in his Nisa1 al-Khulfa*1""*at aXL
It is this uncertainty a n d ‘obscurity which surrounds 
Mu’ta§im!s early life and upbringing which are significant. 
Mention of him in .his father's life-time is very rare. It 
is certain that neither his father nor any of those around 
him had the slightest idea, that not only would Mu*ta§im 
become a 0aliph but In fact have all the rest of the Abbasid, 
Caliphs descended from him. With all the care that al- ^
Rashid had taken to educate and train his sons Amin, Ma'mun ?
and al—GisLm.as befitted the sons of caliphs M u fta§im had no 
claims to a. proper education at all. While his brothers 
had the best of teachers attending to them Mu'ta§iin was sent, 
to a madrasa like many other commoners. Whereas however, 
most of the commoners had some sort of education by attending, 
■regularly the.schools, M u fta$im was destined to quit the school 
at,a very tender age when he could hardly read or write. The 
story relating to;, this episode is amusing. It. is saidthat - :’i
Mu*ta§im used to. go to the school in the- company of a young, 
slave. The slave died. al-Rashid asked M u fta§im about 
the slave and M u fta$im promptly replied, that he had died and 
was,thus spared from going to school. On this al-Rashld , k
1. Suyuji: Akhbar. p*113*- Here he says "Some said that al-
Rashld kept the Galiphate away from his son Mu'tasim because.;
* M u ’ta^iim was, illiterate but. God brought it to him and made all' 
the rest of the Caliphs from his descendants."
** ' 'j - ' - ' • , vV, -'V
' ; : , ■ 6 3
said "and it has come about that you so. hate the school" 
as to see death as an escape from it? - By the Lord, my son, l y: 
you will not /go to the; school again." "They left him", 
the story goes on, "and he became illiterate. Elsewhere it 
is said that he used, to write badly." . . It is significant 
■that the story is related in these sources which are of the 
secretaries1 - Kuttab - literature rather than of the 
chroniclers'• As such it is relatively late. That should 
not,, however, make one discredit it, or if one discredits ;/>
the story one need not doubt the inadequacy of Mu'ta^im's , 
edueation. •Contemporary or near-contempory sources like 
Jahiz's writings or, the works of Tabari, Ya'qubi, Mas'udi 
and Ibn Qutaiba do not throw much light upon his education.
Their silence about this'important aspect is a plausible 
reason to suppose its absence* In this respect it is 
interesting that Mu'ta§im does not have much of a place 
inral-Aghanl which reflects the cultural tasie and education ; 
of the time* It is also significant that almost none of 
Jahi^'s treatises was addressed to Mu'ta^im in person. His 
part in the Inquisition .which reached its climax in his reign 
with the Mihna of Ahmad h. Hanbal, was a negative one., revealing^
1. Ibn Kathir: al-Bidavat X, n.295: Ibn al-'Abbar: I 'tab
.• :p;.58->V Suyuti: Akhbar, p .132j Ma<mzi: Kitab al-Suluk» I, p. 16# ;
not only ailack 'of5 Interest in ;tl^. intelldciualexploits! 
of-His brother M a rmum\and the;!M u H a z f l a ! or the; period in . 
general hut also' the, poverty of'his knowledge :ahd education. 
Ill .M&'J-mun’s life:hie own '---voice>■ was ; heard . in; hhe disputes, on 
the-creation; of the QurVan, not simply as the voice:;of the.'. 
Caliph who had the power !of the. State behind- him hut * equally 
£ h hb the voice qf the intellectual and passionate believer.; 
££££:; .Vlfe voice'-was^onlSr-- the,, voice., of power. The arguments
;■ £,£!■£ ^ were those; of* Apmad b • Abi B u f ad. Perhaps it is this
b  illiteracy- bf;rMu'tasim which the:«ppet Bi'bil meant! when he;.
! hhb as devoid of religion and mind.'*’ JEv
: f amous poem2 r of AbuTammam in praise !of •MU^taoim^'pn-.'his>
, ;victpry. in Amorium contains verses, which could be -understood 
!;!i .;! ; as;:;haying some allusion -to..- this;. >7 . ; v: ! !
!£%; h£,_v This; di stance from intellectual, arid! educated circles
‘ v1 in his, early -days.^may explain the poverty of information 
k-;/;. 'about that ...period- iniMu* tasim * sklife^, The re;,, are! some
! references which shpv/ that his , father who was not so keen.
£ r V y ! on his education;;was nevertheless, very fond of him.^ Some 
ch;! ‘V, more: reliable pieces of information show -that Mufta§im took 
v - !to ^ hunting at a very early age as the sources mention, this
1• -Muntaqayat, p * 123* :
; 2 . Ibid, p.71* ■, h
• ,. 3• Suyuti: Akhbar. p*13h;.
6to have taken place during his father’s life-time*'1' This 
information is meagre, hut from it one might,deduce that 
M u ’ta^im was endowed with a practical nature and that, as 
the son of a caliph who was known for his interests in wars 
and Jihad, M u fta§im took to giving vent to that nature in 
learning as hest as he could the art of war* It is possible 
that his childhood games, in which he indulged instead of 
going to school or taking to study, were dominated by this 
spirit of war „and ;]ihad. It is possible too that his 
father encouraged him in this direction, as he used to take 
him hunting when Mu !ta$im was hardly fifteen years old* 
Moreover perhaps having failed in the circles of learning 
he consciously or unconsciously felt that his chances were 
in the field of war* Here, indeed, as will be seen, was 
his genius.
The picture is no clearer during the period of the 
Civil "War. M u fta§im was young at that time. Unlike his 
other brothers and elder relatives he was not directly 
involved in the disputes of succession. Nor was he involved 
in the groups and intrigues of the court. It is difficult 
to know anything about his position and inclination in that 
period, important as it was. Up to that time he was far
1. Ya’qubi: Buidan p.32; Tanukhi: Nishwar, 8, p.28. The 
earliest date for Mu'ta^im*7^  birth is 1 7 8 A.H., al-Rashld 
died in 193 A.H.
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aWayrTroin -the' polities-' and:, pplicieivb-f the period* Ilis 
;chances for the caliphate were ■ nofe jret within sight* But " r J w .  
then he emerged in Ma’muh’s reigh with a train of Turkish 
soldiers*"1'. These are referred ;to. as his own. How and when d; ^  
he collected these Turks and for what purpose is not' told*; \ -;o':
As a prince he had the .wealthy to;; cbileet and keep them; " -
and pr oh ably hi s mi 1 i t ar y  tendencies, t bge ther wi th the 
•troubled; atmosphereof the; civir war were amongst the - .
causes. which made him do.;--sb:*' '--1. •What' is significant however :
is' that,.he emerged with; that power and command tot in ;the 
service' of the caliph Ma^mun but pn the ' side' of Baghdad 
and for the cause- of the Abbasids in the wake of Ma'mun’s J
policy for the .succession of; thal^Alid: All b. Musa al-Rida.;; * 
Gpuid he have seen his possibilities at that time? By ■then;' ■ 
al-Qasim».his, elder brother, who was to succeed Ma1 mun ha d 
been removed from the succession. . Snly*Abbas, the son of ; "
Ma’mun,. had a real stake in the problem of succession beside 
Mu’tapim himself. Ma’mun*s' uncles Ibrahim and Mansur - h 
sons Of al-Mahdi,- aronhd: whom - the ppppsition to Ma’mun’s SX 
pro- ’Alid policy was centered;/-and'withWhom 'Mu* ta^ iiii had \ : :
1. Tabari, p.1067; Ibn Qutaiba: al-Ma1arlfVp.198: Tadarib. VI.
; ,p.h37« ^rom this episode in which-Mu1 ta§im .with his Turks
.v arb: said to have met some.^arijite''rebelsone could^ see, 
f;that there we re. not many; of them. It is however significant;:;' 
that they ,were called the, slaves. - the;; possession (mamluks) - 
of M u ’tapim owing personal allegiance to him. ; ;
ranged himself for the time being, were older than Ma’mun .
, ' ‘and .were -not likely to- sdrvive him,, although Ibrahim in :
: ; fact did. Again, the; whole .tradition of succession •
■ .indicated that the odds were; against. M u f ta$im.^ All the
' same, M u 1t a§im .had lis chance r.emote as it was. Although .to - •; 
say that it was the drive .for the; Galiphate which motivated r
Mu’,ta$ im to take this stand is; perhaps far-fetched, it is . 1 r:i;
,:b , yet significant', that his appearance in at ate affairs was '. .
/ - .linked withvthe; issue of "succession.- ■ - p ; : : ; ; b -V'
- •' With the problem of ; the: H 1 Alid succession’* over ' after i
:: , the de a th o f ! Al i b. .'Musa. air-R&da^ one loses; track of M u 1 ta§im 
-tor a while. But it is perhaps not- far from the; truth tb:,'
. assume that he was steadily; and .gradually proving his ; 
capabilities as a military commander while collecting more 
and more T u r k s .. Mamun was: in great heed of him in that o-
it  ■;, period of revolts and changes in the army as well as the /;.p;j
^administration. :iMu*ta§im was of particular tmportance in 
;. this matter being a bi^other of the caliph in whom the caliph 
- had-great trust.2; It i s .to be remembered that although
■ . Mu* ta§i.m hadioppbsed. Ma’muns .^Alid-policy of succession he i .
; 1 *, See ■- A.; Che jiily The Succession to the Rule in Islam. The choice
: :v , after the. first four caliphs-wds: predominantly in favour of . ;>■’
"■the direct line .though in Actual fact the result was hot so: 
in many cases, especially when these-were minors or in absence
• \ of the direct line. ; . ; '"Vi '■ v \ v V  ' V-
; R. airKindit Ritab al-Oudat .0.119.
did not go to the extent, of supporting, the. rival , caliph 
Ibrahim * b. al-Mahdi • From what is known about Mu’ta§im* s 
attitude to this episode it seems that.he.was against this, 
move of Ibrahim. There is. evidence that M u ’ta$iBi together 
with ’Abbas, advised Ma'mun to kill Ibrahim, as.punishment 
for his'deed. There is also the fact that Mu*ta§im was 
not, as far as could be seen,> in any way. connected with 
Baghdad:court circles" and their intrigues in the. period 
after Hanun al-Rashld. All these factors must have commended 
Mu*ta§im to M a ’mun. Moreover.,. Ma’muh> handling his state 
affairs by himself was in. need of such men as Mu*ta§im to
. 2 ■ •' ' '
confide in.
Mu.’ ta§im*s star was rising.^ i-Ie: was ■ acquiring more . 
power and importance. He was given the governorship of 
Syria and Egypt (213 A.H. )^. Both of these provinces were 
turbulent at the time. Syria was a centre of anti-Abbasid 
risings•J . In Egypt. Copts as well as Arabs , were giving
1 • Tabari,. p .1076; Ibn (Jut aiba: ’Uyun al - ’ akhbar, I, p. TOO; cf • 
Ttoukhi: al-Faraj, p.1^5* . —
2. Mas’udi: Tanblh p.352.
3. Tanukhi: Nishwfr, 8, p.28. '
h. Tabari, pp. 9937.1100; al-Kindi: Kitab al-Wulat., u .185.
5. Tabari, pp. 1042, 1069.
6. TabariVpp. 1103, 1105, al-Kindi: op.cit., pp. 189-92: al-
. Maarizi: Kliitat: pp. 33k~k0; Ibn Khbl dun: .’ Ibar y 111 ^ p • 255 •
! v . .  ; ■. '■ 7-'"
much trouble to Ma’muh in hi-s}>-la-ter!;yekrs‘ 'with'; their- .con-.;'./-: 
tinuous risings against, his men :ahd;thelr policies. Egypt 
■„ .was also being attacked by raiders"?from todalus and Byzantium.^ 
The choice of • Mu’ta^inr wasj-periidps .‘-mb-re for his military 
abilities thah for his knowledge l&f lot at e-craft or provincial" '
administration. «It seems 'that ’hevVhad.‘aiready- acquired a V> ,
, reputation for, being: ;toi2gh‘rgndWavage.’--; It is said that the 
people of/Egypt feared him ehdiwbn^/to the- extent of sending / ; 
a deputation to Ma’muh to aslc him to spare them.the governor^
- ship of Mu’ta^im. ; . /' Nevertheless; /Mu’ta§im was ‘getting more; V  
and more involved in/state aff dir s.; ,
.. It was becbming clear; that together/with Ma’mun*s son V  V  
Abbas, Mu’ta§im vms the caliph’s right .hand man. Of the 7 -V -V 
remaining members of the ruling: family these two were the, / 7 -77 
closest.to the Caliph Ma* muni ; ■{ What7is significant is that V
there does not seem to have^beeh anymafked rivalry or 
clashes,.bo tween the., two. ; Ma’.mun himself was young and V;
. the issue of succession :was perhaps hot ;/sO- mrgeht ;as to pro-7/ 
voke such* Perhaps it was;also, because of Ma’mun1s policy 
of treating the two., in shch ;a. manner as-to- give neither a 
cause to envy the other. Duties ware often delegated to - v.
1. al-Kindi : /op.cit . pp. 163-8. / v’ ' -/
2. al-Kindi: Kitab al-Qudaf P.117;
v7 them .jointly;.*1',' In certain matters the; .advice of both of ; / 
77them was/sought/at, the same tlme7% 7 They shared in the ,* \, /
7 duties'-of, admini strati on., W &enM p.. *ta§im,as governor of 7 
7 .- Egypt /and :Syria^ was aslced to -levy/1 men/ and collect money - . .
7; . v; v and materials for the Byzantine ibampaignb of; Ma^mun Abbas :
as a .governor :o't ’ JazlRA-was;,Asked;'tb'. do'the same there.^ V  
;Both'Abbas- dhdtiu1 ta$im wbre ^ military<:men^ ;/But where M u 1 ta§im 
: 7 had his own p.ersoanl group of Turks beside the other sections 7 
v of the;. Caliphal army which, happened to  fall/under his command,
77 7AbbaS had no7such7^ersonal;soldiersy;;77lioreoyer Mu*ta^im was 
.. the .older of the two and the tore- Experienced.. It is also 
V ‘7 possible to. conclude. th$t7Mu1 taigsiinyM^• man /‘of stronger/■/,•
7. /... .character than al-*Abbas, and such; commanded;more respect
■ 7 than ^ he did.^* 7 There is evidence that even7before the 
v7 : ; settlement of, the -question of succession Ma’mun had more 7 
77 7 " ponfidenee and trust in Mu* tapim.^ But :'he7was,n.ot nominated 7 7 
for succession. 7 There is. alsooid ^ evidence that even then ; . 77; 7 
77 7; Mu*tasim himself or; any: group amohgst7thpse,.iiear to the ' ;ir7777 
;77 7 Qaliph:thLbugh or acted bn7thpt7ppssibility. - On the one , 7 7
1. Tabari, pp. 1098, 110. ' //77
\L“ 7 2. Ibn Qutaiba: *Uvun al-Aldabarv VI # 70^100: Tanukhi;, al-Fararr,
777 ,V ' p.45V/;;;-, 7 7 7 '""v -7 '77”7" ■'7': '7 ' 5 ‘ - " b v V . J
'3* Tabari,.pp. 1100., 1112. 4 ■ /
; 7 7 '-;'';li,.7ta*qubiY^iII,_p.l97  ^.7 ; 7  7  7'' ; 7  “ , 7  *7 / 7  • ’ '. -7 ; C
7 ,7 5t tal-Klhdi? Kitab al-Qudat p. 119. - 7 ■ 7.7 7
/.handv^h,e• issup'-'did:‘not7ari-sej ^ on the., other .haftd7therp 
! were so many problems tlaat. consumed the at tent i oh of 
M a ’mun and, his men, including M u1 tasim.. -There/were 7 .7 V
Ma*mun*s religious policies and the many revolts and ' ■ ■ 1
risings. ; _ . • ... '•‘".7" ■ Vy777,
• • ^  is. iptopesting to note that/despite the /closeness : -777
of Mu*ta§im to M a ’mun one does not find M u fta§im any closer " -;"-7':77 
;t<f the circles, ofiadminlstration^ahd: secretariest Nor is/'7;'-!^':::-'nV  
his, name, of for that matter,, that o:f- /al^Abhits,/*^anywhe’r‘ei- 
mentioned in cophection with the1Mu’tazila or Mplmun * s 1 *
religious ^ policies,:It is a picture ;of the mi lit afy\ man 
v/ho was far away from politics and court' intrigues that 
^merges. / A .gulf 0f .different, cultures and different V  - 
training separated him from these groups ‘df-77the.-m'en of 7 ;, . 
the pen1. His place was amongst the 1men of the sword1. 7
Yet even here Mu’tapim was different as, were the men around 7 7, 7 
him. His image under M a ’mun - rand more so later as a ! 7 777
caliph - . was that of the chivalrous knight mo.rd than that. 7 7 7 7 
of the successful commander, a fact which explains the re- . 77775 
currence of his hame in later sagas and legends of heroism 7,
and individual exploits*’1'- His. love of accoutrements and ;
1. Mas^udi;., VIII, pv302; idem: Tanblh nn«35U-5: al-Fakhri; p.3l6VV 
; Suyuti:. Akhbaf, p.133; Ibn ,fAdd Rabbih: 1 lad. Ill, pp.5 5-6Vv ^  ;7 
jMaqrizi>al-buluk, p.l6. , ,,df- M. Canard: Les Princioaux 7 7 7
,/ Personages; H.G-regoire: ,Digenis Akritas et le Qalife M u ’ tasim.
7 ^■ *•
Byzantine aiiife.and his cfaving/ tpdemonstrate his bodily 77V/\
• strength and y alour all point to this departure from the
/ military tradition of his time.5 -This could have bden due , :
7-7/to the / early years /Spent/; in learning the - art and craft of .
.\var.. It could have, been top7 as/a. result of / those turbulent 7 ‘7
yearsyin Baghdad/during. the civil; war.and afterwards when '
./ / security and safety lay in the hands "of the f ityah, the
furat, the fayyarun and their like when a sense of chivalry .
/ and valour dominated the/exploits of these groups. Mu1tapim 
7 was physically very strong-and was not ladking in chivalry. :
Certainly he did not b elong/to this,class-of/common adven- / 7  /
7 turers. He was a prince and later.; a . c.aliph. In. this . / / /I //;
. respect he was:.-perhaps the fororurmer of Saif al-Bav/la b. ; ; ;77//7 
/ $amdan whose reputation rested /upon his courage and ex- :7 7// 
pipits against,/the Byzantines. /The few poems oh Mu* tapim 77- 
b y A b ^  wereybdt7the 7foferurmers, of the // 77777'
many by al-Mutanabbi on Saif/al-Bawla. This is the more.
7/77.;-, y/sbvwhen: one. seep the reign of Multa^im ; as a turning . point . V .  : y
y. in the history of border warfare ,/felations between the By- 7
■ y zantines and. /the Abb as ids before the; breakdown of the ' ■/• - ; ;■ /.
i Abb as id Caliphate into dynasties and amirates. Mu* ta§im 7 7 7/
/ . /was to lead the last-major attack on the Byzantines while/ ,/ /
• 7 7-7; 7 7  7'7/7, - 7 .7 ;■/ >/ J v ' P T n f t t V  s- 7  ;.7/77' '7/ '
1, Arabic sources in/l above. Also Tabari pp.1326-7v E.M., p.130.
^ t h e ' ,  A b b a s f d . ‘' e i n | ) i r e / ;w S L . s .  j i r i t a c t * ? - .  • /
.77 * • Equally different were hie men* Their out Ip ok and *7
military trainlhg^/seem to have been different from :the , rest /
Vof the armiea bf the ;Galiphate who, whether, they were /I&iuras- . 7 
, 7; - anis, Abna1, or /Mawali, were within the /Abbapid;imperial, 7 7,
7 tradition Tahd: civilization. 2 . Rememberihg; that ;Mhft^§im 7/77;
7.7was, to; reign .bhlyyelghh years, ahd^ eight months, after M a ’mun 7;7y 
: and . . that he had;, to. face, his major military operations/almost
immediately, after /the/ death of Ivia1 mun in the campaigns. / * 77 /7-
/ /against Babak, .Bybantium and the. Zutt it is;sale to conclude 
7,-. :tha;.t^ M^ □.l'ta§im -had/gathered the bulk; of these troops - his -77
, / Own trpops 7- under Ma /mun who. had a long' reign. / This cbuid/7 
be supported by the.7fact that Mu* ta§im was/td 7 build" Samar ha 7/
; , sopn after his , accessibh ’mdinly to , secure a safe place for.
77,-/. /these troops> \; It was these men-who were rising in numbers 7
w .  . and. importance. 7 Rivalry between them and the old groups of 77/ 
; the -army was /thus,,.inevitable. And it was these men who 77 =
, . • 7surrohnded7Murta^ Iiri. Hence.if the gulf of education had / 7 
separated, him, from ;the administrative, the secretarial .and 77y/7
W p  HP HIM
7 H7d. M.t,Canard: hes/Expeditions, on./ 165-12. ■ • • . 7 77 7- 7
/7 ./R. rThefe is not /much in the sources, about the military training//
; ' 7 7or the 7dpy to* .daylife of these; troops. / But from what there/ /
.7 . ‘is7ih‘ on the /Turks (Risalh/.fi Manaqih al-Turk) /
7”'; :f ;7pr ©^ter references to them on siich occasions -as the buildingf 
77/7 7 - 7of/'Samarra one -gathers/that -they were, in/all .sense newcomErs/7/ 
V /: 7 7 /. to }.the Abbasid Wprld. Sbp below Chapter. Till 7 7 ; / / ' 7
the:learned groups, the difference “between hid own out­
look and that of hi s men and the rest of the army 
separated him from, the old military ;men too,. - Here lay a 
danger, since M u fta§im could not “be the bridge “between the 
new and old elements in the army. The trend towards 
chivalry, with the cult of the' herov- the military commander. - ;
and thereby the power of the Individual to hold the imagi­
nation and the allegiance of the group, was, dangerous too. ’ ' • •
Nor was M u fta§im- possessed of the aptitude or the training  ^ .
to carry on the traditions .of ; the Abbasid Caliphs. He was 
not meant to “be one• But nevertheless a caliph he came to 
“be. - ■' ■
It was on the Bysantine campaign of M a ’mun of 218/833 
that M u ’ta^im was nominated to succeed to the seat of the 
Abbasid .Caliphs* With Ma'mun as general commander of that
campaign was his son ’Abbas and his brother M u fta§im leading :
• - o ■ -
sections of the Abbasid army. It was a well, prepared
campaign arid, the Abbasid armies had won initial'victories.
But then .Ma’mun was suddenly .attacked by malaria. His
illness grew serious. The thought of dying, without settling •
the problem of succession when the affairs of the state
1. Jabari, pp.1133-4*
2. Tabari, pp.1135-6._Ibn Qut^iba: al^Ma’arif» Pvll9. Bar-Habraeut 
if P*133* DinawarTs account says that air*Abbas was not there. 
Bed below p
75.
internally and externally were,much disturbed must have 
weighed heavily on M a1 inunf s mind and coriscience• ; His * 
advice, to his.successor reveals this* And he had to choose 
a. successor• His choice fell,upon his brother Mu’ta^im. .
. Had Ma ’mun a better choice in his son ’Abbas?. ’Abbas 
did not become caliph and thus there i s no t much about him 
in the sources; Was.it only the nrgency of the problem 
and the atmosphere of-the- campaign with the possibility of 
some sort' of pressure from Mu* tasim’ s. group of soldiers, 
that made Ma’mun nominate his warrior-brother M u ’ta§im or 
would he have'.chosen M u ’ ta§im " anyway? The guestion is 
difficult, perhaps.impossible to answer. But it is certain ; 
that in choosing Mu * ta§im - his bro ther, rather than ’Abbas 
his- son, M a ’mUn' had broken the accepted tradition of 
succession* Although he had kept the caliphate in the 
family he did not maintain the practice of keeping it in 
the direct line when his son was not a minor. It is also 
possible to s ay that' he did this consciously feeling ib to be 
his duty as commander of the Muslims to choose for them the 
best possible person as Caliph. According to this and
1* See above p.^7n.l•
2. Tabari., pp. 1137"40, Qalgashandi ; §ubh: IX, pp • 3^2-6., In Tabari 
where M a ’mun’s last advice, to7Mu’ta^im is related thexe is a 
sentence that indicates that;Ma’muii’s choice of M u ’ta§im was 
.a deliberate one and that he knew that he was breaking away 
from the tradition in doing so. Here, he is related to have' 
said in relation to the caliphate ”that I have transferred it 
from others,:" to‘;..ybu!t • The vaddressee was M u ’ta^im*. ; ;
what was said before, about the relati on between M u ’ tapim and- 
.Ma’mun. it could be, assumed that Mu’ta§im*s choice' was not t, 
made on the: .spur of-the, moment nor as. a. re suit of pressure. . 
or the hpgency of the situation. V  . :h
- Nevertheless the appointment,of M u ’ ta§im was sudden, : 
..unpre pared for and unprecedented/in many ways, v- It was 
only a matter of days between ,the nomination, of .M u ’ta^im 
. and hi Sc, assumption of power* ,-/■In the past the practice : / //
. amongst the Umayyads and the: Abbas ids was. that the reigning ■ 
Caliph would nominatehis successor and/she that homage 
c and support-were paid to him a long time in advance,, / indeed 
the'fact/v^s, that the Oaliphs/were so eager to secure'.that / 
hompge and,Support for their:successors that the -nomination 
of the successor1 was. almost the nqxt problem after the :
. accession of /a caliph. - ; Mh/muh himself had done with regard/' 
to this ’Ali b. Musa. But then wi th the latter * s :death,/^// 
the pfpblem ,of sue cess ionlwas,/nb:;it were, shelved till thh/, 
/last days of,Ma’mun*; One d s ;thUS l e f t , to speculate whether/- 
that was. a deliberatelpoliby;-qh itoetlier. it was the unex-- 
dpectedness of,/such .compelling ..circumstance’s as that which r/x 
y4w^ounde..d/thei death, of ‘ Ma * mun that made him le ave that ; ; 
importa:nt/issue/tili the last;./ /■Perhaps it was both. The 
/ nomination of a successor long/ih/advance might have resulted
77
in the rise of c,amps; .and/grdups/among Ma ’mun1 s supporters 
at a time when he needed compiete unity,to face the many 
.burdens .of his reign• But for :Mu’ta$im it meant that 
although he had no hard core of opposition/as such on //
the issue of succession which-had not arisen before, he , 
had no long prepared group of .supporters on that issue , *' / /
when it arose either* Yet opposition did arise, as did .:„’;/ 
support, reflecting when they did the grouping's and the 
' /  differences between these, groups around which they arose . 
i ■ as %eil as the circumstances b f  the nomination* On this
/ .problem Tabari’s account, is the most detailed - and perhaps1
. ’ ' . • - A, ' 1  ” ■ ■ 7" , . - ' ' ■' ./V '
. the most accurate* He says that in the year 218 A.H* 1 .
• the . letters of Ma ’muii were, sent to his governors; addressed 
witii nfrom the sla ve of G-o:d,;CAbd Allah al-Imaim;al-Ma’mun,,. 
the commander of the believers,; and:his brother the successor 
caliph after him Abu /IstLagf : the son of-the. 'commander of the / 
believers al-Rashld’-« He then relates that it was said 
that M g ’mun did. not write;:thus> 'but' that this was written ;. 
during his awakening from'a - trance which pre vailed upon him / 
during his sickness, in accordance to7a command which he/;; 
;:/ia4e to. his. ’Abbas, to ibb&g. and to ’Abd^Aliah'B. Tuhlx*,:/.. ; ,/
1* Tabari, pp. 113-4*
. A' -
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that in case he died from that sickness of. his the caliph 
should he Abu Is&iiq - al-MuJtagim t- son of the Commander of', 
the “Believers al-Rashid. The letters were ."then vritten by 
Muhammad b. Dawud. Further Tabari, says that. Ma;!mun sent for 
his son .'Abbas when his illness was very, serious thinking 
that he would not see his Father alive hut that al-'Abbas 
did see him in a state of-physical and mental change and 
’stayed with him for some days, after the letters' of nomination 
had already “been sent. Jabari then adds that it was said1 
that the nomination of Abu I shag;- aleMufta$im, was ,not made
; - s v 1 ‘ ■<
hut in the presence of ’Abbas, the qagLls, the Fuqaha*, the
•; ■ ’ /'■ - . ; i ■ ■ ■ ; • ' ■ •.
military commanders and the scribes. . It should be said.
here that ^ahariVs- doubts do not concern the fact of the
2 -• 7 • ■ ■ ' ' , ••
nomination but, the nature and sequence of events, especially
In regard to the whereabouts;of al-■Abbas who from all accounts
1 •: T a b a r p . .  ' 1135 y ,Ibn Kathir:: Al-Bidava ,;X,. ;p ♦ 280.
2. -DTnawari in his al- *Akhbar al-Tiwal has, a completely different; 
story. lie says that f/ia1 mun had; already seen that homage was 
paid to his son * Abbas as successor and left him in Iraq, 
when thg foxvner left for the Byzantine campaign. On the death 
of Ma'mun - he says - Mu*ta§im gathered the distinguished 
generals and men and asked, them to: pay .homage to him, which 
they did. He then went to Baghdad where he deposed 1Abbas, 
having prevailed opah^him^and then: the people paid homage to 
Mu'tagim. As - such- Linawari1 s gtory could in.no way be support­
ed by other sources. See Dinav/arl1 s . ’Akhbar r, n. 596. • :
seems to have been present at his .father.1 s death-bed. In 
this respect the situation is perhaps better explained by 
the fact that the whole thing had happened in the camp far 
away from the capital and hence the reports received 
directly or indirectly by Tabari and other writers were 
conflicting in.that matter of detail* Yet the fact that 
the position of 1.Abbas was the centre of the. conflict is 
significant.* ’Abbas was the alternative,. perhaps the 
"legitimate and hence expected.: candidate for succession ^
to many. He himself did not. seem to have harboured such 
ideas at the time as is evidenced from,the prompt and 
categorical support which he readily, gave; to his,uncle 1 ' 
Mu’taqim and the equally prompt and categorical rebuff
which he gave to the sections of the army which wanted him
to challenge M u ’tg$im. This in itself supports the idea 
that ’Abbas was at least:present at the time when his father ,
made his desire known that M u ’taqim. was to succeed* •
V . ’Abbas’ rejection of the advances of his supporters 
for the caliphate must have been greatly appreciated by
1* Ta^^ni,-pp*1133*5»„ll6U; E*M.p.l}; Y a ’qubi, III,jp.l97;
Ibn Qutaiha:al-Ma’arif,.0*199; Ibn Kathirt al-Bidaya, p.281; 
Bar-Iiabraens, I, p. 133* ■ . r.
2* T a b a r i p . 1135• , Ibn Qutaiba:. on.cit* p • 199• Mas’udi says
that there was some dispute between M u ’ taqim and ’Abbas' on 
.the succession but that ’Abbas was led to pay homage to M u ’ta^m 
Mas’udi, .VII, p,*103*
al-Mu* ta$im. It settled the,issue in his favour and seems 
to have spared, the caliphate the. evils of a, sharp conflict* 
According to Tabari it was reported that the people feared ’
lest/Abbas would contend with Mb!taqim f o r 'the Caliphate A. 
but that they were spared that*1 / . But the incident itself 
,1s very important as regards the fate^of al-’Abtas and;/ r . / 7. 
some others like Harthama b. A*yan who might have been 
amongst the generals, wlio. supported the accession of al- 
’Abbas* The sources do not say much about the. development
of the incident or about the groups among whom it happened*.
It appears to have been abrupt and ephemeral* Tabari speaks 
about the .iuhd (soldiers) who mutinied at the accession of / . :
M u ’ta§im and who ssked for ’Abbas and addressed him as
3 „ . . ; V • . ..
caliph* Y a ’qubi also tells of some.generals who refused
■ ‘ • . * * ■ • . ,e 1 . ’
to pay homage to M u ’ taqim*^ Neither of the two accounts 
lacks support. Thus it was some soldiers and some •//'
generals who opposed Mu*ta^ini* From the evidence in the 
sources, meagre as it is, especially that of. Ya-’qubi who' 
describes the relations between the rebel generals and 
fAbbas and M u ’mun, and from the knowledge of the composition
1. Tabari, p.ll6h; B.M., p.l* ‘ /y. / :
2. ihl. (2) S.V. al-’Abbas b* al-Ma*mun, E*I.(l).s.v* Harthma b* 
A ’yan. .. ■' : - ,:/■■/ .y . . / '•
3* Tabari, p.llSh; F.M., p*l; Ibn* Kathir: al-Bidava,» p.281: 
Bar-Habracus, I , p*133» ;■,•••: ^ '
h* Y a rqubi,- III, p.197; Ibn gutaiba: al-Ma’arif» p .199• Because 
Abbas was so close to his father.
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of the army it is safe to conclude that the opposition 
came from, the veteran generals ahd;' so Idle rs .who saw the 
dangers of tile ascendency:of M u 1ta§im and .his- new troops• ;: 
This could he supported by the unfolding* of events in ■ ,
M u H a § i m f s reign. Perhaps it was more anti~Mu!ta§im 
than pro'-rAhhas.^ .-'' since;;'the; geherals seeing his feats as': • 
a general and his closeness to Ma1mun. must already have ; ' 
resented MuHa'sim in Ma*mini1 s life time;. It is significant 
too that this opposition seem^,to.'hiye- Aeen limited to the V. 
military circles* and so did hot include the secretarial . 
circles. It seems that these, unlike the soldiers, did 
not fear any interference from!Mu1ta§im in their affairs.
Moreover their position was actfcdally safe-guarded in Ma*munfs
- - - 1 ' ' ' 1 ' ' ' ' * 1
will; to Mu'ta^im. It should he mentioned/vEa? by this
time, these groups had fallen greatly in power arid influence 
in state-affairs now that the age of the "statesman waglr- 
type" secretary had given way. to the age of the "clerk-type- 
secret ary" who was more the . tool rather thaif ;the initiator 
of policies. . As .such there wex*e; no distinct opposing 
groups in the court as before* Instead a sort of a esprit de 
corps! prevailed,as^witnessedi?y\ithe ICuttab class and their
li -fahari, pp.H3S-U0* In fact Mu,;ta§im could not have done, that 
as he was uneducated and quite;alien to these groups.
This .was., thelmbre^so!, ^ 4 tliev^pwer of the 
generals.}and the mill taryimeni^ general was rrOih^f i ;Ih! 
itself this was a m a j o r a n d a s i g h i f i  development in
the; h i s t o r y o f 5 the./ Abbasi dGaifphate. ?•' in . that respeet: the 
ascehdehcy; df^,Mu,!ta§im WUSino^exc^ was a- ?
general V ; His, ascendency was oneiof; those. r are hi st or i cal 
:ihGiderita >tiiieh {everything seems; to* .ha ve T ebnspired to . bring 
about. The nominaiion and accessioniof Muhammad Abu ■ Ishaa: .
al-Mu1 tasim, the ill'iterate' warribh prihcb Whose, reigii was. 
one of cbn^estbihhd iiOftary grarideurtook; place during ; 
■a-., eanrpaigni amongst the;:s^bT.diers/ Und?t E b :'^gehbrals. ;/;;Thb  ^
issue w^sisettled,themand- there;^ riTo{the re st of the Umma 
his Muslim subjects, even,;fo;"the;,dabital Baghdad- the^:issue
fozi which their consent -Wak; required'tyit: 
fhe /settlement b f  which was hardly theipconuern. Nor did 
it. appear that they were concerned about5 it . . As rfabar i
bfates';.-, " It was is aid that people ;f e aredies tk£Abb a s would 
^contend th{®uf^ fa^im for;; tte■ Oaiiphate* A'^iit was a ,■;i 
negative attitude,/.resigned: an<d.;mild in its lresij^ationiv ^
It sounds as. though it were ah issue distant and far removed 
from their own; world. :^ .The^  ^ Gaii^ate; had {already become
1* . Sbe; Jabibl; >bhamfn Akhlaa ai-Kuttub >; " ;: ; . {A
a dynastia concern and a dynasticpr.bfogstive-;' Tfere ; / 
again/one notes, tlie'-deye.lqpmeht;i3a:Ai?ba;sid;%istory in 
particular and Islamic hi story in general*' \v -;bp to the, 
time ; (o f ^ Harun al-Kashld the ■ .consent, of/the, -U m m a . In sane t i on- 
frig:*tKe'':'nomination' for the';* sucQebsIoh’'*was: sought • Now it 
was';"a prphidiB' settled by Ma|munvqn .his /deatii’bbd ‘.with' .only . 
his ' generals band, official; entourage to witness and carry i 
out his command.^ v;it, was a .military?- decision establishing 
a military successor.and leading, to;ah increasingly military:; 
regime.r not only{because of- its hature ahdl circumstances * 
but more SO; beeauso {it had come ;at/biiimewhen the dichotomy; 
be tween'/the officiati^ and, the umofficiaiyside of;the state ‘ 
was so marked, and so grave, in its /consequences.* • ..Curiously l>// 
.enough;Matm u n ,s last; advice to Muifa^iiin shows tliat he'.wai." 
very; c one erne d about the Viiwamm; the common , pe ople . But in / .
M s  own, words these were the Ra * ivva* the subjects or the , *'*
‘ t h : v  - A  " 2 >v ■■■ ■ ;  ' ,  ' h  ■ ' •. , ■ ■■. •*'. -shepherded* .^Gradually the Umma-,;! Muslim Cq.mmixhity , by losing
interest in the issue of succession; fo; the;..Caliphate lost
its right and influence, in settling, it.l Gradually too
society-was.-, divided into the srtilers ;ahd;the' ruled> its
1. v.This is; very different. from^ the; nomination ,of fUmar ?by Abu;
. , Bakr 'who, did, not see; the issue as dynastic,, nor settled i t
} . . as a. power alive to. its rights in;t.his issue which was ‘ 
" v  settled with its power in mind* - ./ , / . .
2, Jabari, pp.; 1137-8.
 ^"Qfficial" {and; "imoffieial".;Sides.
"? ■ •/ good ...deal:. of {hisff elgh vainly trying to bring these- two
sides together * Ultimately; this meant that : the VQ&l -iphate 
. 'was losing {its ‘ actual powar and - signif icance/;and becoming 
; \ mbre;;;arid^ m^oretatniefe f el-igipi^ .'But; here - we ...see-1 ;
!{ - only the . beginning-, o f. that {development • / Yet- again it is
t{significant that ithis^ bhoulS'happen in the reign' of Mu1ta^im,:> 
{ i whose; upbringing, was so differeht. from that of any; preceding 
;/ ; ,; -’Caliph• ' r-,.!,-{if:■ -.yf-y1- •!-'■ ■- ■  ^ .<
V { ; '/ However /the lack of interest. of -the Umma: In :the Caliphs!
.y/. .i and the Oaliphatb was/ not paralleled by . a slmilar lack .among 
t the^bhroniciers* ; in the caseupf^ MuHapitfh fjpw that he 
; f : -liad' bbqyome; €aliph,. the spbrces|/hav^ say. /After! all
, ’ he was t h e e  entre of interest‘. : , ‘ There, appeafs.,, moreover, 
T:!;:;;f;a/degree;of; certainty accepts Tabari*s version r
; hf;!|h^;tdiilage was id aid to MdJ;tapim{ ast Oaiiphy£pn, the 17 th of 
;!<;!''Ra jab ;;218/10 th, of / Augps t 833 • \ • This; to ok pi ace on5 t h e . 
ptyyiBhdri^ Syrp-Byzahfihe/b orders*/ • { It was" the
day^on, which7^ Mamun; diedi .;Mu‘Vta§i'mthlmseif' was not yet fully 
f  -fv. frecovered from the:maiaria.^.wh'fph{had-., struck--.-bbth him and ;
; ' b V  >Tbbarl:,. p. Il6hf ;. owl .-A:Ibn wQufaiba:/;ai--Mhf arif»: p#-199;'
11/;f; ./{Mas fudi, VII.,, p*;102. Gther/sourpes give different dates 
‘f  A :g / ; / . d u b { f ^ b a s e s  to a defebtable .error !i.e. taking^ ;y ■ ■ 
/BaQiyna-/for Khalawna* ffe^.Vfeinalned for; Passed* •
• ' i , .• ' ■./{ : '////' ' - 'V.- •.. .
Ma’muri. The Campaign against Byzantium was suspended., ■ Y
/With * Abb as and the rest '-:of -the,-, .troops. he; amoved, -to Tarsus.,; ‘A  
where he paid the: last; homage' to his late brother Mamun • 
whose body was buried there. .He' then ordered the destruction 
■of all the fort if icat ions built at.; the order Vof Mafi&uh in : " 
Tyanu*, Now that the 'campaign/wad suspended ,and .the armies.
back/these {fortifications/would have been a 
.menace' to - the Abhasids;ha;& they .been; left/.intact to fall :
In/zthe, ihands of the Byzantines. ;/ MuHapim then "moved to 
Baghdad, in the’-bpmpjariy''of“ Al-1 Abbas.y- They'reached the,;. - A 
capital - at the beginningvbf / Ramadan 218/20th . of September f 
833* It is' curious that*1-.Tabari does not say • anything 1 /
about, the Caliph1 s entry . into hi s, c api tal p  i ty or ho w he 
was met{there, but goes.onto/mention;the- revolts' in the , 
region/of//the libal, a fact which shows that ,the people 
were not as interested in the/issue of / succession; as they 
.were in the rising which affepted their livings as well as ■ 
their b eliefs. Tliere *=are;:aisb 'certaln;• refers nces 'which
show: that, although. the,{ susperisio|f Pf :;the campaigns which. ■;
had hardly; begun could ;be; expiained: by!;.a wisdom in those
l.{ Tabari^ p.ll‘3B* Ibn Kathir: al-Bidaya 1, -p. 281. ./ /" / !
:2Tabari,, p .1164i B.M., p.l, Ibn Qutaiba; . al-Maf arif» p. 199; "
Y a ’qubi, III p,197* Ibn al-fAbbar in his * I * tab al-Kuttab1. 
p*55r, says, that Fapl b.; Marwan the secretary of Mu*ta§im saw
that, homage was ;paid to. him 'in .Baghdad before his arrival4; 1
.circumstances in which a change of Caliphs and disputes
Pmorigst .the Soldiers,'has/well as the advice of Ma'mun
. ? -/ • -kV A ■'* i . . - 'A / - .? '
played a r6le,,-; the speed with which-it was 'carried out.
were necessitated by .other factorist {/{Ibn Qutaiba says that’*-* -,;V
^•Mu't'a^inf was 'afraid for his own {safety of certain commanders
who were about to kill him.:, Tabari does not .say anything .
, about this,; but the trouble created by the soldiers reported .:
; by him amongst“’ ;sbme. o?triers-, mlgh^;%ery w ell «have gon0 that /
.far. If so the resort to the use; of force {by the army in
settling the{question of succession was .not/the innovation ■
/ of the Turks. It was after all the veteran 1Abbasid soldiers
{iho had killed Amin. However {thatmight have'{been,' M u !ta$im
must have felt tlie need to hurry to Baghdad and see that -
homage was paid to him there .  ^a in ••’that' way ‘"he"'may - have ?
A forestalled-the1 development of further trouble ?by the •
. ^soldiers; or .the rising of any group; in ?sUpporb of 'Abbas,
were there any possibility of that in Iraq. A The; return of ?
the sqldiefs, to .their families must have been a factor in, ..
.arresting: their,;rebellious atti tudes. ' Oh, the .other hand
- v the/whole, tiling could, have been a rb'sult of the advice o f /’>•;/;/
Ma1 mun coupled with- the sound. - policy of. Mu'- ta§Im /in weighing
/kahd{balancing, the problems which h e h a d ’to fade. This
I.' Tnbaf i,. p. 1138,.
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should not..however minimise.those problems which he had to : 
meet from the start to make good his succession as a Caliph..
It should also, he rememhered >hat .with the opposition of ■ • 
some sectors of the old army.the rift between him and these
groups widened., From the;.start of his reign he had to
calculate the risks from these quarters . •' u .
Thus began the reign of M u fta§im, unexpected, saluted 
with disputes and, troublesuhnd'^in ^ unprecedented circumstances.* 
>By the very nature . of. these circumstances, .ad well as - by the 
unpolitical nature and training of the Caliph . Mu* ta§im, it ;; 
was. destined to be a continuation of the previous reign.
• ■' i.' - 1 • ' • '■ : - ■. 1
This was ..the essence of Ma^muh’s last words ,to: Mu*ta$im.; ; ;
1. Unlike .some other political testaments this, had luckily not 
been used as a.literary specimen and was thus saved from 
.... changes and alterations. It is only in Jabari that it is 
•reported'In some; length; . others. only refer, to it stressing 
certain parts of its contents in one-w ay or another. As seen 
; in Jabari it has a lot of the tone, far from literary cliches, 
of ordinary speech - one .may add of;-a dying man. All the l 
•same it was nothing less than a policy programme for M u ft§$im 
who was urged to settle internal - and external wars - Zut$>.
;, 1 Babak and Byz antiurn -, to Jfceep M a •mun1 s men in the adminis- .
I,- tration - Abmad b * . A M  Buad, Ishaq -to Ibrahim - to maintain ;
. j good^r.elations/, with the Tahirds and the • A M d s , to follow 
v  Ma^mun* s policy.of Ihe Inquisitionin. relation to the problem , 
of the Creation of the .Qurfan and to take care•of his subjects; 
Ma.’niun also advised him aginst the appointment of a Wazir*
;■ :This Vis what M u H a d i m ; in; fact/did:Vand;' hencer some, doubt** as to 
the authenticity of the testament may arise. However it should 
be remembered, together with.the remarks above, that these 
problems ^ were M a !mun1s own problems and taking the circumstance 
es of his death and those of ...the -accession, of Mu* ta§irn it is 
more than, likely that he spoke of them in that w a y • That the 
source- is Tabari is also .important as he was; a near-contempor-, 
ary and is reliable. Thus any doubts should be minimized if 
.not completely removed* See A.Dietrich: Das Politische Testa­
ment; pp• 133-165; II• I •; s .v.: J^aeiyya. ; ;;
By the nature of these factors too it was. a reign in which 
the divisions of society and the deterioration of the 
•htatus and power.of the daliphs and the .Caliphate were to 
continue. Mu*ta§im was not a;t statesman hut a general.
.Only in-this light can one see the suitability of his. 
accession to that reign which was to settle, the,revolts of ■; 
the;.Zuttj of Babak and. others and to see the famous march 
to Amarium.1 But it was these warring exploits.which paved 
the way;for the ascendency of; the:soldiers, and hence 
furthered the alienation of the rulers from the ruled and 
ultimately the decline of the Caliphate, .•
■ ■ . ■
■! -•
, ; •: • . • •' , •
'. .■ . v1’.
; ■ ' ’ ' ' ■ ' ■ '' - •; . • ■ r ’'- j.'..v '
1. See. below Chapter V.
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: ■' - . CHAPTER III ■'
Mu* tasim and the T u r k s . .
Throughout,their expansion in Central -Asia the Muslims r 
were meeting with /Turks, as, settled and Iranized or as • 
nomadic marauders. As early as the time bf Caliph cUthman,
- when the conquest of-ffliurasan-was" hardly completed, the 
sources tell of some^dhc of Turkish nomads in that 7
. province in. the neighbourhoo^;bf-tfarw and as far as Nishapur.1 
Under the Umayyads,’ howevertlh/Muslims came into direct 
contact with hoth Western and;NortherM \-.:M
Between the years 86-96/705-15.under Qut^ba b. Muslim, the ; 1
famous Umayyad governor, they won/their first/ important 7’ . ;-7:
. .victory over the. Western.Turks.,, 7;t i n d e r . b .  Sayyr in the 7 
' 7 ear 121/738-9 they broke the power of the latter by defeating. 7 
y ; |ts dominant group,, that of the Turgesh khiqans. The empire ^
,/ of^  tihe Northern Turks was to come • to an, end shortly after 77 7 
that in the year 7M+* Having prevailed over the settled/-. i:. 
Vand hence according to Barthold, the.-civilised parts, a n d - ^
1* Ya’quhl; Buldan g.56; Balidhuri: Futuh. Y, p.58j5s cf. Gibb- 
. - The. Arab - Conquests in Central A s i a . :-r.v;c} -
; TurksirS dS S Tt,r(i * —  ■-Wi'tteK; Turhentum. p.J/95;;
■■7-'-.7 - ■ ■■ i'’ 7;V;/. 7; ' ‘ - ’" 7/77 7' . .0 d\:/77
havihg brbkenthe, major threat!to their pulp! t h e r e ^ t ^  77 777:7 
, 7 ; TUmayyads then follov/ed a defensive policy, as ;all those .
.7 haddQne7whopreceded them in these regions, v  With the . ' ; :,7
v rugged and/mountainous nature, of 7 the land and the turbulent v v; 
and nomadic Turks it was ^ difficult ahd unrewarding to . 77:
: attempt'accpnquest. The prohiem:was7indeed7one of defence. .- 7:
.7 7agaihst- the,:cpnstant inroads-of the , nomads intp ihe. settled
parts. , .In'- facing that, prbBlem; the Umayyads,: and the 7:77
7 7 'Ahbasids for some time "after them> followed the practice 7
7 ;of their predecessors, the Romans, the Greeks, the Byzantines- 
and ths. Sassariids in dealing. with7slmilar. situations, s namely 
7 7:^ihe; building of defensive, walls ^ strategic areas' to, stop -. 777 
the advance of the attackers.8 . The erectionVof these: walls. ;.
. against the threat of,ilie Turk,s7was so common a practice^that,.
, 77-. one iTrabicwriter explained7the7'word Turk-by alleging that 7 
it Y/as derived from the Arabic yerb Tar aka,7 to leave behind. ■
;.7, 7, According fb ;him>they were so/called because they v/ere left
7 . 1* Barthold:':Histoire des Turc n n . 31-2. Wittek: Turkentum,
p. 509. ; It l s  to te.' remeirterei that, the final victory oyer
v77 the Western Turks'look place f only some ,tv/enty years before
7 V. ; - • a the,'Abbasid Reyblhtionv/ ;. 7 / /■ - . 7"7 - 7 77 ' ■ ,7 .7 7-'7^ ./7
• :g:.;Mas1 udi:. Murudj. XI, pp.S-3; Y a ! qubi:. Buldan. p .56; £udama:
7 ; Rhara.i,n.363: Ibn al-Faqlh: Buldan, p.50l7^™Ibn Isfardiyary 
7 ;p# gT^B.artlioid Hist oire des Turc»--.p,33 ;vv/Witt.ek': Turkentum,
■ 7  77/. p. 509. .7 7 7 7 ’/ 777'-"7 7 7* ■ 7""''7' 7.7,- \ 7,
■91:-;
.■behind the. W a l l , of Alexander It: was perhaps .due to such ; 
/notions as. well as to the difficulties'which faced the early V 
v ; Muslims with the Turks that the tradition of "Leave the Turks ; ' /;t
alone-as long as they leave you alone" beeame current• ^
.Trade, relations however continued and> through these as..
.-*■ well as through; the c out acts .with Muslims> Islamic influences ; :- 
found their way to the Turks. Thid;jWas;especially important
. \ ih relation to the Northern Turks,?\'wit,h whom-the Muslims ,
did not have the same, contact s. they had with., the Western 
/ ! T u r k s b'
' . Through, these . contacts,; amongst other things, came . ^
also knowledge about the Turks,\ their kingdoms and empires, v
* their languages and tribes,their Settled as well, as their v d
/Wtrading  ^ centres. ;Yet despite the evidence that , somh of the d 
early Arabic writers were: aware of ■these; things,^ most, if 
not all of them,, used the1 word Turk to signify .all Turks /.v'/‘-VVV;.
1* Ibn, al-ffaqih: on.cit.. ..p*399., Earlier, p.6., he gives a
. different ■©xplanation for the. name. They: were called Turks ;
/ /^because \6f theiroeggeshapeddfaces^ • Thathwfiawbeeausevof the ;
v /constant cold to which they .are exposed# Of. Wilson, CUE*. - j
. :.. The Wall of -Alexander : and Lis ah s. v. Trk. Also
’ ' l * 4 M p t a M n t W H  ‘ r
S* Qudama: Khara,i. p,2Q2; Ibn al-Pagih: Buldan, p.316. cf. Oold-
. z.ihr: Muli.Sbu.\ -pp.270. dahlE,. MahaqibT attributes to ,.;■//
, Galiph limer I 7a tradition which describes the Turks as' an" ^ ' / d
\ 7 . enemy difficult and- unrewarding to pursue. ;
3* Mas1 udi: Murud.1 . It pp.298-300 and II :pp*ld"5; Barthold: Hist- p 
oire ;de s ?Turc. pp.32,35; E*I. s.y* ■ Turks. “* v V/^;
U. Mas1 udi op ♦‘cit .. I, pp.288-90 and II pp. 58-6di Barthold: Hist- 
oire des Turc. p.25..
and thus the word became synonymous, with the nomads of the; 
Central Asian Steppes. . In this they were indeed not very 
much different from the Turks themselves who used the word. 
Turk not in the ethnic so much as in, a political and/or 
a linguistic sense. Their empires, which extended from 
Mongolia and the northern frontiers of China to the Black . 7 . 
Sea, were essentially nomadic ones. . But needless to say
■ not all the Turks were. nomads nor were all of them contain©d
within the, boundaries of these empires. In their incursions ;
■ ' ■ 5 7;.- ' ' / /  ■ 77/' - '■ ‘ ' ; . , a*?.-
into the neighbouring lands like Soghd, Ushrusana, • Tabaristjn,
Jurjan as well as IChuiysan, some were left behind who in time
became part o f .the indigenous populations* In certain
cases their.own language prevailed over the local ones and
‘owing to their, use of the Turkish language even non-Turks,
*: :■ . ' O ' • ' .•
were considered;.Turks.
For the Abbasids khurasan and the provinces around it . 
had alw.ays theiri special significance• . The; important role 
played by these in the; history of the dynasty need not be 
mentioned here. .First the Abbasids followed the defensive 
: role of the Umayyads vis-a-vis their/neighbourers east and
1. Barthold on.cit.. p.25; -Wittek: Turkentum. p.ft95. E.I£Ds.v 
Turks. .-7;^
/ 2. Frve and Savili: Turks. pp. 191}.-5; Wittek: Turkentum. p. ^ 96 
Barthold: Hist oire des Turc: pp*29<-51; cf. B. Lewis: The 
Arabs in History. Introduction. .
north-east of khufasan. The change over, to an •■.•offensive :■
policy came, significantly, under Ma fmun arid:then during 
the . period wheh he was . in M a r w . K h u r a s a n  had; already "been, 
in recognition of its importance, elevated to the status of :;
a royal province;before, Mafmun.^ Under.him it became for 
a while a ruling province. . During his stay there as a 
prince and as a £aliph Ma * mun came to grips with the defen­
sive and even the: offensive possibilities of the situation.
For together with the dangers in these regions there lay. the h 
chances of territorial,■ religious and material, expansion.
There lay the land of promise. Unlike the other frontiers 
of the Abbasid world where political, religious and geo- 
graphical barriers rendered penetration and expansion 
difficult if not impossible there were no such barriers 
here. M a ’mun, whose relations with Irag. before and for some 
time after the death of. Amin,, made it crucial for him to 
safeguard his'position in Khurasan and to look east and : . ■ ;
north-east for expansion.as well as for securing Khurasan 
itself, Inaugurated a new era in Muslim-Turkish relations.
The change seems to have been noticed and. appreciated by 
early Muslim writers, as Baladhuri begins his statements
1. Bartholdi .Turkestan. .u p . 197“8«
2* See Chapter I p . 16 * , ' ■ ,
onMa'mun's activities.with! the Arabic word fa-lamma, .
(•and- when) which indicates . a new turn* . He reports, that, 
on his accession ahd during his stay in idiurasan Matmun •
. used to send soldiers to Soghd, Ushrusana and to the rebels 
from Farghana.. Simultaneously. he sent letters, .invoking .. - :
people to.accept Islam and come within the fold of the 
; C a l i p h a t e • ../'.This dual approach, won him Raft1 b *. al-Lavth i .
. and his 'Turkish *sup^ well--as --Maziyar of. Tabaris t an • y
"More import ant than this, perhaps,. was the. fact that under 
Ma'mun, Nu £l b'. As ad the Samanid and his three •brothers ;
became. governors of SamargLand, Farghana and S h a s h - With, ;
■ the collaboration, of ’ these Samanid brothers and: from ; thode. ; 
regions,: especially SamargLand under Nuh, came the bulk of 
Mu* ta§im's hew troops.; . =,;■
; , But although these, .nev/ troops were commonly referred
to a s Turks not all of them., were of Turkish origin.. . Amongst!;
:' them tile r e We re tlip;- Maghar lb a ‘gr oup\ re crux ted from Egypt, i ; 
or perhaps frutlier west. . . According to Mas'udi.-these were
of . Arab Origin, from Yemen ;and-^ais.^ For -those who came 
from the eastern districts;from beyond Khurasan and Ma-wara1 .
• i* Futuh-*. Vi p p 603-4:: Barthold:' Turkest&n. - p . 212..
2, , Chapter I p.J8 and Chapter V p. - .
3• Barthold: Turkestan, pp.109-li• : v
Jjw Mas ' udi: Murud.i VII . p. 118: idem: . Tanbih, p*356. ;
an-Nahr, Transoxania, there are sufficient references 
to their. 1 ands of origin tip .show that the name Turk was 
used indiscriininately.^ . The omission, of the name in 
certain sources is indeed worthy of attention* Baiadhuri.;. 
relates that tiie^  majority of M u 1 tasim1 s troops were of the 
people of Transoxania, from Soghd, ,Farghana, Ushrusana, ,
Shasix and, others *' -•; For him 'the Turks . lay- heyohd these 
regions, as:, lie goes on to ■ report' that; the kings; of these 
regions came to Mu f: tasim1.s court, that Islam was dominant 
among their population and that. the latter had "begun to, 
invade; the T’ufks heyond them In . this hedoes not 
differ from others whose references to the inhabitants,
, of the above mentioned regions and the Turks indicate -that 
they, do not regard them, as the same ; people• :Ibn al-AthTr, 
writ ing^ under-; the Seljuqs, and Ihn; Khaldun, writing under/ 
the. Mamluks, do not mention the name Turk at all, hut refer,, 
t o the7 Magharlha^ from Egypt and the Faraghina. from Samar qand,. 
Ushrus ana and Farghana • Y a fcihhi,. together with ^ah.ari, ; 
reflecting the Baghdadi attitude use the name Turk for all
1. Baiadhuri: FutShi V , p . 606; Y a f q.ubi:! Buldan, xrp. 29-33;;
Mas * udi: note 2 on previ ous page ,* Jahiz : . M anaqi"b pp .5-8; ■: 
Kamil, VI, p.319; .; 1Ibar.rlll. p.S5^: OnlJ/'the two flatter -
^sources give the names F.araghina and Maghariha. as collective 
names, for the two groups of the'troops. .
2* Baiadhuri: FutuhV V. p.606. . _>■ .
3. Tabari* pp.1250., 1312 (E.M., pp.7l, 118) mentions the
Maghariba.,
but give, here and there, indications to the differing . 
origins of. the troops, although the former hardly mentions 
the M aghariba group. Mas*udi, falling.between the two 
groups of writers in time and place.mentions the Maghariba 
and while using the name Turk to cover all those coming’ 
from the ea.stern provinees he points out that they included • 
non-Turks, from; Khuras an, Farghana and Ushrusana. For Jahiz
‘ v r ‘ ; , - ' \ ,T ■ - ‘ " .
all who came from the east were khurasanisl
Indeed with the indiscriminate application:of the 
words Turk.and khurasani,- used always in a regional sense;
- the Abbasid armies were certain to have had Turkish 
elements within their, ranks much before the time of Mu* tasim.: 
From the time of Mansur one encounters references to. in- 
dividuals described as Turks, in Ifrag. and elsewhere.. . = It 
is to be noted that almost-in all the. cases these individuals 
had acquired some measure of importance by having had some 
form of relation with a caliph, a ruler or a notable.. Cer­
tainly there were, others who could have been described in ,.
1.. Ja^iz is here reporting the views of al-Faj&hb. Khaqah. to 
which he, however, subscribes and for which he argues. Fprw :., 
them the only distinction between the Turks and the Khurasanis 
was that the latter .were settled and the former were nomadsjr V 
Ja&iz* s arguments for identifying the Turks with the Khurasan- 
. ids were; a recognition of the. Importance of’ the. latter s 
role in the rise of the Abbas ids and in thi^rState in his 
time. - . ... ■
2. Tha* alibi: Lata* if .p. 15: J ahshiyari: al-Wuzara *, p.l3U;
Ibn al-Fadlh: Buldan. t>. 282: Ibn Badrun: p. 292. Tha* alibi , .
and.Ibn Badrun state that it was Mansur who first introduced 
Turks ih the service of the Abbasid State.
the same way bad the occasion arisen. But again one is not 
certain in which, meaning the word Turk was used, .That 
these were distinguished from the. other Khurasanis must 
have "been due to their fitting the accepted meaning of 
the; word Turk in that period - the nomad of the Central 
Asian Steppes who was not described as a khurasani, as the 
latter had been Islamized and probably Arabicized for a 
long time 'before coming to. Iraq., For the Baghdadis the 
problem was not that they were Turks but that they were 
sa-rages'ib (1 uluq): and foreigners (1 anamV.^
. Certainty about the origins of Muf ta^im1 s new troops 
is perhaps not so important, although for those who explained 
Abbasid history as a glorious period of Persian influence 
followed by a dark one of Turkish domination...the case, is 
otherwise, ;What is. important is that Mu* tasim collected 
a good number,, if not the majority, of these troops under 
M a1 x n u n i n  whose reigh. the necessity for the introduction 
of new elements,in the army arose,^ It is very probable 
that M a ’mun had some other Turks in his armies besides those 
mentioned in connection with M u 1tasim. When he was in Merw.
1., ^abari, . p,1181|' B;.M, ?; p.l7j Ya'qubi: Buldan, p. 29, of. 
Chapter IV. "■
:2. See Chapter I above; Tabari, p.995; Barthold: Turkestan, 
p.212 note 5.
JT
■while the bulk of the Khurasa)! soldiers were fighting, 
first against Amin and then for the suppression of the. ;
many revolts, in Iraq., Yemen and. Syria, the gaps created 
by the absence of those soldiers must have been filled by 
.new elements• These/could not have been different-from 
those which Mu 1 tasim collected from the East, the. more'so 
q.s it was h&fcL b* . Asad,, a governor of. Ma1 munf through whom 
it was done. Jabiz makes a reference to a group of Turkish 
soldiers .who were waiting with others for M a fmun. While ; 
the others, except for three or four, relaxed on the ground 
after having been exposed to: the mid-day heat, the Turks, 
save.for three or four, kept their vigil on horseback.
Jaiiiz .passes oh to praise Mu'tasim for his wisdom in. collect-, 
.mg.such good troops, meaning the Turks. His references :
. do not make it clear whether the Turks, mentioned/ in connect­
ion with Ma* mun were any other than Mu* tasim1 s. . The 
important, thing is that they were in the service of .Ma* mun.
At that time they were a minority, in number, compared to 
tlie vete rans who dominate d them . in rani?: al so. T he me nti oh 
.of the new- troops in conneciich withvMlxf tasim even at the.
1..Jafeiz: Manaqib V p.57. ; ,
time ■ of^lia’mun, was perhaps because, that -he had no. other :b*\ • 'r 
V^ .^hpps. Even more likedy it was because of-what- happened v:
,v ;! •- later in the; reign, of Mu* ia§ini when^ the new;/ troops became. ; ,,0
doniinant ^n ‘numbers arid, in rank|L dabiz was'/-a "contemporary ;
-V y'b^Mii’ "h a.^ ±iti but most of the /other wr iters we ref not* ./ vv-
' $?• V;! ’ , ; Moheb^r the group- t h a t t a p i s i  had;'%t;/:the of
; r Ma*muiij>^wphb-not; a contingent ofhpoldiers under, his command- : ‘r
but were rather described as: his -slaves^' -The words applied -
that ‘ respect v/efe -’ abld, ghilman and. mamaiik*1 The \ h :•/
, ; . flC^bsence of the word niawali . is worthy of note*. The nature -.f. T  t 
of the relatioh\;between M u ’ta^im arid; his' slave t^oop was . f :
, . riot .similar tp that of the Wala1 nor * ; for thaf matter * "• h \ >'- -d. *>-. =
; x that o f  Wala.. al I s t i na ’ 5 Abna ^ Aail-Dawl a or , ’ Arab - ad-Dawl a * ^
;. „ .While:the former related the individual or the group: to the .
f tribe i' -and '"finally^ to the Arabs- in grierai^y. 
arid; the latter related the person tp the state or the dynasty;
/ i r tapimis: slaves o\ved him* personal ••••allegiance • *.‘ Thi’s^-tyas•• ;v- 
' i y;i perhaps - the beginning of ; the slave army system which' saw
biimax bf ifs: deyelppmpnt iinier the Mamlulcs of TJgypt .
^But:agalhx/itvfs. io^bje• remembered* that' this-began in Ma;*mun’V f  
. reign prince and a. provincial ’ governof -tlhan; Mu * tapim . ; ’
r : . 1. .Y a1 gubi.: Buldan, pp.29-30; Tabari , ,pp*1180-l; E.M*, pp.15-6,
; ; Mas’ndi:^ Tanb^ji,: p*336; Yagut^;III;,; p.l6?;: Ibn; al-Fa&ihr t f
V v - Bui dan j p * 319; Ibn . Ita thi r : al~Bi day h * b * 296: Suyutir p.133
'■ / ‘ , Wittek: Turkentum. bv^lO. -cf 7:¥il. C 2 ) *Abd, 'B.Ih^Mamiuk and
. _ / ; . , - ;•' ' v :f: -;,i /-maw^ a / >
: f: .2* : -E-*.-I* f'2) s.v* Abna-- and .’Arab ad^B'awia^ E.;I*tt)s.v.. ^ /aTai— and-
w a s .first and fpremost a commander* Taking, into account: 
the circumstances that prevailed in that period, and 
leaving^/asi'deythe^ .legal ‘ aspect;, the relation between .. /f;f;7.v
. -Mu’ta^im and his troops was indded not very different '
/ from that which./existed between other commanders and their —V-, /
. troops• , _ ' ■ ‘‘ . •! / *■
Eurthermprp, .although the hew troops were commonly . V"' . 
described/as slaves, not all of them were: so, which a p plies;,> f ; 
perhaps, to: the'.majority'of them, especially, in Samarra. ‘
; Hence the Tdescription: fAbidj G-hil.man and Mamalik were &•'&?
,as inexact as . calling them Turks. Ibn al-Athlr. and 
Ibn Ivhaidun do not use these words, nor do they use the. 
words .jama1 a .ucolledtedn » or Ishtara,- "bought” .ah do others,;./.
: but relate that. I|[u-ta§im istana--1 a* •11 won over and used for
his purposes”-, /peoples from Egypt and others from Samergand, 
Farghana and Ushrusana* Jabiz uses the words istana*a and 
jjama*a, ”collected” "but not the othere. Tabari c alls them,, 
ghionah, -(slayes) *T Ya* gubi gives “the impression that they.-.
/ / were, all bought/And accordingly they were all slaves* . . :
Mas *udi uses all of the .above descriptions but Baladhuri . // . vx/
A uses, none of themi; hot even isf an*a*^ V f
; 1. See ..p.35 noteul.;cf. Bar-Habraeus p.lhO,* Jabia, Ibn:al-Athir /
and Ibn IChaldun migrht have gpod reasons for not calling them f  / 
slaves*; But'evidence shows that, together with Mas ’udi and-'/ / 
Baladhuri, they are more reliable than the others sources. ;,-
'With/-.thesefd-ifferences .as to';?the,.hat.ur’e of- thes’e/ : 
■troops, - there are also some^ references to their numbers/ 
whieh may help :bhet to; pome to a conclusion>in that fespe ct. 
..These; vary a great/dealf But whether when Mu*ta$im was a 
prince, or at the time when he moyed to Samarra or late in 
his reign-the hunber. of .his so-called nTurMsh!f troops was 
. too large to have; been bought of • owned/ by= /an/ individualy: - 
be h e . a jprince of a baliph, without the support of the 
State* At their lbwest number, at the time wiien M u ’ta^im 
was a prince, they were quite considerable* Y a ’qubi relates 
^that; they were three•. thousand. and' more ; al-Kihdi put them ! 
at four thousand* r,Mu*ta§im could not possibly have /beeh^ :- 
able to. buy and^maihtain such; numbers at that; time;* Under
the Caliph it- is clear tiiaf as a part of./the-, afmyrrenrolled;/ 
in .the registers of toe State, .the IBiwans, r they drew their 
salaries from the Central Treasury* It is thus to/be 
assumed that at ther time of -Ma’muh also: they had. all been 
enrolled in the Registers of the;State from which they 
;bpd.. their • pay••/g*..^u1 t.a§im-himself was but in "the service / 
of the Caliphate* His owii group;of slaves, perhaps with
1'%/Jf,^ if: -BuMah,- p.30, ai-Kindi: al-Wulat. p.i88;/ here al­
ii indi refers to the number of those who were with M u ’tasim 
in Egypty in the *. year 2lU/829*“3G • ..All these numbers do•’ not 
include the tfoops- from the West but specifically refer to 
. . the: so-called Turkish” slaves* . ,.-.-,,//
a good? number -of Tuflcs amongst’ them, was to be the core 1 
•of the.. new-\tr oops;,- ;the-.;name of which wasylinked with bis 
but the majority of whom belonged, to the State serving it / 
as free men* ; v \
.Beside the’ones M u ’tagim bought or collected from 
the Eastern provinces there were a few others:he bought ,s 
in Iraq itself*/ It' is noteworthy that the leading figures- 
among the■new troops were from the se• Amongst these we re 
- Ashinas*/" Itakh, Bugha the Elder Wag if,; > n d  Sima of Damascus 
all whom rose to places of importance in the reign of
' ' ' - / p ' 3 / . '
Mu*tagim and after* They were already slaves, of certain 
individuals, in Iraq and a1sewhere•... As such they must 
have learnt the language and known some of the customs . 
of the people* Because of this not only were they to 
serve as a;1ink between Mu’tagim and the others but by i //; 
doing- so. they; wefe:;also to channel the Tatters* loyalty : 4 
through their own: to M u ’tagim* For alijconcerned that was 
very opportune* As a governor and a commander Mu*tagim ^
.'had /'-rivals•.W h o , :riyairy nearly cost him. the succession- to 
the Caliphate, perhaps liis life as well* . His reliance , y 
and increased ugee’of ’These- hew --elements- then- and after^liis '
1* Y a ’qubi: BuJLdan, pp*29-30, cf. E*M., Indeki
2* See'Chapter II above.
accession was Thus a result of his needs.and. circumstances 
much as it was for his early relations with them* His ■ 
first emergenceupon the political scene in/the company 
of some of his Turks at a time when, he; was not directly 
connected with The affairs of the State is relevant here*/ 
For the new troops it was very rewarding-to be related . 
to a p r i nc e and. a l a t e r d a l i p h  who ,p at iconized them, and 
took their cause in the face of deeply entrenched hostil­
ities * . It. was this relationship of need arid trust which 
paved their/way /to power and influence; under; M u 1tagim* 
Coming at a time v/hen not only the veteran soldiers but 
also-the Iraqis- in general were mistrusted and discredited 
by the ruling/caliphs, they found the/‘shortest way to the 
centre of the .State and the heart of the realm without 
difficulty or/delay* The events of the reign which 
brought M u 1tagini to.a head-on collision with the veterans 
and >discred!ted : such m e w  eommanders as Afshlh were '• very. 
decisive in that process* Those events which threatened 
the security of M u ’tagim and the life/of his favourite 
Turkish generals had in fact hastened their advance to 
positions of power and influence* ; • / .
• 1* See below Chapter V*.
/Some of the'/iibWztroops who were bought as slaves 
could only/have; been--sub je.cted to capture and sale, while 
they .were, n o n - M u s l i m s C a p t i v e s  of war provided this*
' None of /them could haye<xserved in: the/ armies of the- ' / ; 
Caliphate Tf/hbtwas; hot" Muslim* ■ But; while, there- are 
sufficient refe;rences to the . ; centres}/ from, which. they \/ 
were • bought * ttEer;b',;:i s.: nothing as tp tlie manner /in which 
they were;%pughtfand; presented toAMu* tagim* ; • The * only■ /■ -
evidence in this respect is that Mu*tagim used to .send,
, A ■ f ’" - / a  ‘ -/'■ /-'■■ . > /
.a certain; da* far al-IQiushshki to Samarkand to Nub b* As ad
to buy Turks/and that.Ja*far used to return .with a group
of the latter/ey^ : This, according/to,-Ya’qubi,: /
was how l^ultaglm/iidd got his three/thousand’Turks,.during
the reigh. of -Maimun.1 ' Doubts as, to the truth of this,
. number hadL/airea^.;be/en expressed. Were they already:
/Muslims .when - they/, were bought for Mu/* tagim. or did their
. conversion follow their purchase? There/is. no direct
.^ reference'--tptthis problem.:; / -They/were all however described
/as non-Arabic/sneaking ,( * A jam*) Even Ashina s/who was/- x t
bought in, Baghdad, belonged to/this group becording; to
Jabari.^ .There/ issnp/:-Cause to doubt this- statement as, - /
1. ./Ya * qubi; Buldany n * 2h-wv -■. ‘ ■ ■ ' A ;
t,2* Y a ’qubit Buldan, p . 2 %  Tabari,, pp.* 1067>11181 f E.M. p,l6. 
Ibn ’Miskowayh:\,.T.a‘iarib:-t'--Vlf p*437» ’ /. -//'■/’As A-A:’
together iviih:their nomadic nature, it; resulted in 
their being/.calledTurks, despite the inclusion of 
/ some of Iranian origin, "from Farghana* Ushrusaha and - v
Shash which/place s>wCre:. in fact the centres,of their 
cqliection.x A. It is. more than probable that most of A  ^A 
them were./converted to T&Jam</t>qfqre their :coming to Iraq. ; /:/ 
Even before fheurise of the Abbasids Islam was making / , ’
/headway/in the, provinces bordering on Khurasan. / •; /;/■
Througli contacts with traders and individual wandering 
Sufis converts were'madb* . 'That Islam was. the religion 
of the. State which had inherited the Sassanid Empire, to whose
Civilization tha/nomads had alwaysvaspired was also ah A
. ' A' !'VA'-A'"^  . 9, , . //
import ant -.factor Aihywiniiing ...over adherents • The: active
policy of Mabmm,/Afollowed by Muftagi.m, in spreading Islam /
■ and pushing forwahd the boundaries of the State and its. 
influence was b u t ;a^spe © ding*up of an already existing 
process.: But evidence is that then, it bore quick and,
important resulisAA/■Mention of a number of rulers from, theseAf 
regions in the court of Mu*tagim bears Witness to this*^
•1* Barthold: Turkestan* t>*212* - ; / / " 7
2* Barthqid; /Histoire des Turc, pp. 55"6? h7-8, 56-9; Wittek:/
, TUrkentum,p * 513* cf> ;Ibn Khaldun:j Muaaddima * .0* 1U7*
3*/3ee above//p*35 j note/*,|;.. Baladhuri is statementcould be'-bA 
taken/to allude to; group .Islamization, / the/ tribes ‘'accepting 
; Islam after their leaders* ; A" v.
The. type of Islam ■which they had adopted was what came 
later,to be called Sunni Isi am, in their case very much 
influenced by/the spirit of Jihad which suited their:
-nature and which was the mark of Islam in frontier 
provinces. .. Perhaps what appealed to them most .was 
the fact thatl7gpether with the simplicity of its. basic 
tenehts Islam opened to them doors to careers which 
befitted .their aptitudes: service in the army which ;
./-beside regular pay provided, chances for booty. The 
simplicity arid,. • atA.thd same time, the firmness/of. their, / A‘-
new,belief could perhaps be seen in the declaration of 
■ Bugha the Elder, when, wondering '-what' theA'Ipquisition// 
of Algmad b. tlanbal was about, stated that he knew no' more 
of it than the declaration of the Articles of Faith, the 
Shahada, and tliat the Caliph was a relation of the Prophet.^
On his accession Mu* tagim increased his efforts in 
recruiting new troops. In this he was not only pressed 
by his fears and misgivings regarding the veterans who'had 
not accepted his elevation' to the Caliphate without objection, 
"but also-for the many campaigns v/hich he had to face. And
1. of. Nizain; Siyasat-nama, pp. 68, 165; ,cf. C.Cahen; The 
;. T u r k i s h i m w s i  on and Wi ttele; ADevshfrme and Shari va. . Nizam 
.refers to Aganafi, influence:amongst"The Turks•:
2. Abu Nu* aim; Hi 1 vat . 0.198: cf • Chapter I, p.//v3 •
A a , A A A A ;' A , AA ,y_;, 107
A - A it WasAnbt^mbrely for their;Vsuitabiiity.,9n political , ' / A
A A .gfoiradb but nlso Afor: their "beingAm|litarily the best for . :A 
A y ■'-■■'/y^ isApurpb'sdJs.Vthat Mu* tagim/didAt^ti , Professor/liuri- has: , /A ; 
v AAA^siiggested .’that- perhaps bee;aus'e>--Mu'taglm1 s\-mother.' was a 7
Turk that: he ^ introduced them ; in-his services. But the A A A A  
basis of hi;s ;suggestion>: that Mu* tagim1 s mother was a . A A A/ A 
/A v7 Turk, is doubtful, andAprobably untrue. AA More relevant A . A; A 
; was perhaps:Mu*tagimTs own convict ions that- theywere the AAA^aAA 
. best of soldiers.2 y In.h'is treaiibe/bn the Turks, where -:AAAA';a : 
A a , arguments'for; the qualities : of the-other .elements of the A
v a a ; AarmyrAthe Abna *, the Khurasanls %nd the M a w a l i , are; pro- \
A;A y . duced> - as well, as in other/ijlaceSAx:Ja^iiz*s description1 of A- A 
; the former.\makes it clearthat they/were the: most suitable a  :
A. / for; the problems of '/ the/ reign^^/ Primarily horsemen, -A 
.//" they were possessed with remarkable^ pbwers ofendurance^
;A i ; . and/^^rcsourcefulnessAespCcialiy in difficultvffontierAcon-' A /
.ditioiis.. - Nor were they lacking i n  discipline; a A
ability to- learn hew techniques ^ in/ regard to organized A/A/a
A.A‘A.-; .campaigns and siege warfare-, as was; revealed; in;the cam- . - 
AAv/iApafea;-^ agairisf/ByzanfciTam.^ A: /Moreover, from the little one' - AAA
 ^A a 1 .  :See AQhaptor^II, pp., .A A A  A/ a A- iv • ' .--""A - _A-
A A' ■ 2 . Jai f ur:r Kitab: Baghdad, (Kawthar i) p # 80. , % ■ .Af
A  . '■■■■£• ,3ee' /  Jahiz: A Manaq f b , I d e m f Havawln, I I ,  vv.353~U and,/ 1 1 1 ,  A
A. p.l6l. "A_:; - -AAA, A-"'. -';A  A a /a :a /"
i+. See. below Chapter V.. V  : A  :; A ' /A'AAA;
■ A A ^ ' - A - . .  , A: - V A -  ' i o s
knows about his own training in his- youth as well as his 
image;as cavalier, M u !tagim himself fitted well with his - 7
new Troops,.'1' The important problem is how many he had of 
these when he became Caliph. The idea .that the Caliphal AA-:
troops under Mu’tagim were overwhelmingly composed of 
.Turkish slaves is. indeed not new.. The-relatively reasonable 
number. of - threb .'.thousand which he could;-acquire, during the .'V/
long reign of M a 1mun, according to Ya 1qubi, was related to 
have, been near twenty thousand.by some sources and seventy AAA-"' 
thousands by others.^ . And this, designated only the Turkish
slave troops* , Lack of proper appreciation of numbers had.
A •. A ' ' A' x  , A , A - ... -'A: w ■ ; .
•already been a subject of complaint by Ibn Khaldun.
Closer to the -truth was ,perhaps Mas *udi * s four thousand.
although he does not qualify it as Ya'qubi does.^* Besides,
the ,Turks were neij?h©r’ the only nor,, even iheA dominant
element in Mu*tagim*s army.^. Had they been so MuHagim ; W i P
/would;have h ad•no fear of their being killed by the veteran . / A
1. See Chapter II,3abb^Apfi'A&ffe<7 and Chapter y below,^op.( 7 v
2.; Ya * qubi: Bui dan, p. 29: Yaqut,AIII, p.lSf/ Ibn Kathlr; al- 7
/ B.ldaya, Habraeus,,1, p.lhO,' relates that oh his death Mu*tagim A 
freed 8Q00 slaves:and left-3P000 for the stables.
3 *A Ibn Khaldun:A Mua addima. p. 10. A ■
h. Mas*udi, VII, p. 118. .
5. See Jahi^1s Mahaqib.
troops A The accounts of the campaigns1 of, M u 1 tagim *.s >
reign with the. description of the troops and their z 77
commanders show, that the Caliphal Corns (.iund al-Hadra) ^  /;A, \ :
Were hut a smallsection pf the army. ! Even in Samarra# —  A
the city which was “built7mainly to /garrison .them,/ they . A7;Ar
. • ' I"- A, . x ' x - -■ ' o ■ ' " - ' ■ - A”
were hot the dominant group at that time. Despite all'
his pr.e ferenc e for and re! i ance upon < the se troops Mu * t agim A A .
was not ...discriminating against the 'others in-their favour. -  ^a7
The fact that the Caliphal Corps was spared-the brunt of.
the campaign against the Zutt was. a question, of technical , ; , , 'Af
suitability* Such.also was the;case/with the campaign/
against; Babak;in which they did take part and /Which was > * * A;
led by Afshin, a favourite commander of Mu* tagim.' v Afshin* s
troops were' indeed a part of these new troops. One notes
that only after thez discrediting of the old commanders, A 1 -
*Ujaif, ^Abbas, Afshin and otherb/that Ashinas rose; to a ;A\'A:;
place of importance. Before that; it/ was Mu*tagim himself; Ar
1. Jabiz t Mahaqib * p . 5 A speaks of' Jund al-llhilafa* the Caliphal - z 
.troops,^which includes the Jund^ad-hadraT the Caliphal Corps* 
cf * Baladhuri Futuh* IV, p.b7b* It was the latter whowere a -a 
distinguished from the rest,by their gold decorated girdles,;1 
•Mas*udi, Musudi VIX, p*ll8, Suyuti, p.153. f They were however* 
not of Turkish origin only*, One notes"that Afshin of Ushrusana 
; and his officers probably all of Iranian origin, were amongst A 
Mu* ta^im* s body guards. A:cf. Tabari, ,p.l306;, E..M*, p.113., : /A;
, 2. See Chaptexv IV/ and/V, beloy/-. T’ —  J
•/V • :v who could have been counted, as ’ the commander of his .
royal troops 5and ras•; the equal,-y int that respect> of the, - 
//veteran commanders * The deposition and imprisonment . .
of Ja * far b. Diharki-Khavvat v who had • been;-;elevated to/the 
position of governor .of1 Yemen, Ts yet another indication of . - y
Mu* tagim* s standard; in/his treatment of bis favourite ' A  ,
f ■' A -yA.', ;A  ■/.. . , ;A : --A- ■•// ; % . .■ -• - -,Z'/v' • .
Opmmanders.v /Commenting: on the subsequent problems V A  -
- -that befell the Abbasid Caliphs .in Samarra,' Ibn Badrun '
; . ( points out tfratfthese came into /being only" after al-.Wathiq ‘
A  227“232/8b2“8b7*/: : 70>yiiig both to his. personality , and .they, Ay -
re spec t ;wlii clT;7bei-.d9®^ahde d , -; argue s Ibn Badrun,; the,, Turkish.
/ A slaves would not Zjhaye /dared toy go against h i m . ■ This ■ ..../
could not have, been more true than with Mu* tagim; himself,. //
iriwhose reigib■Tb)®'^-Turklsh most, loyal yAy. .y
-servants ,of .the Caliphate • It is to be remembered -that, •- x :
,./,/..i. although some o f ; them' like, Itaidw <Ja*.far b ; - Bihar and ■ ■ y
y Ashinas hadzrisenz to\the; position of provincial governor^ > *
/• yy they wei^e only so in their military capacities with ho en- '/
,y trenched poiitical; positions -like/, those of the Tahir ids in
y Khurasan, or> later, the Thlunids :and the Ikhshidids in A y  -
- l.ACee Chapter V below• v z '.
: A 2. /Tabari* p.1303> AE.M.,... p. 110. . Ay' ;
A.'75* zlbn Badrun, pp* , 292-3. .. ' •. / - „
y y b. T.aiDari/A:pp.l5p2.A3yVi318;;pp.110,. 123. A y '
Ill
Egypt. Throughout the reign of Mu’ta§im and his son and 
successor W athiq» they served the dynasty very well, 
,quelling anti-Abbas1d revolts and guarding!the territorial 
integrity of the,realm* In later years Mu*ta$im was' 
reported to have' expressed his regrets that he had fostered 
Afshin, Ashinas V: 11 akh and Wa & I f » who were according to 
him nothing compared to the four men who had heen fostered 
b y . his brother Ma-mun. , The important thing here is 
that his. regret was expressed only in relation!, to an" al~ 
ternative situation and that Mu* ta§im expressed no overall 
regret invfostering: the cause of the Turkish troops* ^
To the important observation of Ibn Badrun referred 
to above, which .besides putting the interference of the 
Turkish soldiers in historical perspective alluded subtly 
to the mediqcrity:of the Abbasid Caliphs in whose reigns 
these things took.place, one may add that these were the 
symptoms and not the cause* , The period, characterised by 
the emptiness, of the Caliphate, which M a !m uh had • strived
.1; Tabari, pp*. 1327-8; E.M., pp. 130-1* M u H a q i m  was reported 
to have expressed this to Ishaq b. Ibrahim b*. Mus*ab b. alf 
hus ayn who together - itith his bro ther .Muhammad, his uncle 3?ahid 
b • al-husayn and the latter*s son 1 Abd Allah were s a i d ,  to 
have been the. four men fostered by M a tmun* Ishaq was governor 
of Baghdad at the time. cAbd Allah was. governor of Khurasan 
then.: .• ,. ' .
2. Gibb, Government and Islam, v *120;- cf. Chapter I.
so hard to remedy only to end iri depending oil what, 
military power he oould muster, was soon coupled to that 
of the isolation of the Oaliphs and t heir troops in 
Samarra.* That the age of the generals had already set 
in during the reign of Ma*m.un is not only to he seen . 
in his choice of Mu* ta§im as successor hut also in such - ^
remarks as that Ma fmun,*s troops were not matched before, 
neither in numbers n o r .in, weapons, the very remarks which 
were made about Mu*ta^im later* It was the. latter . ,
however under whom began that "Era of Isolation*" For 
this his image and'that of his Turks came to. be not only .. 
identified; v/ith the disturbances which partly lay behind 
the building of Samarra but also with all similar happenings 
that took place' afterwards, and often with the caused of 
the decline of the Caliphate itself* One notes how 
their mention in the early sources was very much influenced 
by, if not identical to, that of the Baghdadis * The 
letters * own reflection of them was limited and at the 
same time influenced:by the disturbances'which were caused
1. Ta/fur; ICitib Baghdad VI (Keller) * p* 12; Tabari, p*1236,
. E • M •, pp.80-1* • .■: ' ■ •
2. By this is meant: the period., 221-279/836-892? in which the 
Abbasid Califs ruled fhorn Samarra* cf. E.I.(2) s.v. Abbadids:
, also G-. Le S r a n g e Baghdad* ,p.l3> E.M., p. 13, n*105;
• Chapter IV below.
by some/of them in Baghdad, , Even,.their -numbers were 
mentioned in those contexts • But- for Jattiz, who put 
up a mggnificent defence of them, and the occasional mention 
of individuals i n ,connection with particular events by 
Tabari, their move to Samarra marked the end of their 
mention.as far as the reign of Mu*ta$im was concerned.
In their attitude to the,Turks the Baghdadis were perhaps 
in that respect influenced b y ;what they know about them, 
from Sasanid tradition as well as by what the Quran had 
to- say about the nomads, in this case the A*rab, (Arab 
nomads). These;.Turks, who spoke no Arabic, were thus..
■ even worse, But. despi t e thi s, Mu*ta§im*s Turks as seen
in the early sources- were not taken to be. representatives 
: of an emergihg" dpniinan.t =•race. . (This is, y e t a , further
argument in support of the view that they were only a 
group not . .even .dominant numerically in Mu* ta§im*s time* )
The * Turkish Invasion* .par excellence was yet to come• ;
At the time of-Muitagtm;’ and. for quite a period after him 
the break down of the frontiers between the- Caliphate ..and 
the Turks had been in favour of the former• Under the 
Jah&rids and Samanids Islam had been the conquering power#.
1, Sura IX, verse 9d,'
2* C. Cahen* The Turkish Invasion.
Nor do later . writers, like Ibn Khaldun- ahd' Ibn al-Athir,. 
wlio wrote after, the advance of the Turks as far as Syria 
and Egypt, suggest any identification between Mu’tasim1 s 
troops , and the Turks' as such.^ As has been inehtioned,, 
before, both, of these writers called them the Faraghiha 
as opposed to the Maghariba .and both .groups v/ere included 
in the ..designation "new troops"., This is so even though 
Ibn KhaldQn, faithful to his theories, .of kinship, decadence 
of.civilizations and the cycles of rejuvenation based on 
the encroachment of the nomads, pver the settled population, 
did remark as' such the advance ,of the Turks under, the 
Se.ljuqs, : But even here he only reveals this: awareness 
in dealing with the rise of the Sel juqs, and- introduces 
that by tracing the- nomadic origins of the Turks. It 
is perhaps worth ment toning that notwithstanding this 
awarenes s the import ant.t hing for - him was that they were.
/Muslims, The '‘real’ problem that beset the Caliphate',/;..;. - 
in hi.s view.was the break up: of the Arab kinship and the 
division of the caliphate between Umayyads and. Abbasids 
and later' between the latter . a n d . the. * Alids. ® The only.
1. C . Cahen, The Turkish Invasion, p.7* . . • :
2. *Ibar,; III, -pp• ^ 3 ,  1*50 /> cf. Muquddima, Index.
3. rIbar;■ III« p.l70 .
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faGtorttot ^ tended to indie ate a relation between ' .
Mu - ta§imf s Turks, when they were mentioned, and the.
Turks iiy general was hot that the f ormer were the heralds 
of the advance of the Turkish wave, hut . that they were 
all .fearless, dangerous and,uncivilized nomads. Even 
Nizam al-Mulk, whose overlords were Turks, speaks of the 
Turks in these general terms, although it is quite clear 
that for him as well as for his contemporaries any degrading 
remarks, were: meant to,refer to the--'Turkomans • arid hot the ' ’ ;
Bel3uq ruling circles. The,identification: of M u 1tasimf s 
Turks with all the Turks and of the latter with all that 
beset,the Galiphate -and the Arab world in particular is a
modern phenomenon resulting from ideas, of Nationalism and
the" recent uhhappy venture in Arah-Turkish relations.
Indeed such a projection could, not have developed earliery 
while the Turks were still seen either as a caste of slaves 
■or the saviours of the Caliphate and Bunni Islam from the 
Shi* is and the Dailamites, not to mention the Crusades and 
the Byzantium roconquest.
1. Nizam; Siyasat-nama. Use Index for .Turks; E.I. (l)f s.v, 
Turkoman.. .. X
no
. . . One may wonder whether there was any choice left, 
for Mufta$im, caught up. in that age of regionalism, weak . 
central 'administration and dependence on military, support, 
but to surround himself by the best and.most loyal of 
troops. The question as to the possibility of his suiting 
this with other policies not only reveals a’ projection ■ 
back into his. reign of what happened after it , but also 
ignores the facts about his upbringing and circumstances 
all over.'*' : His adniinistration was left to the very 
men who had worked with Ma*mun and.who.' had been recommended 
by the latter.^ ; Beside the reasons already advanced for. / 
choice, of .troops1 from; the East there .was the fact that 
he was in Iraq where, even had he desired, there were not 
sufficient elements to fill in the ranks of the axmiy among 
the mostly, settled 'and urbanized. population. ; This geo­
graphical, factor. is relevant to Egypt also. It was in 
these two provinces that the , rule of the Abbasids was based 
mostly upon dependence. on foreign troops. .For Mu' tasimVs . 
troops, already foreign when introduced in Iraq, their 
alienation was made doubly so by their isolation in Samarra
;1. See Chapter II above.
2. See D. Sourdel: he Visirat Abbaside., I,, pp. 2h5-60; cf;. 
. Chapterll, p. 8 7.. ~ ..
and the policy of separate settlements and non-integration 
The 1 Era of Isolation*, begun,v/ith Mu*team’s move 
to; Samarra. with his troops; had seen the reduction of the 
Abba si do Caliph to, a . de f act o posit i on of regional rulers 
or even less. What' local support, or semblance of 
local support, there was for the Abbasid Caliphate,- appar­
ent in the days of Ma'mun ainong the/ Baghdadis, at that 
time- for practical reasons, disappeared with their active 
r o 1 e. in, making it iiicuinb e nt upon, Mu Vt as im to- le ave t he i r
■ '■ g ■' •' '■ ■ ■ ■ ' V- - ' ■ 'V ' .
city; ; . - Compared to the Tahir.ids ,pr .even, the Ikhshidids 
later the ;Caliph was in a weak situation.. The Tahirids. 
had local 'support, he had not. The Ikhshidids were 
provincial governors. He was not. He was the Caliph, 
the overlord of all. What is more, isolated and de­
prived of local support, the .Caliph came, gradually to be 
the prisoner of his own troops. Enclosed by Muslim 
lands the latter were engaged in the border, pro­
blems, which was the.-case with Tahirid armies and equally 
so with the-Tulunids and the Ikhshidids. For Mu* tasim
1. See Chapter IV below.
2. See Chapter TV below.'
this was not so. .Despite the problems he faced and . 
the confirmation of the, Tahirlds in Khurasan he .was still 
the master of the: situation. His.troops defeated Bab ale 
Maziyar and marched into Byzantium. . X>,; /
1. See Chapter V below.
: ^.V 7 ",' . c h a p t e r  iv " .. - • : . * , •' .■ >: 7 ;
—■— i y w f . i i f r f r f c W M iH iw mmmmammatmtmt o
• The founding of a new capital: .SAMARRA,V: H ■ ‘  ^7:7777'
7fSurr a-man~ra* au, says Mas*udl, uis.the last of 
■•‘i.he great cities founded in, Islam*11- , Seven, in all, 
till the time of Mas!udi , these ;were according to him, ?/:\<7T:
.^i^Bagra- founded in I7/ 638/9 *, al-Kufa founded in 
17/638-9 9 al-Fustat founded in 2Q/6iiO-?i, R.amla,2 777
‘ Wa^i^ founded in,;13“l|4/ 63U^6, Baghdad founded in ' 7 7 v77.
, 1^5/762-3'and Surra-man-ra’a founded in 221/83U-5*; The -•777
one thing that they- ,had:;in common was. that they were all ;777
: except, for Rami a, gari»i son cities* Built -on the edge .. v77.:
of the desert, the natural refuge for the -predominently; 7 ":'y 777 
7 nomadic Arab invading, armies, the first five, cities t:V 7,
; maintained" all. along . an Arab-Islamic tradition. - Rising r7;V ;
almost simultaneously, except, for .Ramia, and providing '"7777777 
in the short intervalsvbetween their emergence historical
T. M as * udi: Tanbih: p *357, The omission of 'such‘clties like 7
Qum and air aw an is an indication of the feeling of ' :7
. 7; regionalism^ of "the time of Masvudi,. whose attention,.was 7-”-4 
centred on the central lands of the Abbasid Caliphate.. 7‘
2. R“aml,a:; w.aa'made into an' Islamic city by Sulayman b. * Abd 
. ; / al-Malik when he waS7governor J of- Palestine, under his
7. brother WalTd. When he became Caliph he looked after
its development. It never had, however, the same 7^ 7;.
importance o r . influence as the others. See .S.I .(l) - A 777
s. v. Rami a. 7 / 7  -7 \ y. 7.7
landmarks in{’the rapid expansion, of the Islamic Empire 
in its early stages, these five cities were populated 
on ■ the -whole,.ty Muslii Arabs who were s to1 safeguard the 
conquests ..and gradually’absorb rather than be absorbed 
by other elements* In this way they were able to' 
maintain that- Arab-I si ami c tradition which, challenged 
{later b y  :the heterogeneous cultural,heritage of what, 
became the Islamic World, was able to keep' it Islamic . J 
.;if not on the whole Arabic. This was the fulfilment 
Of the' ,policy ,of the Caliph fUmar I under w h o s e .reign 
. the ma dor Is1ami c7 c onque st s were made and who, for 
direct strategic, reasons, advised his,, generals to camp ,
their troops on the. box^ders of the desert Arab lands
7- ' ‘ . \ ' ■ - - 2 '
, and tho s e of the; new ly a c qui r e d e  ount ri e s • \ Bu t where
four of the first five of these cities, developed from y .7
camps into the cities they came tp{ be, with :only one of
- ' 7'. 3 '■ • ‘ - ■ ' ' - '
them, .al-Kufa,^ ever being a capital city.'and then only
for a short while, the last two - Baghd'ad ahd Samarra -
were {founded with the; explicit intention of their beihg-
; li See,C.Pellat: Le Millieu Basmen; J-.Hell: Kultur der 
Araber. pp. 55"C)..X; de Planhol: The World of I si am»
pp . 2-3* • { ■'' / - 7 { ' v,-'-7 .
2. .See Tabari lst._ser. year s i  V 5  A.H.
3* Under eAli ,b. Abi IJlib and-it was the -second capital,
. . Madina;{being the first one in Islam.
1 2 1  . . . j
• y" ■ 1 - ' : . i\
capital cities as well as garrisons# In this aspect
the first five belong to the development of the Islamic,
Empire and the.last two to the dynastical and political
development within the empire, being built as they were
when that empire was centuries old. Not that the first
five were restricted to that role or that the last two
did not play their parts in the development of the Empire
in its diverse aspects but that at the time of their .
foundation that distinction could be made.
Yet,.Mu f tasim, the founder of. Samarra, was but the
great grandson of Maii§ur, the founder of Baghdad. There
had been no change of dynasty. ; - What, the^, were the . .
reasons;and the circumstances which made M u fta§im
abandon the Abb as i d C ap i t a1 not long after Baghdad
had secured the Abb as id; su c c e s s i on t o the Caliphate - a
victory the first to benefit from which was Mu*tasim
himself - and at a.time when it had.no rival in. its
material and cultural supremacy in the Abbasid world?
1. Under the Umayyads, one notes a further development in
the founding of Islamic cities. Rami a was an admini s tra- y, 
tive capital while ¥/asit was a garrison city for the_^Syrian 
army in Iraq. . ' As such'these differed-from the Amsar of 
the conquest. This.separation had significantly ended 
with the rise .of the Abbasids whose power was closely .
. associated with and dependent on the army and the bureaucracy*
2. See__ above Ch. I: Y a ’gubi: Bui dan, pp. Tha1 alibi:
~ Lata1if. pp. 10h-7* E.I. * s.v. Baghdad*
V -■'77 At that time Baghdad was. over seventy-five years
7 Ay old. During those momentous years the garrison ,
7 . 7  eepital had ;grown{into, a-metropolis, Athe.,:metropolis of 7
thefslamic Empire* Blessed^with a uniqub geographical 
77 7 -situation In- an empire the economy Of {which, was trading ; 7
,7: 7 7; and agricuiturat 7and benefiting from {being ;the seat pf 
;.y government and Me';, abode of the;Caliphs, it rapidly . .
,:' , .became the/ embpdiment of the splendours of the material 7
77 ,s and cultural wealth of they Abb as i d  Wo'rld* That material.
77777 and1; cultural wealth was continually ^changing; the character
 ^;ahd, attitudes of the ever^increusingypppulatlbn of Baghdad♦ ^ 
•1 7 - In that period it had bedn, theta®ital. of hik'Caliphs.
7{ It {saw the rise an.d fall of the. Barmecides and .withstopd ..V;
7. 7 tIie-.;-Ci-vii W a n  between .Amin, aM''jMafmun.{ , 7 'Though' at •'•the 
7777 end of that war it was besieged, , damaged..;and defeated;.-/
after the heroic stand of its people for{ more than a 
>; year,yit, was soon after tp win a-vital‘ viptory over Marw,
■ 7, then the"'.capital. of Ma*mun7 when the people of Baghdad
777 - forced; M a ?-mun' tp abandon his pro-fAiid;pplicieh hrd\ leave 7
• ' 7 . .-Khurasan, for Iraql^ This was no longer the Baghdad of
'li 7 If one is7to choose one;writer whose life and works - 
77 7 are,-perhaps,7the bestv.iliustrutfoh:of this, Jahip
, wpuldjbe hbl■ -For a llsfyof his Works Tsbb;-C*Peiiat:
7 7/ Arabic a III, no. lU7-i8Q. See{_.also the description
f f  .• ' • of Baghdad in Ya* gubTrs and Yagut7 s7 Bui dans.
Mansur, built to protect him and. his supporters from
• . _ 1 . 
the anti-Abbasid influences of Kufa. That was but
the nucleus of what became a city with its own/character
it# ovm importance, and influence and its own rights*
l/3ince its foundation it had so;.grown, in size, variety
of population, wealth and character, that where the
couft and garrison were at the ti3ne/of its foundation
was. nov/ only a part of Baghdad and dominated by the
rest; - Under Mu’tasim Baghdad could dispense with
both court and garrison# The city of Man§ur had
grown into a power which could impose its. will over his
successors*
Yet until now Baghdad;had been instrumental in 
preserving within its boundaries the Court and the 
centre of government. Under Mu’ta§im, however, Baghdad 
appeared anxious to be rid of these. So far these had 
been very vital for the flourishing of its commercial 
and cultural life. With the accession of Mu*tasim the 
situation had changed. With regard to its culture he. 
had neither the. aptitude nor the training to appreciate 
and patronize such things.,' Yagut reports that Mu fta§im 
did not like.Baghdad. He was but a stranger to the
li fagut, Buldan* I , p.680. .
.2• Yagut: Buidan* I, p.691. .
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mood and spirit of that city which, seemedvfo have 
accepted his accession as a matter of? course, with . 
neither 3oy nor regret. For Di'Bil who .was perhaps 
very much in tune with that mood and spirit his accession
■ • ' ' ; •" i ’ '. - ■ , ;
* was simply;one of ,the ironies■of fate, ,//: Regarding 
commerce the city of Baghdad seems to have developed 
its activities to- a degree that made the Presence of 
the Court,hot of grea;t importance*  ^.Indeed the evidence 
is that.even after the rise of Lamarra, with all. the 
efforts of the caliphs who ruled there to draw the, 
attention and interests of the/people to it, Baghdad 
maintained its material and cultural supremacy. It 
could maintain its position Because it had a Better 
geographical situation as well as/a tradition ahd a
lead in those fields, Samarra with its court'and 
garrison and with its goyerhmental departments was
\ after all not, far, away. Moreover left to the administra-
. tion of the Taharids-who supported‘its!cause/in.the. ; 
rivalry with Samarrh, B aghdad had a Better administration 
than §dmarra and seemed to preserve-a. strong connection 
with the main T a h i n d  region in Khurasan, . It survived -
1, Muni aaavat ,' P , 123 : - Diwan pp , 13-h*
• 2 « . S,D,Qoitein: The /Rise, no, 583-6oh,
; 3* . G-, le. Strange: .Baghdad, 0.311* .
Samarra as1 a/capital and all along it was a powerful 
alternative to it as is: evidenced from the attempts 
of such caliph' as- al-Musta 'In who had to' seek its-: 
support when he wanted.free himself from the. soldiers 
of Samarra*, For the Baghdadis it was those things, 
which affected its material, social and, cultural life 
that mattered, ‘The-; presence of , the court o r i t s  
'atis'ehcefFaB- seen from that angle, .And .on these things 
Baghdad stood to lose with the-presence of Mu'tasim's
court, which meant the presence/of,his unruly soldiers
• - p - ' / ; ' v,:* 'f  ' ' ' . . ■
as well* ; That is why the Baghdadis were active and
vocal in making, Mu'td^im 'abandon- their city*. ' No patron
of culture, his court was not, a gheat stimulant to.
trade. On the contrary his; soldiers, Turlcs::and .others,
were ;a menace to the peace and/ security of the city and
. a c au s e of di srup t i on. to.: i t s 1 so cl al, cultural. as well
as commercialtlife. These used to -gallop in the streets;
of the city, their horses "Injuring and killing children,
■ : ' . 3 • . •/ . . . "./ /' / ' * . ’ /■
women and men* 'Their behaviour towards women, like
1. Ibid, , 0,311* 1 / , ; / ; .  ?\
.:2 * Yaqut: Buldan, III,p,17; Ibh Iiamdun: Tadhkira, p , 104. 
4* Taloari, :p,I181; E.M, .00*16-17* Ya*aubi: /BUIdan,b.3Q*! 
M a f sudi,VTT ,p*ll8; Idem: Tahblh. p ,356; Bala ami,IV,;
p p .524-5♦ ■ /,"■■■ /.-^ '‘r->
.'that.-of'-.most-, -of. the:..soldiers.* -in their situ a tioh, :
f  abd seems to have aroused many problems* '* Thus they ■ 
pro'yoked, the feeling ,of,.the Baghdadis. dgainst them . 
and against the caliph w h o ■was the/primary cause for 1;, 
their being, there;. ! ; The. pebple; retaliated ,by-injuring / 
and killing some of themy^' But th^t: was;no,!s^ to
; the . problem; for'"the incidents continued*^ ' The Baghdadis 
. had to •ridfthemselves of the; menace1 completely by freeing 
their M t y  from the/presehce of those/unruly soldiers „ .
and making, it into what it- was often called;, a !city 
of ,peace V (madlnat al-Salam)♦' y "vV 7 h * l y / / . '  v‘ ^
' The, development , of the o p p o s i t i o n s ^  included 
;■ ail ; the different elements of the Baghdadis/ to that ' ’/h, 
Situation /is/interesting*,/? In its -different ..stages 
it Shows how/keon they were/to preserve qf thecourt only 
. what suited their interests^// /First- they sOught of 
: Mu11a§im; tio curb . the.?ekcesses of the soldiers*^;> . If 
/;that'’-''-courd be done, the. presence bf thehsoidier s'-;;would / / ■
' stimulate: the commercial Activities of-'ifcoity'/aM they 
themselves might, be gradually Inifluenced, perhaps absorbed,/
ta V . : Yaqut: Buldan>11.1 ,p * 16; Ibh Hamdun :/Tadhkira', p • 10h*
2. Se4-;above,. ,p*r,.~4' ' n* 4* 1 :'V’ f'./' p/! // " <•
v3* Yaqut; Buldan.Ill ,p*17;; Ibh Hamdun, op.cit,, .p.lO.hV - ;
by Its p.opuiation, giving it thereby more vitality 
and power 4 /  But/that cbuld not be done* , Then their ' 
reguest was/that Mu*tasim move his soldiers outside 
the city without moving,his court with,them* That
would have kept the court and government - iii Baghdad*
But Mu! ta§im7could not-remain without his soldiers* •!
Only when the Baghdadi s realised that they had to . . 
accept -all or lose all, they made it clear that they 
would rather lose all than leave their city to the, 
mercy of Mu*tasim's soldiers. - In this stand they ' 
seem to have been;possessed of a political'maturity that 
made them realize"that/after all Mu*ta§im could not go 
/fai* away from Baghdad. Previous" traditions pointed 
that way and the, current/political situation with en­
trenched /regionalism|/:the Tahirids in Khurasan,and 
revolts .against/Mu'tasim almost everywhere,, showed that 
‘ Iraq ;was''thefonly safe place for. an Abbasid Caliph*— " 
Baghdad thus, came; to the conclusion that it was 
f  etter off without Mu'ta^im and-his Turksw For * .
! 1* :v Yaqut, :Buldfan,III,p.!7;, , Ibn Hamdun, Tadhkira * p . 104
E.I. (iX7 sTv* Qatul, Kaqqa, below.; p(*7 ”
;3* vSee Ch* T above'and7Ch* Y i  below.
Mu'tasim there-were equally important reasons which 
necessitated the move from B aghdad* These were ho,. .
. less than the ,safety of. his life.and that of his . ; 
troops upon, which his reign depended* The hostility' 
of the Baghdadis to his new troops was coupled with a.
? differently‘motivated, hostility of some of the old troops* •
■ it was to the Abria* . that Tabari attributes the sporadic 
killing of some of the new troops in the street ihc.idents
' " •— 1 -/■ V - . " /A -r; -;f' <- 7 '
. of Baghdad*, / For Ya'qubf it was .the common people who ■/■ 
were responsible.* For Mas'udi it was the common : ^
people in one instance, the people of B aghdad with no
■ / • . ■' .'■■■• ■. ' ' , 3
// special reference to a particular group in another*^
Furthermore Tabari states that Mu'tasini exx^ressed fear
of another . group of. the old troop s, the Harblyya,^  •'•
1. Tabari, p •118lj E.M•,pp •16-7 > E.M• pi16, translates Abria1
/ as the 1 young men (the natives.)1 Tabari, perhaps, meant
/. those of ,the veterans/troops who were of mixed Arab-
\ . Persian descent or those who were related to tbe. Abb as id
d y n a s t y C f • J a h i z Manaqib* pp. 6-7r 15-9* E.I* ( 2),
, s..v._Abna' */ V /•■';/ : :.v . • ' - ■ ' . ’
2 * Ya'qub i * Buld an * P ♦ 30 *
. 3:. Mas udi, ,.VII,p:*119; idem,, Tariblh, p.*35,6* ./ !• •
4* Name of. the ..corps and; the place in which it. resided. .
. ; ; . The corps .was! mainly",of Persian infaxitry* Both place V.
and corps were related to Harb b. .‘Abd* Allah al-Balkhi, 
see Baladhuri: Futuh, IV, p*4l5; d.Le Strange, - Baghdad:
:/v Index., E.M• ,p. 15 • translates HanbiVya as .‘‘warrTbrs77!™™"
in n* 105a she .cal 1 s. them the Arabs«. /
on deciding to leave Baghdad* It.,was for these; 
reasons more than because of, the.protestations and 
opposition of the Baghdadis that Mu* ta§im deemed it 
necessary, to abandon Baghdad for a place where, he 
could eliminate the; possibility of a sudden attach 
from the Harbiyya upon his new troops and at the same 
time he able to descend oh the former with the latter, 
if the need arose. It thus became his explicit 
intention to moire to a place..north ofrBaghdad, upstream 
and thereby .be, /geographically, * over1 these soldiers,
(fawgahum) where he could have the advantage of land 
and water attack, v
It is relevant to note here that Mu* ta§im was 
not the first to seek an alternative to Baghdad• His 
father Harun. al-Rashid, who had spent quite a good deal 
of time in/Ragga, was also known to have founded a new 
city in al^atul 1 having feared from the Jund (soldiers)
1. Tabari, pp. 1179/SO; S.M*, pp. 15-6; Yaqut.Buldan,III,■
• p. 16; Ibn Hamuduh: Tadhlcira, , p . 10k i' N 1 urn an Thabit,. al- 
' . Jund lyy a fi al Pawl a al-Abbassiya, pp. • 35-6, T ab ar i s ay s:
. that-the Turkish*troops:.also complained of the killing 
of their, mates.
2* P.P,$, n. 1 , above; al-'Fakhri : p .519• k ♦ M . ,p.l5, gives
an interesting translafloh fo'r the phrase containing the , 
word•: fawqahum. ,f • • • • and kill my pages and me on top of. 
them.1*", "she writes. This,, however,: does not carry the 
sense of the phrase or the whole, piece as it is in 
Tabari, p. 1180. €f. al-Pakhi»i, p#319• -
h ' ■ ' • 1 w .
w/at Mu'tasim feared", as Tabari writes. 0is brother
Ma^mun, who stayed in, Marw at the• beginning of his reign,.-
is also said to have, spent much time at al-Shammasiyya,
outside’ Baghdad. The growth of'.Baghdad itself was
largely due to the building of residences' in the outskirts
of the city by caliphg, princes, secretaries and the like.
It is suggested that perhaps Mu ’tasim was motivated by
the desire to follow the example of some of his predecessors
who founded cities or new. guarters of cities in their names
for reasons of fame and prestige. But this had hardly- ..
been the.case with the foundation;of. previous capital cities,
all of which had solid political and.strategic reasons
for their emergence. Besides, for Mu’tasim the sources
do not suggest this.
Like his predecessors Mufta§im tried places near 
to Baghdad. He first moved to? al-Shammasiyya, the 
place which M a fmun used to freguent for months, but that 
proved to be too small for his purposes and too close to 
Baghdad. He then moved to al-Baradhan,. only to leave
1., , Tabari , p.1180; E.M. ,p.l6; Balddhuri, Futuh, IV, p *4l7r 
’■‘Yaiffut,. Buldan,III,p.16;,al~F akhri, p. 319; Bala1 emi ,IV,
PP*523/U. ' /.'■/.
2. N a.1 i’ al-As-ll: Idadlnat al-Mu1 ta^irot.p»16I|.. This .tendency 
to build new cities*; was guite-- common ‘among members of 
the ruling families in Islam. The Urnayyads had already 
■ a summer residence in al-Rasafa; so -had the Abbasids and 
. others similar pleasure or seasonal residences. . See X. 
de Planhol: The World of>Is lam, p.lu ;
3* Y a* gQbi: Buldan ,p73.0. ... . .
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it for a- place called Bahamsa on the eastern bank of 
the-Tigris, in .-Its. turn abandoned for,,,al-Matira* Prom 
there Mu * t a§im went to al~Qatul which had been founded 
\by his f ather al«Rashid‘. There heplanned his new 
capital, -extending the river Qatul to the centre; of " .
. the city and, plotting the:.different guarters for the 
/ commanders, the soldiers, the secretaries,and the 
common.people and the market places on the banks of.,
■ - both rivers, the Qatul and the Tigris. Here the
; sources differ, with Tabari and Mas1udi .going to opposite 
extremes. According to Tabari there was one uninterr~ :
■ up ted move from -Baghdad to Samarra.; H e . does not mention 
, any'building. in Qatul but, says that-tents were pitched 
' ■ for M u1 tasim and the people in Qatul, and that MuVta^im ■
kept on the move till he reached the site of.Samarra 
and began building there. According to Mas'ucll not . 
only did Muf ta§im build a in Qatul. and call . .
. up on the people to move to his new. c apit al, but, that 
Baghdad was almost deserted as a result of the. move 
to the new city* - y ■ Yagut* s version.which states that
1. ■'Y a1 q u b i Buldan, p.30. :
2. Tabari, pp.'*11,80-1; E.M.. pp 15-7•
3• Mas* udi, VIX,pvll9*
M u ’ tasim went straight to Samarra is close to Tabari’ s', 
probably copied from it or from the same sources.
, Heoho wever comes closer to tlie other s, Mas’udi .and 
. Ya’gubi, in; a different version. Ya* gub*I * s version
*  ^ '• '*V l> ■ < , - - * " "
is on the other hand, nearer seems ,
to. have copied from Y a ’lgubT with additions from other , 
sources.^ Y^a^ ,v4^bl '.Bays . that Mu ’tagim started the 
building of Qatul.having allocated plots to;the generals, 
the secretaries, the: common people and the market places 
bn the banks of the two rivers. The building rose to 
a considerable height while Mu*tasim stayed in guarters 
made specially, for him, as did the other people.- Qa$ul. 
was then abandoned on f inding that the nature of the 
soil was difficult to build upon. This is, the most 
acceptable .version of. all. While it is difficult to 
accept the. idea of Mu’tasim pitching and moving his 
tents from one place to another from. Baghdad to Samarra, 
it is egually difficult t o .accept the idea of Qatul . 
rising so guiekly fo/fa position which, almost drained 
-Baghdad of its population. Tabari himself ^ mentions
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Mu*tasim*s move to gatTal in a manner which suggests
that he .was not merely passing through it. Moreover,
archaeological findings support the fact"that Mu*tasim
-  _  1
did start a city in gatul. In any case these places 
mentioned above were not far from either Baghd'ad or 
Samarra..
Like. Baghdad, Samarra was built on the site of an
ancient city. However, with regard to the geographical
situation which made Baghdad a centre of commerce. -
being the meeting point of land and waterways, and having
the proximity of important sea ports like Basra and Ubulla,
as well as centres of culture like Kufa, Basra and ancient
• *
Ctesiphon, Samarra was no match for Baghdad. The story
of ,how. and why Mu*tasim chose the site, how he bought it
and the tradition circulated in connection with the
name, the history and the fate of the place has been told
by many. Bo too are the topographical and architectural
characteristics of the city of Samarra from the time
of its foundation throughout the period in which it was
2 , ' 
an Abbasid capital. These need not be repeated here#
1,- See Haji al«AsTl; M.adihat al-Mu* tasim.
2. Ya’gubTi Buldan,p.31; Mas1 udi: Tam&ih,p.357;idem: Murud,i VIX 
PP.12Q/1; Yat qubT, Buldan.Ill .p.15: Bala1 ami ,IV,pp752475# 
Also see B.Hergfeld.G-eschichte.. der Stadt Samarra, F.Sarre & 
E.Hergfeld.Ausgrabungen von Samarra, H.Viollet .Description 
du Palais d^  "Vl"Moutarsin andr^Un^Balais Musulman du IXe
: Si~ecTetr and Qreswell, Early Muslim Architecture. B.Erancis 
.& M.Ali: Jam is Abi Dulaf.
Certain aspects of these should however he emphasised*
The sources speak of Mu* tasim*s move to' Samarra, 
his new capital, with his troops, his secretaries and 
other people in year 221/835-36 in which he began the 
foundation of that city* Leaving aside;the ordinary quarters 
of the troops .and the commoners these' sources, speak of «.
the founding ..of a number of’..p^E^€€s built as residences .• 
for Mu*tasim himself, for some of his generals and for 
other important men in the administration. Beside 
these there were the mosques, the market places, the 
public baths and governmental buildings. It is not 
clear whether or iiot that these buildings\were completed ,
within that year but the general, impression is that
. . 1 \ ‘ . ‘ • - - - ' " ' ' ' / ■; 
they v/ere. But whether dr not they were then completed*.
the enormity of the.project Reflects a great deal on •
the financial, and material powers of the Abbasid
State despite a; long civil war not very far behind
and a series.:of major revolts .at hand.;, For-the ,/
fo unding„o f •the c i t y 9 la nd s urv eyors,, c iv i1 engineers,
architects, skilled workers and.building5 materials,
were drawn from all over the Abbasid\!^ orid>'--notably
'■ '• , ' ' . ' ' • ' ’ " ; ' v "
  '   ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ’
1. The palace known as.al-Jawsaq was built between .221-5/ ;
^3*S^fl^^vD*S.Rice: Deacon or Drink, p. 15. - ; ■
from Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Baghdad seemed to have 
provided the example to .be followed, especially in 
the lay out of markets and craft-centres, or to be 
departed from, as was the case with the general 
outlook of the new capital. Where the garrison of 
Baghdad, in the early, period of its foundation was con-' 
tained together with the; court and the government 
buildings within the round walls of the small city 
of Mansur, Samarra had no round walls. Mansur, 
then involved in the process of cementing the ascendancy 
of. the Abbasid. dynasty against its enemies and against
the fanatics and malcontents from amongst his own
: ; \ ’ ' - ...0 ' .
supporters, was more pressed for safety and security
and more directly threatened in these aspects than 
Mu*tasim who saw in the move from Baghdad the. solution 
, of these problems * S*amarra was his city and that' of 
his own troops. It is also clear that Mansur felt that 
the garrison would only be the centre around which the 
city would grow. Moreover, with Baghdad in the back­
ground Mu* tasim was determined to build a city that 
would rival Baghdad.
The description of Samarra, as founded by Mu*tasim 
and developed by his successors, seen in works of such
136;
as Ya’gubi, Mas*udi, Yagut and others, and supported
by archaeological findings, is of a city having all
the features of an Islamic capital such as mosques,
\palaces, gardens, public baths, market places, craft
■centres, diwans9 police headquarters, prisons, stables
1
and the like* The remarkable feature of Samarra
; was that it was a well; planned city from the start*
As if to avoid the collisions which used to take place
in Baghd’ad the streets of S'amarra were wide, and long*
In the centre of the city, cutting right across it,
was the Grand Street, (al-Shari1 al-Af;sam.) ' In that
1 1street there were the centre of police (ma.ids aJm-§hurta), 
the great prison, the great mosque and the caliph’s official 
residence - Dtlr al-ldhilafa wa-hiya dar al~* Jmma - in which 
the Caliph used to meet the people on Mondays and
I:..---.-'*' ■ 2 , ’ .
Thursdays. , There, too, were the public and private 
treasuries. This same street, inhabited on both sides: 
by civilians (al-nas) with small local markets and craft 
centres for daily consumption led to IChashabat Babak.
1. A.Buri: Dushu* ad-Ashaf, pp. 134-7r X.db Planhol;
■ The World, of Islam. p.9*
2. H.Vioilet; Description du Palais d1al-Moutasin.pp.15-26: 
idem: Un Palais Musulmandu IXe Si^cle.
the wooden frame oh which Babak’s body was mounted 
after his execution, and to the Great Market. In 
the Great Market, kept away from the houses, each . 
trade had its own quarters and so had each craft*
' In the main part of the city, that is excluding-the 
.residences of the Caliphs:and other notables and. 
government buildings, a great(sense of economy prevailed 
in building, materials, labour and designs. The houses: 
were on the whole built of unburnt brick and a functional 
tendency dictated their shapes and internal divisions. 
This was quite in harmony with the speed in which these 
buildings were made, more so with the taste of their 
residents, the soldiers of.Mu*tasim. With the palaces, 
and government buildings it was different ,, as S’amarra 
had a lot to show of the splendours and beauty of, Islamic 
.art and architecture, in what- were Dar al-Khilal a.. al-
; ’Ashigli, al-Jawsaci, al-Malwiyya, Jami* Abu Dulal and
. - ■' ''2 - * - 
others.. Although influenced, by the styles , of old
Islamic cities, notably Baghdad. Damascus and Pus tat..,. .
,1. . Ya* qubi: Buldan, III, pp. 32-4; Mashdi, VII,p.122; 
Bergfeld: Geschichti der Stadt Samarra,p.106; X* de 
Blanhol: The World of Islam,pp.11-13 * ,
2. AbbvdV p.joS? n.;;2, ; Greswell: Early Muslim
Architecture: pp. 259-67, 274-91*
Samarra.showed something more than mere copying 
and thus struck an image of its own* It is true 
that>raostof (this appeared in the buildings completed t 
after Mu* tasim.; But even Mu'tasim who , according to * 
labarlV had d cra;2se for buildings but carbd for nothing
more than,strength and utility in them, left, a great
" ’ . ■ ' " ; : -v.’" ' 1 • v ':/ >  '■ . ' \
legacy in the palaces which he built.
; It ds most-important in connection with, the rise.
of Samarra, especially in relation to the social,/ : ’
:political and,cultural development of the; hew capital,
to , note .the., policy which M u ’tasim initiated fin settling
the different groups of peoples. These groups were to
:he !quite separate from one another , and in planning
them thd.Jpr^ original homes was maintained.
The Turktsh^:tropps“‘wez>e/settl:ed- near to those, froim
. Parghana and Ushrusana~ These were kept;quite apart
from the, ■quarters of al-lfas - a term used to moan the
different civilian, people, who came, to the new: city to
make its life /complete with regard to . social ;andeconomic
1. Tabahi , p. 1326; B.M. ,p.l30; Mas* udi ,VII ,p.l04; Bar- / . 
fiabracns>r;l ,/p*133 ; also h.2. above,^p/; j 5;/ •
/2>. ■ Ma^udi /.op.cit. .p.122 * Yafqubi: Bui dan p. 32-3. This M 
was not; new./ Earlier cities ,, later ones; also:,; had ‘ ./ 
ethnic'groupings. X.de Planhol: The World of-Islam;, pp* 13 
;/3. Maaudi/L. op.v.dit . ,p»122 . Ya x qubi: op.cit. ,p*33-§*:, /: /;;
1
services. They were also kept apart from, the
KhurE'sanis, who were settled.with the people on.
both sides of the Grand Street. Even within the
individual group the settlement was under different.
commanders like iishirias, KKa;gan ’^ rtuj, WasTf .and 
2others. This however did not seem to have.been 
related to tribal or regional groupings within the 
particular major group (Turks, Earghanis or Ushrusanis.) 
nevertheless it had to do with the unity and esprit de 
corps within each group and explains the rivalry which 
developed later within the dominant group of; the Turks 
.and thereby threatened the stability of the succession 
to the Caliphate. More significant was the fact that 
M u 1tasim had made it a clear-cut policy that each group 
was to marry within its own ethnic community. Ya’cfubi 
reports that Mu1tasim bought Turkish slave girls and 
had these married to his Turkish troops and forbade 
these troops to marry among the MuwalladTn. He 
further says that Mu1tasim fixed some payments for 
these slave girls, and had their names, in the registers
1. Ya’qubi: Buldan, pp.32/3.
2. Yafqubl: op.cit. .pp..32-4. Mas^di, Muidrd.i .VII .P. 122,
,of.‘\the;;DTwans;^ that it was hot possible for.any of
.. ; their :3hasbands th- divorce.oh Teave;; ; i h e m ■ ;>Mof t 
•T<vr\ > . probablythe; same;^policy1 wasapplied‘,tcr they,other 
.  ^ •■-. groups .' the vEargbarirs, the,. UshrusanTaand theyi .
" : w  ; it is not clear whether these, three. ;
■Kgrbub^:werh?hlsh':f;brbidto the
. ;- J rlse‘;.of: S^di^fthe^ attention of ; the; writers 
■'; : *;Ona’turallyy^^ "'ta the'-:lVurka^whb. were uhdoubtedly * , :
'; ■ the dprninanl elenient . in the * army and the: closest group ,
to the.baliph Mu^tasim^ tWoHfactors which:'cpntribut^ d'^ "^^ ....>- 
 ^i to their ih;:the 'history of " the-city after ;
: V- This ^Ifc^ybf^ was; a. great departure from h ’
spirit of^Islam End the irdditiohs of the Islamic j ■
"; : ly; ;-Empire.,; y;^ iiihdugh inythe;;Islamic: cities, that wore \ -:
■ -founded^^bhforeySnmarra, the ;tribaliand rhgiona3?"s e t t i e J  
ments of .tha; armies /were the patternh that prevailed 
^-y’there 'were;no such a policy of co-existence ;
>; ./y, : without mixing; or ; intermarrying, ; , Jn^ thOVearl^ , /
■ -rKufa;find:Basra;^  led y
/'y,- ; ,°n /& tr i h u l ^ it was the tribal spiritythat made , '
/ y - W W y ' '  I *  ^a'VgUbx: Buldan.p ^ 3 3 » V " ■•• - " / v
t he tr iha 1. grbu ping.; the basis of . ,s e t t l e m e n t ■ La t er 
onwhen the nicies;were composed/on a regiQiial basis 
it the caliphs to" have; the different '
:guartersy so arranged that they" ■could use, one group " 
against: they pthefyln' case of need, as was/ the case in 
the settlements of Baghdad. But in all these places 
social,"cultural and racial mixing soon produced a 
well-knit.society despite economic and social -variations*^• 
■;T:he historical;; circumstances together /with: economic and 
social :cph&;^bhs which favoured this, must/not be 
ignored. UniIke Baghdad, Samarra had no K*ufa or Basra 
:1 n ■ ;its:-lilntoridnd>y‘hoi* had it in/.the nascent spirit 
of/the AbbasidyRevolutioh (which for. the . common purpose 
;6f ,economic; and, social -equality with Muslim ideals • 
tbugh't the /different elements, together J- as • § moving 
force In shaping/ it|; destiny. , if anything it had come 
in d ,-per iod...which- mar k e d ^  "end. o f ■ the popular seal for
./■ ' ' y'/../-:/'/'; 2 ; •/.■,;/’ ■ ■ •
the Caliphs andthe /Caliphate • The fate of, these had ; 
now become a matter of military power based on'• professional
;s®ldiers.^,y/vV - . - V / y/y'-.S /• y-’ 1 ..-yy
1. GvPellot: Le Millleu Basrien.pp.21-3^♦
2?. / Gibby;Government and Islam. p. 122; Chapter I above•
3« - Jahis, Manhffiby  p.45» ;
: The reasons fox* Mu’tasim's policy are thus not so {1
difficult to find# Now that the perpetuation of the \ 
/Caliphate was dependent on, military power, M u ’tasim I 
saw;in the preservation of his troops separate and I
ethnically pure the safeguard for his future and that I
v  ■ i ■ .. !
of his successors. The maintenance of the military /
spirit among these troops by keeping them away from /
any civilian influence was'moreover a vital necessity / '
, 's; ■ : ’ ■ ■ • . • ; V- r
for a Caliph who had to defend his, realm against a j 
-series of serious revolts. If'the Abbas i'd Caliphate 1 
.was in;a state of slow expansion in the East with the 1 
Tahirids, it was in a state of defence in those parts 
which were directly under the rule of the Caliph, in 
Iraq, .Syria, Armenia and Egypt.
■The age of the military men, as has been suggested, 
was a result of previous developments, notably those in - 
.the, reign of Ma*mun* M a fmunfs men were, however, the 
direct or indirect products of the traditions of Baghdad. 
They were not alien to. the sentiments and the thinking 
of the people to whom they belonged. Ashinas, Itakh,
1> . It is not clear from where Mu* tasim. had this- idea 
' r of ethnic purity. - *
2. See Ch.. 1, above.
Wasaf and Sima of Damascus, were amongst these having
. : ' —  1 ' -V>- .
been bought in Baghdad* To these generals, the
caliphs, the Caliphate and the people had their own
sanctity and respect. It is significant that
duriiig their period of power, under Mu*tasim and Wathiq,
they served all of them very well* Even Afshin amd
Maziyar who fell foul of Mu*tasim were a part of this
tradition and belonged to a class ~ like the Tahirids *
which combined the ability of the general with the
ambitions of the- statesman. With the. rise of S'amarra .
a new tradition was begun; a tradition in which the
character of Mu1tasim, the nature of "his.troops and
the events of his reign all played parts. The new
generals who v/ere, to rise to power in the garrison
atmosphere of Samarra with its social division, its
military spirit.,: and rivalries and jealousies of the
different commanders and the groups, were ones who saw
no further than, the immediate, use of power and pay. .
The situation was aggravated by the fact that the T
Abbasid administration in the, central regions under the
caliphs was shaken and the power and financial resources
1. Yaf,ftubi , Buldan,pp. 29-30
of the caliphs :wdrh diminishing wi^ . ( V
strbng 5regional dynasties1* .f1^Wha.i'
dynasty had the :curse of/a successipn of\ weak; Caliphs, 
fbr:';a; long- period,after alr^athlg^;^
. ; " With-vthe^.efforts'.;of "Mu*t d slit and some of lxis r, 
successors, nofdbly his: son al-Mutawalkkii,: Sumafra /'/ 
grew'rapidly into a big.city surpassing Baghdad in the
spread/ of: its .buildings and; drawing1 to: it; all: sorts .1. ; -
of:;? p^bpies: with different craftsand trades.^ : . having 
..:f inished v/ith the plahhing/;^ of the:.found-J :
ation of the' buildings on the^ eastbrirbank'.of/the^ ; ^  -fc; 
Tigris, v/here tlie ci ty wa*b‘:-located,' M u 1 tagim erected a ; 
bridge to the western side ;c>f; the , river. - Th^ >V . . :
\ embarked on a programme ;of development giving each:: ^ 
Ocommander y^ a^part-td look after..;: h/halae'bs with: terraces -r 
• ma.jails ~y. ponds ;ahd< squares 1 fruit , gardens: and. crppV//:
■; ivfields/ -soph grew up to; attractr theattbntibnoofthe " \! 
r' notables; whose .;bbmpetitlp^ even/the/smallest ^
plots of land. made the price of land rise nonsiderably.n^ 
£ a l m ^ e e s v fr seedlings; .of fruit/trees from:
1> Ya!qubi: Buldan, :pVi58-i..Masudi^Vli,'^ 122^:N.-ThSbit
Ql jdhndiyya . p .35 * - 1 , . ? Vy:Tv,
21. Ya * qub i ; Vo: p . c i t. . p p. 3 8 -9; lbn^Hawa a 1: d 1-M a b&likV r: 
. pp,i66/7. v ,.
Me so po t drri i a , S yr i a , A 1 -J ibai, Ra y y; and Khurasan, 
together; with .the: people ;tb look after them were, 
transported; to; the new. capital. And so was. the 
chbe with''theli:di'ffereni; crafts ;/; ‘‘paper .makers from 
Eg^Pt* -glass/makers > potters - and carpet-niakers; from:
Basra j/' oldth^raakers i and oi 1-makers , (Adhan) froni Kuf a , 
‘kengineefh/anifc^ ' of .differ eht-crafts and
trades^; were se ttled in the new-: city*^ • The, plants
and. cbops grown .in?a rich sollleft fallow for years, 
and the tra de s * and: craf t s : enc our age d wit h t he;, ne e ds of' 
a growing city add the necessities and fruits of a 
reign of; bampaigndvfiourTshed tp .such an;.extent that / 
manyKpeople> sought their^fortunesin the pew capital.2 
The .Watbr^rbhtl^on the •IShari * al^Khali3 ~ the Bay :
Street «; was, busy with the activities .of merchants:and 
the • arr iv al pf; bax^ges and.- boatsVlpaded.with. different 
merchandise from .Baghdad«: Was it, Kaskar ,:Babr a , Ubulia, 
Ahwaz^ Mosul>,;:Ba;l:arba'ya, ^ Diy^e Rabi!’a a n d .their hinter— . 
.iahdsi.y/ i The proximity of" S’amarra to Mesul, B a ’arbaya and
■1.--A Ya,* qubi : BUidSh^p,39. _  ' Iv.r/AAA/;
2 • Ya1 qubi f, op>cit« ,p. 6iMasudi , VII .p. 122, ■ . - ,?J 
3i Ya * qubi: o p. c it .ypV381 Samarra was about km. from 
-Baghdad. A l B. Francis &■ MvAli: damife Abi Pula#,p. 60»
By Thabit y hl-rdundiyya » p.35.
Riyar Rabi1a ■-’making, for direct contactbetween 
producer. qhdyc.onsuiiier A  was , a .great inf luenceln the 
; rise of the pribbsl .of c ereals, ..notably, wheat, in favour
-of the producersAin;these" placesy 'v A  ^ ?;:/
A:; Wfth;ibeVrapid developmentthese"/adtivities and 1
thatyf lourishi^ state, ofAaffairs;,v Snmarra - so ■/
’ - called uf ter the name of' the" city that-was- 'dhce//built r 
by Sam, -son/of-:"Rqhh:Aasr’'the. traditiongo'es ^ r^is so6n [ 
cailed Surur iian R a ’I  -■ the delight of him who ,saw (it).
. That name was : in turn shortened; to Surra man Ra f8t ■- he ' . 
.who■ /b^  it-was 'delighted. Finally dt was nicknamed ; - 
V Sa1 a man/Ra '1$ A/I the^sight) grieved him whb /baw ( it ) •*** ,;A 
Havi ng/rnaintai.ned; the/ rapid development under the reign 
- o f ' MufawakkiT9 vthoV^pace slowed in the time of/his: son^ 
/bi^untasir/::.and/ the reign of al^Iuat* in.; • //
\Its/fate was reflected in;its* different.names A btldsely- 
connected ,with the fa te of the AbbasId.Caliphate t hen 
growing ^ weaker and^ weaker/with\ the/inferferehpe^ qfAtRey' /
/1rpops an d ;i the: grbtfth of strong regiqhalAgbvernors#^
,1. Mas y„u,dt * Ai1 ahbT4ypV3571 ideifit Mur udi. VII. pp.:: 121-2;Yaqut
■ V' BuldLah;Ill.pp. 14-16.. -.,;;/ / -./ ; /
2.* A v' ../ . / A;'-/yv
A3;* / Ibh Badrun, p*292.; D. Sour del: Le Vis Ira t Abbas ide .11. 
PP^ R45^ 6* '
Unlike Baghdad, whose population and economic and 
social growth'enabled.it. to bear, though not without . 
occasional loss, the fluctuations in the political 
fate of. the Caliphate,. Samarra, mainly e garrison, 
could not weather the political storms.that raged in 
it without 'complete decline., the more so. as Baghdad, 
a great rival, was close at hand. v A
Even at the time of its_ rapid growth and .power,
• f |p(^  "V
under Mu* tasim and Wathiq, Samarra seemed to have been 
living in a different cultural world from that in 
Baghdad. With the flourishing of learning and science 
so marked at that period and so directly influenced by 
Mu*tasim*s predecessor Ma*mun, .Samarra* s atmosphere‘at 
that time was one of trials and executions - Afs&Tn 
and Maziyar - and of campaigns.. Though that period 
had amongst its; poets, Abu Tammarn,1 Di*bil and al-Buhtri, 
amongst its -writers land thinkers. al-dahiz and. amongst 
its traditionists Ahmad b. Hanbal, none , of these had an 
incentive to live, in Samarra or be connected,:with its 
court and politics, except al-Jahiz and that for political and 
sectarian:reasons. Even one like the singer al-Mosuii
1. Abu Tammarn had, certainly praised Mu* tasim on more than 
one occasion. So did other poets of minor repute. But 
the wanderings of Abb Tammarn and jfche persons who were the 
■ subjects of his px*aise show how Samarra was rivalled polit­
ically and culturally in more than one centre ,in: the^ 
Caliphate. See Hajib Muhammad alVBahbiti; Abu Tammarn, 
Hayatuhu.wa-Hayatu Shi*rihi.
148
whose place should have been the court could not stay
■ ' _  1
in Samari^a. With the caliphs and the 'Caliphate 
under the power of the professional soldiers, the
affairs of State fell in the hands of the scribes, who
- 2
had a traditional enmity with the men of learning.
The latter with the bulk of the people were the alter­
native power upon which the Caliphst#-; would call for 
support. It is worth remembering that this period was 
soon followed by the appearance of the great chroniclers 
like Tabari, Mas*udi and Ya*qubi who, coming at the end 
of the political unity and strength of the Galiphate, 
reflect a sense of a glorious past that they were so
anxious to record and tell their people about. Their
period in its turn was followed; by that of regional 
historians when the division of the Caliphate had become
a fact. It is equally interesting to note that
Baghdad, to whose glory and power the former school of
1. Aghani. Vol.Y. pp. 93-4.
2.. See Jahis, Bharam Akhlaq al-Kuttab-; G-ibb: The Social
Significance. pp.105-15; Muntapayat. p.95.
3. This evolution could be sensed in literary works too. 
al-Mutanab^’s' poetry and career reflect a hankering 
for glory and power that were once the lot of Oaliphs - 
and prophets - which he felt he deserved. al-Mu’arri’s 
on the other hand x^eflect A disillusionment in all 
these, and in religion too*
writers always referred was often called raadTnat al-
Salam - the City of Peace' - while Samarra was often
•. ' 1 
referred to-as-al-TAskar, the Gamp.
1. . Mas*udi: Tanbih.p.357; Yaaubi: Buldan.1X1.p.23; 
al-Muhabbar / p.376. To the 1Asker are related
some of the *AlTd Imams who lived there and^are 
referfed to as a 1-1 Aslcarriyyun. See Yaqubi above 
and Abu al-Perdd-d^ Magatil al-TalibiyyIn« p.385.
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CHAPTER y  "S - \ \ :, ■
The Ma.ior Events of the Reipen
■; M u 11a§im. was. not- .a" great caliph* He was however 
a competent general* His reigh could not bd called 
glorious especially when compared to that of his father 
al -R ashid,or his hrother and predecessor al-Ma'mun..
But it was eventful. To the chroniclers it was a 
series of continuous campaigns.*^ His, victories in 
these campaigns' were not conquests. All the same they 
were important*. .lli/hile ridding the Caliphate of a number - 
of serious revolts, these campaigns had helped to confirm 
the ascendency of the Generals, especially the, Turkish' 
generals around MuVta^im, and while helping regional; 
governors, lilcer tlie TPahirids in Khurasan and. the Aghlabids 
in North Africa, to consolidate their dynastic power in . 
their regions; they also helped to preserve the status quo 
between the Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire. " .• -'
With the details of these events in early Arabic; .••'
1 • Mas 1 udi: Tanblh, pp.* 355-6; Blnawarl; Akhbar, pp .398^7;
Ibn gutaiba; val~Maf arif» pp.199-200> Ibn. al-Nagili^ ; Buidan,
. ' pp. 52-3* . Tabari1 s accotints of the reign are translated 
.by ,E. Marin under the title: The Re ten o f al -Muf t as lm * ~
/Tt.//;3 soArce^^ Ya^ulii"^ -Mas fudi;,' arid'- ■/1 : "
; *  ^ (With-the many; studies^; on these ~eyentuV/it is unnecessary
to treat’--thdm/..a%‘ length ;‘herev;;\ u l;fl^ is sufficient in 
/'■^-vVvr:.' 1^ 'Burveying; them^hriefly to/hrihgcoiit their particular - ■ , ,
• V points:^ of ihtere at as. w e l l  as their ,fsigriif icanee/for; the .
_ ; 7 ; treiids of:levelopnient in.the Abbasxd;World.. ? -
; . ,u;y Perhaps the most imporfantviOf these events was the /
; ,/ h r e v o l t d f  Babak. the iOiurramite of Badhdh.2 Having raged 
t  .,//// for- ahout ’18, years he'fore the accession of Mu,1 ta$im and !"v
p 6iiticaloecophmic; and^geogi|ohical integrity . .
/:/oti^^ threatened/the Oaliphate onlyef another
p'-'K//^plnner Rellgiohy^ : -Fon^ ;mehelfc a’ political
h : - a n d  m i l i t a r y r e b e l H e > w a s  ; the;daead of .an .important - 1 
/-. / : tsde tt the ^  . In his: bid for power Bab ale benefitted :
1 /::■S : u- fromi the previous politico-re1 igloushturmott 
i  V : ,mark/o^ region of al -Badhdh since the advent of/Islam
; i ./ in those regions ,ahd eSpeciali#/a^ the demise of Abu,■
;/7j V'; - 1. Gendral: Works like -■ Puri: air-.*j£sr 1al--1 Ahbasi alr»AwwalMuir:
> v; ; • - Caliphate: Vasiliey; . 3vzame?dtles^Arabes, 1: ,Khudarl;
- . :• 7 Muhadarat; H.I. Hasan; - laraMlhl-Islam* Other references
1 ureuquoted in;;dealings with;lhe; individual' sub jects. . . •
- 2v. ^ alqashandi; Stibh>. V I > m>%fiido-g:3:3S^M. Wright.:: Babak of
; hi BadHdlf and ai-Afshin:.: ; Browne: lliiterary History of
' 1*' v / Persla;.%uu. -525-8:1 Bl Bndlor:^; GeOchischte: der Islamische 
^hander jtPbw 1-57-8: :;ldemrhvlrahh^ t o . ^1^3;":' G.H.Sadlghit ITes 
vl -%://’ ■ MouvemehttV u m  187-228t;229-80l; -I;! . -■■-I'l ■ • .
3* Tabaris pill71 Mas'udi Ta nb ih > p *353
' 1 K A>.-';V■ ~L iJ
Muslim al-Khura s'ani♦^ Hev also benefitted from the 1
political situation of his time* .While; the hold of A a- ' A/A; 
Islam hs 'a'religion;hnd.;pf the Caliphate as .a political; : A/;/;
power had, always been precarious^in its eastern provinces., /AAA 
Athe feign; of Ma'muh was d .period' in which the Caliphate . A- //AAA 
■was at a: particular dieadyahtage with the revolts in; ' A/A/
^Iraq* Syria and. ^ g-ypt;v and;with a; series of Byzantine '‘^'v'.r.A
• ’ 2 ' A . 1 - A A - - ■ A ■ ’■ ■ .. ‘ / x :A.-:
' Campaigns*/; It was however not these factors alone .^ v A
which helped and sustained Bib ale1 s revolt*.' "/There were A
economic factors as well. ; It is known that.for a number
A  of reasons the: Muslims had to maintain the ;economic and /A
A s o c i a l  structure in which they found Sassanid Persia, , AA
• where there wasA;d majority of poor peasants .and a minority
of rich landlords ••ahd pife^ans*- - The poor peasantry had V : }A;
. always been probe; to/such revolts, which while claiming ; A
/ salvation in the after-world on the-religious .side promised AAA /
; material well-being in this world. : Babak*s revolt was //A
one of these. ' . _ •. ' A. A ' , a ../a Aa A"
1. See BarthoId:' Turkistan: Browne: Literary History of Persia;:
A  / vA / Gibb: The - Arab Conquests in Central Asia; Ibn Isfandiyar.; A? A
History^of Tabaristan. ■ A.m '
y'AS.■ibn QutaihaArefers to the revolt of gatimAb* Harthama, whose 
A A A father yrahldlledAby Md*mun/ in hrmeniay and his inciting , ; A
•/ heighbbuf i n ^  to rise against Ma*muh. He goes on ,to;.
A; Asa^ihat it is said/that -that'was the cause of Babak*s revolt^ 
A//, Ma* arlf. p. 198. ■ : /• . ./A . " '
3* Lambton:; Landlord and Peasant, pp. 16-7* f/-
It is difficult to be exact about the origin and ,
A - : - ' '■ _ .. v- ’ A / A ' - / ' - A. ,
ideas of Babak* 3?abari is almost, silent , about them.
binawarleexpresses his difficulties .on’theseApoints* To
the best of; his knowledge Babak was, a de sc elide rxt of Fatima
the daughter of Abu Muslim al-Kburisani • ^  . He hastens to ;; A
say that it-was to this Fatima^,from whom also the Fatlmiyya
sect descended, to whom B”abak was related -and not to Fatima
the ' daughter of the prophet, a>:fact: which’shows that some
.people had assumed the latter. B a t u m i  says that Babak*s
teaching allowed all that Islam forbade and was a doctrine
• ’* '■ /„ - ■ 'A ■ ■ ‘. ' ' - "a "■ t,, < . V 3 . - '
of communism which left nothing private. Elsewhere one
learns that he claimed that the,spirit of Jawidan, a former 
religious rebel leader with w h o m ABabdk was, brought up had 
passed onto him.^ This claim was endorsed by Jawidan1^  
widow, whom Babak married. * In this way Babak was able to 
get the support of the followefsof Jawidan and lead this 
sect. 1 Jabari says that on his capture Babak was paraded 
before some of the Muslim women whom he had. kept in cap­
tivity. On seeing him in that situation the women started 
to. weep and c ry..... Asked why: they, di dA so they answered; that
■T.*';-gee; p.lS't -n.®'o; A r ■
2*' Dinawari: .Akhbar. p.397*
3* Bal * and., IV:,yp.ra52g. ; , ,A A -A A 
h • E • M . Wright: Bdbak of BadhdhVAx
he used to Atreat: them, well '«*• lean a: y tihs i nu al aina - most 
likely a fefefence. to the.. material conditions d n  which ! A" 
he kept them.1 ;. It .was; upon all these factors,-religious, ; 
political; and/economic, that the revolt took place. .And - . X . ; 
while henefitting f^om the troubles of the; Gaiiphate at 
that, time he had the great advantage of being at home 
in .an area of;ttouhtains> forests/and valleys with/cold '. 
winters;y/ah’hrea whichAby virtue of its geography proved ’v. ; A 
.the greates|/nbstacie to the, advance of the Arabs .and the 
isiamic lmpifdA;/;// .Strongly entrenched in his centre of A / / 
hi-Badhdh;with ahumber of garrison fortresses, with /X ;/
local supportyXxucal alliances or benevolent neutrality, / A. 
he was ableAtO:^ harp ass the: neighbouring’Arabs - and interrupt 
the Supplies/sent./for the outposts of the Caliphate• H i s /■.//'
suppprtersXalsb made;, use. of the proximity of the Byzantine ■ -
.X' ■ <■; ./ X/- ■' - A ■* ‘A . '. - :i": .. x
borders in Armeiiia.where they were sure of help and refu g e .A
Thiskposition o f  strategic importance across lines of com­
munications'; arid sop' near to . Byzantine/borders added: to bis.’ 
danger and..made/ difficult the task of suppressing the .revolt.
; , Ma*mun, ;bhsy elsewhere,, did not give the revolt his 
full-x^ttenti^iiya xyHeAhowever.,did" not fail to send successive
1. Tabari, p^l28;A E.M., p.51. ' /2. See^p:^ ^ n i 3 ^  ± "« . / .
3* Tabari^ ^ p* 117 If , p.8; Mas1 udi j £anblh, p.169•
A ; // h'xped’iti $tis againstBabak/one of which w a s l e d  by cAbd A
VX Allah b. Tahir governor pf/^urasan>'1 < / in,; that:. c ampaign A : •
X/> A":/ A :Mu^amad-:tV'. H^mid^'al.rTusi A-al^Ta!S;:Adied These did not
, / meet with successahd^,withA;the/pbritinnous attaeks/from
Babakdhe toll of Mu slim ' Ibssesmount e d.^ Itseems '.A - 
A ; ,that the successes\of Babak coupled with the Ineffeetive,
' ;■ x . .Measures of the Caliphate- :againbtA-‘h-im helped' to gain him// _
/X AA:;A more . supportehs^A In .thidxwpy he was able Ato maintain 
/ x illsrevolt; throughout theXheign/6f. Md'muii, f roil/the/ / A/
A ( -/^ x; start. of. the 'revolt dn^^bl^SibAyy/A:.''; / . A //A/- ; ‘x / "x A/Ax^ >// ;
A- A yy / //ih AtheX-y^ah of tbe ;hccebeiphA pf;, Mu*tapim 218/Q$3~b 1 
A ;. x AbhbakAdrew to his side h/greatxhumber /of/followers from >7 .// XX ; 
;A^ vx/";/■ :/Athe; hibalregion-:from_;the;/areas of Xllamadhani Ispahan,
V: A:Masabadhan, ahdAMlhrifanadteqtj ^TheAey ’-according‘-to••■'Tabari,
- A A Ajoined the! Khurramit eXfeilgi on, • joined forces,X and camped
; •; /in; the district of Xiamadhan.^* Luckily, Mu * ta§im, with -X/
; V x the . cessation of the By 2 ahtine;, camp aign be gun - by Ma^mun, r
\>'”/ X' Apbhld afford t o ’- turn his attentioii/td Babak^ - v Towardb the 
• / ■ end of. that year he sent an expedition A led by IsJjag b * ; ,
A • ..!> Tabari, pvl233f p>5b;, Blnawarlf x^bbar,p.397/- X // x/-
>A / 2. He.;was theAsub ject of ,a/famous/ poem, by -Abu Tammlm: in- which/,/;x
X amongstxother things /individual heroismAieAhighlyXpraised.. A// 
x Jjpihawarl: Akhbar,0*398: Munfaa/avat« 0 0 * 99-102/ - xx ■ / x /
X 3v Tabari, ^ . 1 ^ 5 / E*M;AAn^56:: Masludl. Tanbih, p«353, Blnawarlf/X-
: h  A Akhbar V ’^ b.397:: A l b n h l ^ a ^ i h t ABuldah, pw52i / Bar Hebraeus,yf>;./
k* Tubarl/-p.1165;; ■ l.;g>2
Ibrahim b . Mu$1 ab who was named b y  him governor of the Jibal 
region. The expedition met: with some :success. however 
with ■ the increas Ing danger; of the , Zufc'tV'revolt•, so c 1 ose 
at hand, Mu* ta^im had to turn his attention for a while 
thither*. The campaigns, against Babak were not sto^./pped 
but dragged.ori, on a small' scale , for the year in which 
the Zutt revolt occupied-the Caliph* s attention*: . In 
that year Mu*ia§im*s men facing Babak were able to .gain 
some valuable information;about the topography of the 
area and the power and location of Babak and his; troops.
That information was gained from some of Babak * s :men ' 
either captured or won over by various means# ■ By the 
year 220/835 the Zuft revolt was over. The fortifications 
damage d by Bab ak in the area, between/ArdabI1. and Zinjan 
Were put in working condition and/manned.. The routes 
between-were garrisoned and trenched.to protect the move­
ment of supplies and troops. ' The grip of government was. 
gradually tightening on the situation. .This, as Tabari 
says., was the fir^t victory achieved againstBabak... It 
was indeed a turning point. , The major campaign was at 
hand;. In. that same year, 220/835* Mu*tasim made Afshin
1.; Tabari, p. 1165; E.M., p.2.
2; See below p.
3* Tabari, p.1171; E.M., p#9#.\ A
governor of Jibal and gave him supreme command of the 
campaign against Babalc* ■
Starting, from' the Prayer-place ihBaghdad Afshln moved 
,on to make his headquarters/at Barazand. . - At once one 
notes that a new.plan was evolved. The war against Babak 
was no longer a series of expeditions but a major campaign. 
■The strategy, summed up in Afshln1s words “.staying. in the
place you/need is better than fighting/for the place you
2 ■ 
do not need,“ was to advance slowly to the Babak’s place
to contain him and his troops, and to force him.to a
decisive battle, making sure of the safety of the supply
line and the relation between the..different garrIsons and
■the major base - at Barazand ; - which was , in; turn in con-
tinuous. contact with the Caliph Mu*ta§im in his capital.
This was . the strategy 'which/had; been followed Ain/the .
campaign against the Zufct • /The part played by the Caliplr
Mu’ta^im. iii these two major campaigns,, in which he did not
take the field, is very important. In both he took direct
Interest, and In the strategy for both he was. behind.the
policy of continuous supply and relief, of campaigns instead.
of expediti ons and the mdral backing-given to commanders and
1. Tabari,,p. 1170; E.M., p.8.; DlnawarI: Alchbar, p .398.
2. Tabari, p.1208; E.M., p.37. "XX/ —
Ifddps*1/ ; In both of these/campaigns, one,i notes the 
great use of hofse./for theA^yeirient o;f men and ‘supplies'^  
ahd./inthe field, : This should;, ho t -qas t any. "doubt - on
the; ability of .such -triedvgenerals as ’Ujaif/ ahd Afshln,
In xthe e ase/of Babak the choice o C Afshln could not have 
•-beeh bettered by , the choice of any other commanderHe 
knew the region and the brunt;of. .the campaign fell on- 
his ownA men who were better ; l.ed.f'by him; ' x. '. x
The .campaign dragged on till; the last.. 3rd 'of the 
year 222/837*. ; In that period the/heh experienced the, 
problems o f long •campaigns' in. the; di f f i cul t climatic al'-- 
conditionsxof rainy and cold winters;, / With the problem 
of supply which,. Ihough kept flowing from Mu * ta$im and 
led by .some of his Turkish gehdrals;llke Bugha and Jarfarx 
b/xDinar, was often interrupted byXBabak,s men,. there was 
the problem of - discipline of an army coimposed of different 
elements and kept for a long -bime/in/difficuit conditions 
without serious e n g a g e m e n t W i t h  Afshln!s men from 
UdhrusanaX and the Maahariba there . wereX some' Abna * ., Turks 
and some of.. the. unruly vo lunte ers ( mut a t amwi1 a); ^  And 
.friction 'did/arise/but was met by the resolution of Afshln
1, Tabari, p, 1326;; E,M., p;* 13pfX Ibnx.Hamdun’: .Tadhkira,
: ■ pp., IO5-5; ; Ibn ; al-Fagih: B.uldan , p ; 32 *
2,/Tabari, p;120b; :E,M,/ p/37* r :
who had the full hacking of Mu* ta$im. With, the use of 
strong fortifications,.trenches, a strong/supply line, 
a system of intelligence, a policy of winning over Babak*s 
supporters and the local elements all made,with continuous 
vigil and strict discipline, Afshln was at. last able to 
contain Babak in his fortified capital of Badhdh.and 
give him no alternative to a ;showdown, . This came after 
long waiting ahd:continuous negotiations for surrender.
For Afshin* s men this was after a slow march of about h 
miles a day, with day and night shifts, men on the backs 
of their animals and surrounded by guards, A Moving to 
the beats of the drums in close formation, the men were 
under strict orders not to exceed or fall short of their 
marching commands. Then followed the battle, a severe 
battle, in which the strong fortifications of Babak and 
the gallantry of his men were of no avail, al-Badhdh
was at last conquered, and Babak defeated. But despite
the efforts of Afshln to close all. the routes of escape 
with his men, Babak was able to flee:by evading these and 
slipping away with some of his men to a valley leading to 
Armenia, . Afshin, however, now that he had achieved his
1, 1 arable mile = 1 l/h English mile,
2, Tabard, p. 1203; B.M*, pp.-33“4, A - .
victory and established his power over the Jibal region 
as governor of Mu* ta§im, was able to send commands to 
the Armenian governors and 'Pa-triarcHx/annpuncing': the . 
flight of Babak and asking them to:, look out for him;1 
’Meanwhile there, arrived a; writ of Aman (safe conduct) 
sealed,in:gold from Mu*taaim to Babak;’ . XThis was not; to 
the liking of Afshin. However he communicated the 
safe conduct offer to Babak through some of the latterfs 
followers* Babak refused the offer, and went to Armenia
to settle with a certain Sahl b • Sanbat ;in his castle.
' • . • • ■ A: • ■ : 3
The latter betrayed him to the agents of Afshin* Also
betrayed, was the bro the r of Bab ale, 1 Ab d Al 1 ah. Wi th the
situation in the Jibal area so.well in the hands of
Afshln the Armenian rulers.had every reason to please
: their new powerful neighbour.-
M u fta$im., in his new capital Samarra, kept in
touchwith the development of the situation. After the.:
victory over al-Badhdh, the defeat-and arrest.of Babak,
and the freeing of the prisoners which he had kept in his
/castles, Afshin marched with the army back to Samarra.
1* Tabari, p.1219; E.M.,/p.U^; Dinawarl: . Akhbar, p.hOO 
Bar Iiabrneus,. I, p . 136 ♦
2. Tabari, p. 1220; E.M*,. p.li-5*
3. Tabari, p.1225-6; E.M., p.50; Bar-Habraeus; I, p.136..
With- him were? f mpprtant captives , Babak, /his brother 
•Ab'dXAliahy 'guiii'.sbind •'others* . Mu*ta$im was' eager' to 
celebrate the Ay1c toby, to shower gifts on his victorious. 
commander Afshln ./and to reward his troops • /• ' On, appro ach- 
ing Samarra Mfshin■ was met by Harun al-Wathiq. son-and M 
.successor ofIMu’ta^imA/together with other members of 
the Caliph*s house.x/A/Xfeforo his trial Bebak was paraded 
o n . an elephaht/dn/ the Xstreets :bf; Bamarra.B/ After being 
tried and killed/in^ a ;iiidsb savage manner, his body was 
. fixed to; a posf which became one; Vbf/the land harks;of 
the new c a p i t a K - z M a ^ a b a t  Babak^ x. ;Babak! s head was / / 
sbnt/to ^ur a b i n  to be exhibited there too;,^vh :, Afshin'! 
was crowned: by' MU* tabim. who, giving him two bands of 
jewels, alsohhvb/him 10/million dirhems for .himself: : / ‘ 
and,as muph for his m e n . ■ He moreover appointed Afshin 
governor of Sind and .called upon the poets to praise 
/Afshin, promising them/rewardb*^ '; / •/
- So ended the revolt/'of/Babak. But the Khurramivva 
>sect was.:b^./np means completely crushed.,; 1 Some of Babak* s
1. Tabari, >p.l229yZ/E.M.Z, p.53* ; .
2. Ibid. p> 1 2 3 6 ; ' / ' p. 53~4* /  ;/ ' X ^
3 • / Ibid. 'pi 1231 |/E.:Mi,/p *5h* A bu,Tammam: - Muntaqayat, , p . 88 
Tanulchi : Nishwar * I *-r o .75: al^Muhabhar h  b .h89. -'Babak
brother cAbd Allah was/crucified i n  Baghdad., His head wi 
, also sent to /Khur ad ah.;f : / / , AVyv V/ /;
• U. Tabari,/ p*1233i;;; E.M., p.57; Dinawari:/ AMihar. p.hOO;
followers/had already sought refuge in-the Byzantine 
Empire and ware . found fighting with the Byzantine. Emperor 
in his campaigns/against Mu/ta^lm. According to', some • 
sources Babak himself1had promised.to embrace Christianity 
and take with him/his followers to that religion:/ when he 
was seeking help in his last ;days* For; those who were > :
left, the basic .economic grievances which had driven them 
to his fold were hardly ameliorated. The grip of the 
/government /was -tightened with the; defeat of vBabak and /■ 
new measures./initiated for ^ strengthening its outposts in- 
the--area. But- the spirit of revolt was, soon to/express
itself not far /away,: i n  the revolt of Maziyar*. who. was x
' ' ■ X -'/■ ’.V.- . ■■■.-'■ _ ■ -2 ’ ' -- / "
said to . have been in league with Babak. , -
' ^'-Like- the..-reyplt:' of ?Blbaki the'--affair of. the Zuft had ;
begun in the reign, of; M a1 mun ’ and pro fifed from hi s engage-;
merits in the/north*, "V Like it too tiie Zuf f had benefited from
their .geographical-situation,in the marshy lands and
rivulets in the"area of Basra. . And if the revolt ofA -- , • ,• * 1 ;• ® _ ..
Bafak was one of; a /chain of revolts, the Zh%'i revolt too., 
was b u t ' the • forerunner- o f ’ the revolt of the, Zan.j.^; Here
1.* Vasliev, I, p.137. . / •' '
-2, See/below? p..ifll,/|8;8 :^v//'-- ’ ; . v.../;
3,‘- Cf. E.Ii ;s.vV Zanj* < Noeldeke:. Sketches.
, : /however t h e ; / p r o b l e m - , / w a sf food, an economic problem ' ' //
X X  manifesting" itself/in. brigandage for the acquisition of , -/X; f //
the .necessities/ of ■life*. In ..this aspect it fas' like . the /• / ,//.v
//.-. A•/;many similar affaire • of/theArab nomads who harrassed the X,/ X// 
' / ; caravans ; or raided bities^ nr efen like/the looting and ; -'/AX
XX;//stealing which/was Jhb/fatb of Baghdad in the chaos / -; X.
; /which prevailed- in the/city during the siege and murder ; XX A:
of A©ln. Iu^both revolts of the Zutt/ and the; Zan.i the ;-//-//
nomadic Arab element was not lacking. X / // X/A
The Zutt were/pfiginally a, people ,nf Indian origin, / : /;
mainly-from the S i h d ‘dx>ea, introduced to the/region of A / :;
7/;... /Kaskar by al-'HajjaD, ■the: famous Umayyad governor , probably > /XX
/-/to-'inhabit' the.:...oo'untryslde .ahd/lieip. to reduce the problem A  A/
• -.of-' €hp' loss- bf; mdnqqwer created,by the flight, of peasants A ;
. tovtheAtowns.^./'’^ 'Thby/were herders of"buffalo and accord- -v "A/’;.;/-/ 
ing/xto Mas !udi it .was to them that the introduction,.of . :
thaffanimal in Syria was attributed.. Both groups of Zutt 
increased in number and^vattracted others in time,, meanwhile X 
/spreading over the /area of the' Batiha* However the Zutt AAA;///' 
who harrassed the/trade routes at/the time of Ma*mun and / /
. Mu*f a$im were /not/ aloney /With/time they'mixed with other
. peoples, of different origins but of similar social standing.2: //.
. // / ',!♦■= Baladhuri: Futuh♦ i y « b .525:. Madudi: Tanbih. n.355. / A '/A,
Baladhuri: Xlbar, III, p.257; Pellat; Lev Milieu Basrien, -;//
X/A. . pp. 37"^0f/■Ei;l./s;v. .Zutty, Lull .and Nuri. ■ : A / /
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Slaves- and m a w i  of Bahila and/other >Arabs vard mentioned
. amongst themX v It-was. indeed/ these • latter i' .according ! 
toc al-Baiadhuri, ■ who encouraged, them to r o b a n d  defy A 
/A ; authority, ,sihce/hefore.Afh^ they AusedAto/bsk for petty \ 
AA vAthings;or td ;f dke/the Oppdrtunity/bf the-negligence; of 
. . ; shi ps * x, hands -andA s e cretly steal. *1 V 1 A . X A' ■ . A -
Add ‘ XAz - Taking:; advantagbu’cAfAthe /nature of. thbAmarshy' land A 1 
X ytiiichwas/ a Agood;; ground /for. retreating, thblrX •,
, A of the use \of small Ac raft X  and/the facfx that At be Amer chant 
AXb urge s; were, * usually '-hot /properly guarded,/ they progressed A 
>A A from begging, to./stealing,; frpnu stealingXto-Xwayiayihg^; and 
; ; /: frbm ^ & y l a ^ n g / t u  supplies frpm>Ba^raAtb : x
. XBaghdad. .//and; thus; openly defying/ the; Btate.1 / The - climax 
/• / of /this/h^ accession/of Mu*taeimj who. had al-:
j. v ready/-given/ hiaAdt tent ion to/ tHb revolt; of/.Babaty /A .The//
/A cut ting/bf eupplfesA to^  Baghdad''"was however a/matter that ;
/ /X a-fforded.-'nb;;/delay.2 -A -A ■/campaign’''-was plhnned;*/ / ^ ItsXleader
XAnbasa;u;dAydteran/general of Ma;fmun and one ■ 
/»/ /of the leaders’ of the vain/attempt for the abccebsichx of
l.ATsiburi, pp. p-*IiX5* /The/ ZuftXwereXledAby a . ber-tAA
A talh^Mxidammad b AAUthmah helped by /another/ualled Bamlaq whov 
organised the/military /side of the movement. Ibn al-Afhlr 9.
/ / V I , p *313 *. and ;Ibn,; Ipiaidun,X^III, ,/p v/2571 give A the Aname Sammitq: 
A A for Ssimlaqi but/Ao therwiseA they depend/ on Tabari 1 sA version, / B.X
2 *. Baladhuri i,. • FutUh aX t$fX  dv526A / • //X XyX- a,- ^ X : .A ; yyA
fAbbas son of Ma^ mun.. Did M u f ta$im: want to keep him ; X . : ;/X' 
busyAbut./hotf'qut.Apf'-r.eadh for some time? - He did. not I V
show any sigh/ofq/desire to rid himself of the old ; :;V;XX
.general. X H e  spa|ef no effort to malce himbucQeel'in ./A*
'/ hid mission agaihst A the Zutt.1 It ,wad here,,/before the X v X A
. .campaign of Afshin against Babak, that one notes(Mu*tadlm/s
tactics of a sustained campaign with the/ confintiity of A,: / -a  / 
supply, direct-’relation between;the capital and the major XX; ^
- base, and between.;major base and outposts, with/ the use . ,v;V:,;X
of relay/horses, fon men and/reliefs. Here tooXone/notes- , y X X
r the|strategyA.:pf /contaihmeht and the closing ; of the/routes/ //V. a XV
XX /.of flight orXr.etr eatvXX *Uj-aif/mpved ;to';-\Wa§.it %hdre he.: X.
/. , made -his. headquaftefd^in a neighbouring village./ From- ’/V>X
there he -i^ tarted:; to' dam the o utl^ /of the different streams /: ' .
- ..which were Xuseb by/the Zutt as bays for attack and re'treat. / 1X- ' Xy. ■- ^ - *, ' . / * ' , ■’ ’ * ‘ ” X'..' X X  -
X This was the/ prelude to containing and attacking the Zutt / X; /://; 
X bhich happened/so on, afterwards, and seems, to have been an X / /
; easy, affair according to the Arabic sources.   Bdr^Habraeus X/ ///.
, -.however /says- that X  Hjaif's men were unable tp cope with the, .
//..XyZut.t,--; wh o excelled 'in fighting in'small boa/tsV /. MJjaif had7 XA/ X
»■— iiiHMhb   WliinH I If >,•*'„* 'a I- /•• , : ' , •'
./1 * Ibid....Tdbafi, ' p*ll67; E.M*, p.b-~5v - Ya Vqpbi mentions that X
X.-X- Mu1 tapim had already sent an army led by XAbmad b. Baf id .al- 
, Bahili", /but'- that: tliefZutt defeated Him. XTarikh III> p.198.
then.to use some Egyptian captives whom he had brought 
with him and who were used to. fighting in water* It
was these w h o  defeated the Zutt according to Bar-Habraeus,
■ ■ ; ■ . • i ■ X- . / • a
a 1version which has no other, support.
. The campaign, which lasted for about nine months,
ended in the surrender of: the. Zutt who., neither strong nor
well organised, chose a surrender guaranteeing the safety ;.
: 1 - ' . X; X • ‘ g ■ • '
of their persons and belongings.' *Ujaif granted them
this. Twenty-seven thousands in all they vie re shipped
to the outskirts of Baghdad . from which they, entered'the a
city in their small boats arrayed in their colourful ‘ a...
dresses, and playing the in horns. M u fta§im was in a
barge, to watch this parade .and. the populace of Baghdad
observed the scene froiriXthe banks of the river. From
there they were .deportbd to the Byzantine bordefs.^
/Their fate thence is, a problem of collating different X/
reports in the .sources. . Ya^ u b i  reports that they were .
— ■ '/*. L.’ ;
settled in Khanlqin. According to Tabari they were/sub­
jected to. a serious at table/from . the Byzantines upon their
1. BarrHabraeus,A"I, p.133*'
2. Jabari, p.1768; E.M., p.6, Ya'qubi, III, p.198* Ibn Kathlr
■ al-Bidava» p. 282. v
3* Bar-IIabraeus says that. they, were imprisoned in Baghdad- and,.
. perished there; I,a p;l33#-. .
8. Ta!rikh» p.198. ^ v :
X--, , .deportation f'tC'--the b orders .axid/complete-ly/annihilated.1 ■
X. 1 Mas:* udl/however utates; ;bhaf/ therec were;- still some in:
'■ X * A  . . ' * a' ' / a  - - V X  a X ' A / A -  • o ' X  A-’. B a / a a /  A - A
. . / his time in the, 'Byzantihe .--border's;; Ibn Rosteh Speaks :-x.
a of the existence of soWe of them in the BatB*ib/area / ,
A hear. Ba^ra u p t o %his time., which suggests thnif; they.-- had X
-i .. : ''•-•/ - a/ 3 "A a- . X :-X ! ■ ‘ 'X :i: a;
not been exported en vmasse;* Both latter .soiirces are /.
more acceptable than Tahari, who while showing interest/ /
. . in the. da.tea ;ah8: general, trend ;,of events, reveals" a lack X : ‘ / ^
; X- .of interest in checking his;details. And here,, as with ,A : Xl
the revolt of-Babak, neither the-State nor later chroniclers vX/;/;;f
' ■ / ; shoWed any, interest in dealing: with the-cause a of these X x/y//;:
-a/., -revolts.' In this way the Writers reflect their atomistic .- - ;//
, XX;„ x attitude to eyents Which; cebsed to be of - interest once X'.XX-
 ^Xa a they/had been-reported. / -xXa: ■ 1 a- X X X ,v f X -^Xaaxv//
X X X v .//"/a - The Caliph, having,rid himself of the menaceX0f theX/ : X V a 
A./xX>Zutt, wasahle to . turh'his'- attention to the^ warXagainst: / JX//X
-Babak, as has been .related, /XCt is/signifI dank, that V ' , XX
although Mu* tadim did reward the soldiers. Who campaigned //
/ X;.a8uinst the Zutt as:/we’ll as their- leader *Ujaif, this was
1. p. 1169; B.M., p.6.-7.; X , / ' " a, X;/ */' " .X / X->v;
; -2«, TanbIhX d.555. Babadhuri before him says something similar; 
aaa./X Futuh, IV* p.526. According to both of them the ZutJ were . 
partly, settled in Khaniqln and Jalula ihHthe, KhuSrasan road
a. , X rX and partly sent to the Byzantine b orders. ” . . . ...
XB/a aiX* Ala* ia . p. 95 * X ‘ ■_./-. X  1 ,aX’ '"-XX/
in no Way /similar to what he was to do with Afshln and 
his men. Seeing , the. rewards and honour which later were X 
the lot of Afshln and his m e n . VU.iaif and his men were more, 
embittered against thb Caliph, whose succession they had 
tried to a/art and/which, they were later -to try tp> end.
. Having celebrated the victory of Afshin .over Bab ale 
M u1 tapim foundXhimself: again faced with the prefects of a. . 
major campaign.. .TheXByzantihe.Emperor'Theophilos had 
invaded his Syro^Mesopotamian frontiers, .lootingsacking, 
burning, killing and carrying into captivity a great,number 
of Muslim men and/women.1 The Byzantine attack which came 
so close in the1 wake, of the campaign against Babak had , ;a
indeed a lot to do/with it. According to Tabari> Babak,: XXX 
pressed by Afshin* wrote to the Byzantine Emperor telling 
him that the 1 King /of the Arabs’’ - the Caliph Mu f ta§im. - 
was then a defenceless prey as he had sent all his.men, 
including his tailor and his cook, against him/- Babak. . X
By inciting the Byzantine Emperor to attack, Tabari says
!• Tabari, p. 123k; •E.M., p.58; Masudi, VII, pp.l33/k; idem:- ; 
Tamblh, p . 169; Ya1 gubl,111, p.201; Ibri Kathir: al-Bida.va,/ 
p.285; Bar-Habraeus, 1^ pp.135-6; Vasiliev, I,. pp.l39-kl*
2*/Tabaripp.l23k"5; XS*M.;, p. 58; . Ibn Ka thi r » al-B i day a , p *285 
By his., tailor was_ meant J a 1 far, b • Dinar al-Khayyat, by the .
, cook was meant Itdkh. ,Itakh was .a cook when he was bought 
by M u f ta§im. Ja* far b. Dinar must have been a tailor before 
being bought.. Both were generals at the time.
169
that Bab ale/ /had hoped to relieve the pressure oh himself 
with the- opening, of a new front. , . But whether or not such 
a letter existed, whether or not the contents of that letter 
were as related by Tabari, it is certain that Babak and the 
Byzantine. Emperor were in some form of contact. The . . 
Byzantine.Emperor was certainly aware of what was going 
on in the domains of his arch enemy the Abbasid Caliph.
His own domains were, the natural refuge of the enemies' of 
the Caliphate, as was -the land, Of the Caliphate, for his : 
own<>enemies. A major revolt like that of Babak, was1 watched 
with great interest.in Byzantine circles, as had been the: 
Civil War./between Amin and M a ’mun. It came at a time 
when the Byzantine Empire-had a series of problems in the • 
West with the advance, of the Muslims of Andalus and North 
Africa into Sicily and Crete. There was moreover .that, 
series of campaigns in M a1 mun1 s time, whiih coincided/ with 
the building up Of; an army' under-both Ma'mun -and M u f tapim 
in the former's effort to revive the spirit of Jihad.^ ...
The revolts :;of Bahak and the Zutt had helped to keep
\ '• ; 'Babak
Mu' ta$im busy iil Iraq. For the Byzantine ./Emperor/offered
: /.ibfA x  • , .. , . A.-A/' ;
1. cf. p;lr8/h.2.. and.see Vasiliev, I,;/pil37* X
2. B. Lewis:: An Arabic Account, ■ no.385-6.
3. Vasiliev, I, pp. 126-7* Va  : • , .
k*. Sep Ta6ari,' Reign of Ma'mun, arid Vasiliev*a I, PP.* 22-rl23*
'the - pbssibility•/6;f''-'a strong ally just across the borders . 
of Armenia, a; There was even the possibility of4 the ex- , a 
paiision, of Christendom invthese domains.1 . ,Wh;at.. was 
certain,was that"Babak and his/men looked ,for/ support 
from the/Byzantine Emperor. A group of his followers- / 
as. well as some of the Muh’ammira rebels tbok-part in , . 
the attack ofthdyBysantiiie Emiieror against Zibatra
■ ■ A, ■' • . g  .. % .' ■ V ' . \ " - * " : A  - ‘ / •
,/a (Zapetra) . / /This. _was but the nature1'and pat tern’of : 7 
events that existed,/and;continued to exist along the 
: Byzaniine-MusMm/^fronti ers till the final victory of 
■ the/Ottomans' over Byzantium*: Although the Caliphate
A and, the: Byzantine - Empire; had lived side by side for more 
/ than two: centuries the; time of /Mu11a$im,. they were 
only obliged to keep, the ^ status/ quo//for' practidal reasons. ;
/ 1 .Their/neighbourliness was. always/an armed and. an offensive. 
one .A/ Thid,manifested itself in continuous- frontier dis­
putes, '-rebellions,. and cccas'ional campaigns from both sides.■/ - 
• ‘Rebels; • against. Emperor or Caliph were -/.-helped directly or 
/indirectly hy/the/ other side, as neither failed to interest 
themselves:-in/iwhat went on in the domains . of his/ enemy
1. Vbsilievy/1 ,; p.137*/ / : a / / :
,2. Tnbari,. pil235* E.M.., i>i59f /Mas'udi; Tanbih» p.l6$);
Ibn Kathir: al-Bida.vav p.28.5:;- 'Vasiliev;*-!, p.13§; M.Canard 
/■.-• Gueloues.-A/Gdtd.H b;lQ8. / ■ - "
rl7i
par ;e x c e l l e n c e * h a r d l y X a n y  . conquestsXorX"'X'X-, X 
(changes inXthe\fpqnii^ X The/Byzant^ -
Empire,, had forXaAl^ its- fronti ers i n 1 /;
the; east into Afchemes. / The/Gal i phateX foil owed suit - /with :. ^ 
the; creation of the regions of 'Awasim (sthoiighblda)' and 
/■ Thughur (butppst s|:y t ter//organi sed ' f rom /the time/ of 7 v 
' Bar un al-R'aBhld whose reign had seen the last peace (treaty- 
Xhe twee.iithe (Ar abs and the Eyzantihos.1 / > ://./ , , a.
/ ■ /  /yin/th^ reign of//Maimun a./full cycle /of "these hostile/; 
(relations took,p l a c e . M a ' m u n  himself, had/ abrogated the v'- 
(peace-treaty madei i d / h ^  s time by helping the X
insurrecti on. o;f Thpmad the 31ayragainst Michael i1.(204-
14;'/?: 820t9) which, took place' in Asia ;Mihbr i n "20/7-8 xX( .’X
X  /X ■ X  2 ' ; X X "  / ( X  '■ ; X / A  :.iX q  / ,X. /x
822-3.X 14 helping Thomas the :81av Ma'mmi" had hopedv to /
put; oh the Byzantine throne ah '.emperor p£;^&$owiXi choiceX :
//.The (attempt, however, failed in 823 and with it ended the .
/xhopbh:;;bf Ma'mun. No pe/abe was /..concluded’ as.; Ma'mun ‘re--'■(
- jested/thd of fen ,of the (Byzantine Emperor. /;;/:in//the.(ye;ai?.!
/. 209-10 / 825. the/A#abs^/l^nched an offensive "against /-the; ;
(Byzantines/oh: the^gyrp^Armeniah bordersXbufcX the/ attack was X
1./ Baladhuri:: :FutuhX  II. v . 1?6: gudama b. la'far: 'al-X .
X Khara^f //pp.♦ ; 232li49; /./^owarazmi j Maf atih al- 'Ulurn. p. 144; 
Vasiliev, 1* rppy;9k^6X/ (; ;X 7- X‘XX XXXx x';v.■(( . a X
2. Vasiliey X }p9\ -PP*/ 22445X i,db>n.,xByzahtihe'xE]^pire(,x. I i (pp• 874-6.
halted as a' result o f  the death of its .Conim.andfer*XX.-Tlie/: ' ,;
same year saw^both .Matmun - dhd ;Miehaeir II occupied with . X v''VX 
attdekers from/the West.1 Some Andalusi ans landed in X: 
Egypt, and Ma'mun was able to expel them in the: same / ; x X ’X  
./year’ thfough theXaction of his government ^ Abd Allah b. X rA X X  ^  
(Tahir*2 /; The .Byhantine-Empire however lost Crete to them and/, 
was- to lose'/Sleil'y to the Aghlabids much/later. /These 
problems/ togetherewith other internal ones helped to; redtice X / 
hostiiitio^X^P'?*X(£X while* ;. Iu;213“4 X,829 /the ’coasts/of / ■' x 'aa 
Asia Minor were/sdbjected;Xo MUslim -attacksy; In the X A-XyX 
same yqafXthe Muslim fleet destroyed/ the Byzantine one /;. /!
in the eastern ,waters of the Mediterranean* This was/ 
followed by l;#iB|aigii in 214~5. /83p: led b y  M a 'mun himself,/X
>who could hbv^eyer /not press his victories; as, he had to/,- a X
A ./A "'A ' A ’"5 A  / A   ^ ^1-SA -:i' '
deal with revolts in Egypt. B'abak's revolt was} gaining ,
al-B'O' momentumv/at tliat time. These events gave/Emperor /, X
Thepphiios , ( 214-228 /829-42) . a/chance' to/Xlead ah attack/
on Tarsus and Ma§I§a, a successful, attack of revenge which;
/was celebrated in the Byzantine Empire A n  215-6 / 831.
Ma'Mun was soon to respond with an attack which forced the. ’
Emperor to; ask for. peace. .The 'offer .was refused as Ma'mun
1 *. Vasiliev 9 I , ,,pp.. 49-52; alrrkindi; al-Wulat w ' al-Gudat, Ily 
: X/ PP*, 163-180* * '"‘A/ -A//' •' ■/ ; • X-- X  . X X XX-'- '/■;>’/
2. as above • X a  , • x a-. - / *■ .XX/X. ,-X ; - a a -\ X.a a
wanted nothing Ibssfhan capitulation.v Ma'mun/led 
two other, succesafp.l/campaigns in thb years 216-7, 7 ,
X.But. these, as had the others,. ' 
ended, neither / in peace nor in any change of the ifrontiers : 
or-the nature o f  (thp relations of. the two-powers* .• This 
was the bhckgrpund to Abbasid-Byzantine relations on the 
accession of . MuXta^iiin: , With a' series of defeats and the X  
problems- in Sicily ih the period 2174223 / 8 3 3 ^  the By*"*, 
/zahtlne Emperpr hadXho intention; of contixiuihg/an^ offeai-- 
/sive against the: Abbasids. . Mu*ta§im hi ms elf/•was'"--."busy in 
the/east with Babak/ahd1 ih Iraq with the .ZUit.1 ;
• • Then came the (affair of Babak. and theXreiat ions / /• / \ 
which developed between- him and the Byzantine Emperor .'/.. 
which/culminated in Babak^ s offer to embrace: Christianity 
and .lead his .men with him, while asking: the. Emperor to/' 
launcsh an attack/on the Caliphafb on his side dh the hope 
that that would, relieve the pres sure of Afshin in the al- 
B adhdh and/Sahakw X/’The, Emperor responded with the attack 
of 222-3'//837; which/opened, a/ hew series of campaigns.
X. /;\:hBeihgq of campaigns and counter-
1. Baladhuri:. Futuhhlil*- p. 296. and Ibn al-F'a^ih'i Bui dan 
p-|394> : sliow hbw.' frontier govexqors of the Caliphate were 
X lenient With fhbiB .Christian sub jects and: neighbours at/ 
times/-Whehxthe/Caliph was fully engaged with internal • :■ 
problems.-/ / . X X  X :;;x ' x . /( / * " ; - -
'■: • h ■■' f :^ /r/ - /i" * Svt 1 "■
; ' campaigns Mutt.asim-smarch on Byzantine differ©dnot , \
. in kind ./but in degree *. Having vine and: o f . . .the news of/;,.; 
v the,Bysantide attack^and the plight"of: hib:‘sub;jebts /
////cbh account .of It, ku/ta§im, according.to yahaniV -at , ;
; . . once: nohhddd the, alarm .for ,mobilisation and he himself^ ;/*-/'/.i./
. ; , mounted his h ofs;e with his .Battle equipment ^  / /But■ he • . •
i 7 / bould hardly go t o b a 111 e that, way. .. So: he held a ; //;///v;
■ " >■ 1 * -~yf- - l* ■" ^  ■' 1 ^  " -.V v ' ‘‘‘■V- * \ ' f t  ■ ’'i
.. meeting in the/Dar al- TA m ^  having called upon two .. pudges v 1 
of: Baghdad and 328: of its notables to bear witness to his /,t t ■
^will (should lie; die in thd .c ampaign) .-2 " After fthat ,he / / v/Z-b
. moved .to .camp b n  the western side of the EupWate's and :///
' thds .thb/famous .Bysantlne Campaign of MnHafim/began bn “
,/ 3rd pf/JumadS/i 223/April 1, 838.5 /Upaif b, fAhbasa ; ,
had already" been/sent wi th a relief expeditlon^tovgapetra; . f'/b7
to quieten its population and meet any attack in the mean- 7 • .
, t i m e ; ; M u 1 ta^im then proceeded with almost; all, the troops / > 
he could muster and-an -enormous amount of ■ mili tary equipment ft ./ /!
, and supplies;;/: / According to Tabari;^ no- caliph "Before:
• had ta&en so/much equipment.^* . With the classical military f /;//
■ 1. T a b a r i ^ E * M . ,  p*59* ■ A ///-• / I V - 7;//
;:/.. 2 .^ ab;arl^ ;,vp/fl'235j $*M*y y.pVS'O; ■ : / / ‘ .• -a /by:
/vf - 3* There, is; geheral agreement onthe year . and the month pf-. the :.y^ V; 
: • beginning . of the campaigiiV- when mentiqned* $abari* %p • 1236 y, - 
: B.M./ p^60; , <fa1 qubi*111* p.201; Ibn Qutaiba? • al-Ma/arlj;,..
,'“■■ •. p .223• . Mas *udi, VII, p. 1355 idem Tanblh, p.l69>/_:<t .; ^  ; /
b./TabariV p*1236^fH.Mr,, pp*60-l; ; Ibn Kathir^ al-Bidaya* p . 286«.
formation used;bybMuslim armies 'MU1 ta§im began his, 
march* Ashinas in the. front* - Itakh' on the right .and 
• Ja’far By Dinar al-Khawaf on .the left* ’Uqaif was 
; , not yfar in advance ; and Afshin/was yet to , march, from ; ■
3another side*y / The attacking army was .thus' made Upy 1 
o f 1 three main groups* one under Ivlu* taqim Who was the 
. supreme comm Under 4? one yuhder Af shin and, the last under ;/ 
idUJaif b*/ ;rAnbasa. Before planning5 the march Mu*taqim // 
: ywas reported to bhaVey, asked . about the strongest Byzantine 
city* The/ answer.-, was ‘thatyAmdriiam (bAmmuriya) was the , 
strongest fortified city and^as. more important to; the 
Byzantines than Gonstahtinopre itself .It" is to; b e ;
“ ' ;V-4 y. „*/•*'■■■■-■■ "'y '• • ' -vX""'- p
.remembered thaty/the /ruling dynasty was from, that city* . 
Mu*ta^iniytheh took it upon y himself to wreak revenge on 
that city|gwhioh had;oibt been sacked by Muslims before* 
The plan was/to invade. Byzantium from both Syrian and 
d/Mesopotamian T^or&erd* r Fixing' meeting points/and /co-v 
/y^aborating-dn thd dissemination of reports /and the: r: 
details of strafegyiTythe-yjarmy moved with frequent halts. 
..•till •, it/deache.d/:^ fell to them without much
1 • £abar i *■ p *1236; E • M • p . 60; 1 Ya * qubl * III * p . 201 * des­
cribes ityasy ’having been one of. their./- the Byzantine 
. ; great * well; equipped;and well manned ci ties1* Dxnawari 
Alchbar* b* 397.*: describes it "a smaller Constantinople,*
2 * ydsiliev, IV/p.lhfe;
•opposition* ;;v//T-n//point: of' fact the section led by 
Afshin had/.already, met-the army of the Byzantines led 
’•by. t.Be - Emperor hints, e'lf and .after an initial. victory* of
the Byzantines over the infantry of Afshin* the letter's
■■x / i ' /'yX^ b 'X ' ' / - >/ ./X ' X
cavalry Y/as able to rout the troops of the Eniperoi%
it is reported that Afshin had'intentionally spared the
life of the Emperor saying: , 1 He is a King - kirigs spare
-the lives of ,one .another**1 This decisive/battle near
al-Arminiyaq* hot far from the river Lamis. (Halys),
facilitated the; advance of the Muslims armies* /The Em- ;
.peror could not rally-his scattered troops and was in no
posit ion/to giveXMut taqim a pitched battle* His plan /:
was to defend Atmaium which was a well, fortified city* ./ '
. With the fall of Ancora arid7 the assembly of all,;- ^
his troops .there^Mu/Vta^im began lii s' ‘march to his goal* .
The same dik is ion .of'the troops /was employed again*' But
no W i t  was Mu* ta^im in the centre* Ashina *js - on the~ 1 eft
add Afshln on the ri'ght* f(fUlaif was relegated to a
minoryrole)*x The distance betY/een Ancora and 'Amoriurn x-
1. Tabari, pp. 121+2-3 and 1256; 1*1*, pp. 65-6 and 75;
Mas1udi:/..■ Tahblhy p.l69> idem M u r u d r VII* p.136; Yaseiiev 
I* pp.. 15U-6.
2 • Mas * udi *. Murudn YII, p * 136 j se e below p *-2 00 *•' x ;b : /
was seven daysX march*"1' X . The ; first to reach there was 
Ashinas» 6th of yRatnadan 223/August 1st, 836* followed 
by Mp * ta§i;m- the second day* and Afshin, on .the :3rd day • ;
After a long, seige and continuous, attacks; from the X 
Muslims against;the walls of" the city using/catapults 
and & r e e k f i r e t h e  Muslims were able to effect a bregk .
ih the wail of which they had previous knowledge of a
. ■ ■ ' . ■ 2 ■ x : -X : ■. ; . • . V ' ' r. x  ;
weak part*, / That .was the prelude to the /capitulation .
qf-the oity which,.became.a lonely prey to the massive , .
attack bf Mu*taqim* . The Byzantine Emperors not having
sufficient troops to meet:Mufta$im*s, had Y/isely stayed
away*  ^ ‘ -A - . • X X '
But,>Muf taqimXs .victory was not to be a final one*/
Just as M a fmun before him was deprived; of/a final victory-
because of his dqath,.followed by the abandonment of the ;
campaign for the problem of-' success!oh/and-.bther internal
affairs, Mu1 too * had other problems * A plot -against v ;X >
his life was ‘revealed to Mu*'ta§im soon after the fall of
Amorium. X x . ; x x .  ;■ - ’ ' - /X X 'X s
1* T^Ba.ri*s account on the campaign is not; accurate in regardXtd 
routes* of. Bury: Mu * t as1m 1s. March *
2. Tabari, pp* 12k5“6 , E*Mi> pp.67-8• ,Yasiliev, 19 p.162*
3#,The Byzantine Emperor was naid'to have sent emissaries to, the 
Western ,Chriatiah; World asking for help after, the sack of ;
-4 Amorium* ....;Vasiliev- says that it was ,to "ward off Muslim ’/ 
threats in the VVestern Mediterranean; p.177*
Previous/and .subsequent relations show that even 1 f
if Mu*taeim wasXnot so forced to. abandon the campaign X X - b X X
no final 'settiement could have ; been 1 reached between the ,
Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire.. y/At^bpst there could- / x_;l
have ’ been '-a . formal peace treaty based on fhe/payment of ,/ //v/
tribute and relbase of captives which/-vms/in itself to'- be'' X ; X
abrogated at the, right time by either side; - as was the case. XxX7
before.' There/was no indication that i t .could have been XXXX
otherwise. The; tone of the whole campaign "for Mu* ta§im 
as well as the Byzantine %iper6r. was bne of revenge and " , • i
the causing of the maximum damage possibleVtbxfortifications X';//
;' ■ v • ..; ■' . - 4 ■' ' : X ' /'-■■■ ' 1 .
as; well • as ‘ to; villages and'towns and their inhabitants .
With this there were the freeing or capturing7 of prisoners
and the usual plundering and looting,.- Th'at much was v done :
by Mu* taqimj but no peace treaty was signed. From the time X
of his entry into Byzantine; ferriiory tilT his , return- , yX
Mu*ta§im,s policy was to burn, destroy and; lay waste all.
that he. could• , So did T h e o p M l p s b ^  " According. "
1 References in some sources >  /Masudi * Murudfj» VII, p. 136' - X;- 
■that Mu* t a§im* had intended to * march on/ • Gbhs^antinople itself X; ‘ 
after the f all of Amorium' are: but - unsupported' /.and. late Xad- 
/ ditions reflecting on; the one; hand; tbe psychology of Mudim x 
writers as regards the long cherished desire of; the *fall/ofyVX 
. Constantinople 7; cf* MariusXCahafd: XLes Exuedltions and X X/
on the other - in this case -/the magnification of the-': career// 
of; Mu* taqim and jo/f the guilt ,of /lAbbisyX-- See below p . J ^  igl // X
to Bar-Habraeus Theophilos had /^burned, despoiled and, 
destroyed ArabsV Christians and Jews alike. Ini this . ^  : 
sense the; Byzantine campaign whs -carried; toXits natural : 
conclusion. v. It is interesting that while there wad, a 7 
marked reviyal in the military spirit of the Caliphate 
there was no expressed intention of conquest. The signi-7 
/ficance of that campaign was that while intensifying the;7’
,military/character of the reign, it was ,a campaign of 
professional soldiers, and. Indeed, any sense, of political, 
power (sultan) that the Caliphate may: have had on,, this / \ 
basis, it demonstrated at the same time:the.dangers which 
.'^uyrounded the-/Caliph ate from/ rival commanders and rifts/, 
'between the different military gro.ups. Had. this: been 
,v; confined;, to* the / XUiaif ,,*Abbas and the old , guard, a solution 
/ to the problem would have been easy* / B u t . even within the' 
'Turkish.group.,-/ sq; well treated- by M u 11 i m  and sd" envied ,' 
fop that by/others>: there were!-those, who, having been 
, qealous of the / luck 'of,,some of > their ' kinsmen,; had opted to 
collaborate /with “Abbas and !Ujaif against' their benefactor. 
As Tabari fpuisXit); Mu* ta$im didrnot believe the involvement 
of those commanders because of the great number mentioned.
1. '/Bar-Habraeus, I p., 135. ' /'• // X \ Xy//X : X
2* T&ba-ri, p. 1263;X,E.M., p*81. x X ;/r-'/Xf • ■
Oh another, plane the campaign had inaugurated the 
era of the .(battal), the miraculous hero whose character. ,
^ H* •  r*K\ * . * -y.
and exploits were to he/the themes of the sagas of frontier ' '
, ■ "1‘ 1 ■ . ■ ■ - ■;/ - ““V '■ - X '"
warfare against XByzantium. Even the description'by . ■ ■
Tabari of sbme of. the bVents of the campaign could be , / /
regarded as belonging to=that type, of literature. Thus; .
Mu!ta$im was mo;ved' in response to the cry of an Arab lady v
. ./X ■ ■ y .■ ' .yyy ■- , ^
who,/ih the atrocities of the Byzantine attack* had cried-
mQ .Muf ta^iml;1*.? Mu* taqim then v/as dressed in all his
military attire. andrwould have gone alone in answer to- /
the call but for the necessity of waiting to. organize
the campaign*-^ Thus:, he sought also the strongest, point . :
and marched with, the greatest of armies and the.best of
equipment* There is also the, rivalry in the attack . y
■between the different groups of the army and.so on.
Individual heroism had already been, the subject.of a good^
number of Abu Tamniam^s poems.^ 1
1* H* G-regoire: XiLes Armenians» pp. 6 5 5 ^ 7 / Marius Canard: /
Les Exnediti ons , p p • II2-21; idem Les Brineipaux pp * -171-2. 
cf. E. Ii ( 2 h D h u * 1-Himma:.
2. B.M. p.59> n.^293. / ,, / • - / y : '
3. There is also the-legendary, use of the fact that he was. the 
eighth.Abbasid Caliph which brought with it a number of 
other.things ;.using the, number eight. See below: End of
the Reign*/ -x ' - ■ X " ' /-; ■’ ' , /
U . See_Ha Jib ;M* M • Bihbiti: Abu Tammam al-Ta!I liavatuhu wa- 
Hayatu Shi trlhlr;X' Haq, A * » The Historical Contents.
//Xf///X ■ V' ’ /X :>/XX -X XiV Z1^ /
/X / /■/■X ' - The plot to kiil\Mu*‘ta§i-m and replaceXhini as caliph /-'-'X,X;;X;
, by (Atbasyon of / Md/mun recalls tile pppositipn which faced . ; ■ y;
' _ they ace ess ion; of M,u'ta$im.‘ Buf where ^ Abpas/ had been'ah, :'/Xi;Z/
. /importantyfactorXin quelling that opposition then, he was '
■'now won; over to the .same opposition*/. What is;.more the ,
: opposition had; increased its ranks. Its .core however did : X X;
R; / n o t .change butyfound cause . to increase; its discontent,/ , X ■ i
/;X - / ; to rally/others around it/and an opportunity to strike. , / / * X;-/
- ■ / Thoughyfhat/bpppsition failed in the beginning, /it had - v /- X
X  . ; ./^ade/ MuXta^im' shyXaway -from the/pro-!AbbasXbiements in the //
army and in the bdmihi strati on; too. It seemed/to have X:-/„ ';/ 
/ ; / , ; .  caused: a/deep; mistrust on his part of these elements. • \  /  , v - r .
:/. , : ; Y a 1 qubi .reports that he /kept ‘ Mp *.mun * s men in theadmini s- - /
- ■ / ; tratibn only fqr-;;three*.inoxltlis‘ and then dismissed them all.'V
X .Ope does hot hear miich -about 1 Abbas after; the accession of 
,:;-;;y,Mu-\;t_a§imyti'il the, Incident of the plot;v‘‘X-4nde'ed Wathiq,7 
t . ‘/// son and suecessor, of M u 11aqim was alre ady ;emerging as ,;; ;
./ / heir apparent, once -'left in charge in Baghdad when Mu'ta^im ,
. - movedXto// "Samarra arid then seen to welcome Afshin .bn -his 
‘ XR ■ , return-‘from; the war 7against Babak. 'Abbas,,, ..older and more 
i . ; experienced, as a general, was not--'mentioned/ either /amdngst/f/
X, . 1. Y a ! qubi III,-p. 197* X  ' rV; X'X ‘ ’ ‘ X •// . ■"■.;//■:
*• * -  * ’1 w f w w w m w p i  iiiWfcuM ' w ^ t ***  t v„ » - f
the military leaders,- or the men. of the State:* XtJjaif; 
had /successfully7 concluded.‘his mission againsixthe X x X  '
Butt but. there; was /no iiiention of. fabulous; rewards or 
recognition as /happened with 'Afshin. Haying led the/ X / 
rglief party/in the/campaign against Byzantium he was ’> /X:
soon overshadowed by/other new commasaders as ^ the campaign'; x 
progressed*;/. Even /in •' the building of Samar fa there was -X> 
no mention/of; Abbas, or rUjaif. Thus MuVta§im; ’.h’ad 'ail// XXX:. 
along made no effoxrt to/appease= or to approach them.:
They were hpweyer ’ with him in .the campaigningainst Byzantium 
And here; one/notes that 'Ujaif/was sent with,a small force 
in advance, a for be- certainly composed of fhis : followers :, - X 
from amongst the idiurasanis and the Abna'. f Was this,an ‘ 
attempt > to- get7ri;d of/than or weaken their power?/; Mere':X/x 
they mads to take part; in the/cCampaign for fear /that they XV 
•,M^ ght;^ have-'■b'ee)l:;a:'’d'ahger' if left behind? There are no . ,
answers to >;these ■ questions in the sources; but it is cer- ■ 
tain that; their ppwefwaS ho thing compared to that of the 
<rest , of the army and hence, they were safer with it.
Held in .suspicion% jaif was. -not given ‘a major command in
the campaign. X ;he was alsb/not given a free ;hand with-
/' /' i-:';'- XXX X/; / ■' : - /
.expenditure* Thstead -it was the-new elements5 of the
.1* Jabari, p.l256//: E.:M . , p.?6.
royal corps . and of Afshin that had ;e very thing. The
campaign ''was-.: a chance which /brought all the discontented :
toge ther in time /.and1 'place.; and gave them an opportunity 
of united action. , ; . 5 ; / -
/ - The; plan which unfolded itself ,.after, the fall of / v 
imorfUnr shows that the;: idea: of eliminating :M u f ta§im, 
bringing *Abbas'/to ^ poWierV - and returning to; Baghdad from ; 
Samarra had heeh in the minds o f ,the plotters for.a time 
/before.the campaign.^////That does not suggest that they , 
had actually liiade/such a plan, only that the idea, was 
there. Tabari accouht of the plot tells only about / '■ * 
'Ujaiff sreasons;:. - But why should rtJ: jaif,,cphtaci 'Abbas, ■ 
rebuke/him for his/failure to ' stand for succession on 
the death'of his; fathehr have him; agree, to the plot of 
M l i l n g  his uncle/and the Caliph, Mu* ta^im, and have homage 
paid.,, to himselfif thehe were no previous understanding?
Why should the ;t wo/ pf them find a ready support/ from■ a 
large section of the ,army, ranks and officers,. :if it/were - 
not fqr; the disconteht which they knew was/a/good, rallying
1. Tubari> p.1257; , pi-77. Tanukhi-. al-Earad^ I, p.72
;: reports an bs/trangement between Mu' ta§ifii ;and the-poet al”
busayn b . al/pahhu.k caused by thelatter' s compositioh of
poem;in whic|i/he/praided cAbbas /and hoped that; he would be;
■/caliph.-/\ " ■  ■-
point .for such a plan?/'.... The .idea of returning to Baghdad, 
not /to;:^Samarra>./was^/■ very significant. top.i;,/ M u fta§im; had ./ 
had7to call upon two judges df Baghdad/.and some o f .its 
.nofables, to hear/witness to his; will:,: and it was to / ;
B aghdad;that /the n e w ?Caliph was -to; go had the plot- succX 
Ceded... /Thus Baghdad /always remained a/powerful political 
..eehtre.'in; the Abbasid World ,ahda strong rival and al- ;'/ 
ternative' to Samdrra. X ' ‘ - ■■Z-X.- .
- It is significant too ;that :the; original' plan wad : / X;
•to kill Mu1 ta^im -at the beginning of the campaign when ///- 
he would have; been more open :tovattack and the' men would . :X/ 
have been pleased to :be spared the hazards, of the bampaign.1 ,,, 
This confirms the nature of.tome of the Byzantine-Abbasld/ ;:/ 
relatldns-wb^n bampaigns had more influence on internal 
than /on /external situations'. X: ;Mas1 udi1 s , allegation that 
/Abbas had contracted .t&e By^arrfcine Emperor for peace*// ..// 
tho ugh, no t buppor ted i n . any o ther , So urc e , i a no t . al toge ther , 
/incpnsisteht with.that situation.2 In one passage Tabari X/ 
says that some had said,/after'being rebuked by Itakh , f'X
1., Tabarip.1257,/ , p.77h translates ’’the troops/would
re joice at their ' return from/the/ expedition” .; This, should Xr 
be ’’the. troops/^ /ph-better^still/the people r ( ad-nas) X.-would 
be/pleased to abandon; the campaign;" . The - scene took pljabe 
at the beginning of the c ampaign; // '• / / X/;
*2}.' ••MaS.'udiy ' ’ r
that they would rather change sides - i.e. " to, the- Byaantine 
than suffer.subh humiliations** More important/in .: 
relation to, this'new era of Saniarra was thevfact that 
from the start/there this attempt of depositing/, the 
.Cdllph By-'-'bpldieri.S; who'"pinned their hopes of. betterment 
on-the! Accession' of rivals, from - the. ruling dynasty*
(The/tradition:of Baghdad in this respect was ;tlie: evasion 
by the-- ,6aliphs-' -of/ they/wills of their predecessors in - / 
respect to: the/probieim of successi o n ) a n d  here it should--- 
be said that the/ipfaciic.e was established by the old/ele­
ments in the armyv/X/^ only. to. follow. suit.
f  'Abbas, had/refUsed^'Ujaif*'S' suggestion/to/act/at 
the beginning/of; .the, march saying. tliat, he wbuld not..- spoi 1 • - 
.such a campaign; -" Ghaz\y*. But he agreed to the; essence - ;; 
/of. the. plot.with-the/hppe that it would be executed after 
-the end of the: war * - ;/Xn the; meantime his agents" went 
around winning supporters ;and having,them- pay homage to 
'Abbas* x In this/way they drew to their side men from 
those around Mu*ta^lm's favourite generals as well as 
Mu*ta§im himself . Jabari mentions the names .of; two of 
these generals as examples:, Ashinas and Afshin. . v His
1. Tabari: pV 12)19; E .M., p>70.
2. Tabari: p. 1257; E.M. , pv77*
X  ' account makes'/ityelenr/that; the;/plsh. was to. kill : all of .
//; / / M u 1tasim's^ favourite/generals./ .With those who /promised 
/,/-.? .tp/ carry out t he/kll 11 ng. were some froin . amongst Mu1 ta§im Vs 
':/:// //hew?: tpopps;,/;iurks where, vthp/geheral in ques tion was Turk ; r 
* -X//: ahd/lM^^ an/Ushf us’toi. The /plan.was ,
r/?//. that these, nien .'woutd act- upon a signal to? he 7given: when". .
/ / they wahid/attack and, kill? the. resheqtiVe^generals,.?? Anil?///
/// /those responsilnLe; for ^ u Vtu^im would attkck ;aiXdi7kill him.?. ?; /
/?./? But: here again differences ' arose as to whexr/tb/actv//cBjaif!sx
? ; plan ..was /to attaCk/the booty, kept in (Sne placs under /
g u a r d . T h e .  disturbahp^ would, attract; the attention'pf ; 
•yx / . yiu'Hasitiyw^^ would/riish,, to, theV/place/therehy
X : ?/ Oxpphing/lhim^f ^/.///illjail7, hady? according ip /Thhari, ^nomih- : 7
7? //; abed ?home ?--p&eh/to/at taefc/ithb hpbty-hefore. having " the agreement 
//:“ i/hf/ *Abhasi y / . O n d i s a g r e e d *  preferring 
,///:Z t o  attack .bh/fe !|Ujaiffs,m:en. did their- /. *
XX,///'parh'byxatthqjlsi^ /■vMu-*t'a§)im, • as : expected*/'"/v?; 7
? ■ //hurried -t6/the/:spehe^or/hqrsehacfc^ was the end/of X
? ;-:vthe matter. , /; No ho dy a it ac ke d him ? as - Ahhasgave ho, orders:.y, 
/v Z:fOr' the7 men , tp; db/|pf/:/'/But; the? event led to the .revelation / 
? :/ Of the\whole plot*; t A chrtain 'Amr al-Earghani, one of ' .
/ ?/?: the chiet/ cohspiratprs/sgainst/Mu;'ta§im,/had, alreaby/warhed.
?a young helativer bf his? v/ho was a member of the retinue of
the ;Galiph?about?the whole affair and asked .him to 1 ■//
keep rout/of danger.’*' It seems that the failure of the. ’ ? :-/? /?/
/ . attempt had caused the youth to reveal to. Mu/td^im what * x/i?
/ he .’"knew-* of: the/vplot# Mu*ta§imwas thus ablei,. to. round 7 v HS
up the chief'7 conspirators one after the other* The : : 7
/;r7 ; plot; failed: f o r : lack of co-ordination1 and dhdecisiveness x; y: :/?
from /Abbas. . .* Mufta§iM', who was keen7 to .know, all the 
./? details 7 ot the conspiracy in? order to .7be Iri a/better
position to deal; with, its makers, had this? told to him x . ; /■
. 7 by 'Abbas. wiiom: He invited for a drink,s having succeeded 7; 7 ;////?
{x in allaying his fears.'27'/ Mu'ta§im;had :tha details/frbm., -r . v ///?.'
.. otlier sources/todV?? After7 that the main figures of the / /; 7
/>?/ X plot, 'Abbiisihjaifh. fAnba.sa, 'Amr al-Earghani a n d h ’thprVx -xx?;7 
x/Z . -/ were killed in: different?ways-with the Help of the Tiifkish / ; 7 X7;
1 troops of?Mu'ta§im. ^.//IrAbbas was;.then cursed: in the mosques XX;/?
■ and called al-la1In -.the/cursed* /His?full brothers were / ?x>
gathered together and given, to Itakh who Imprisoned them //;
X  / in hla house where they: dled.^ /Xxx X'Xx ' 7 X- /. 7 ///:
7.7- wHlle-getting rid of political opponents, especially
r ebel'v le ade r s and conspirator-s, by ki 1 ling /them had be en 
’' .the prac t ice, perhaps ,with; some justification, the manner ?
■ r x ? 1./ Tabari, ppy 71258-62y-XE.M., pp. 77-81• /. ? 7 v?
/ \ 2^:,^abarih^pp. " 1263^4/■/ E.M.', ppX?81-2. X/yxX--7
-3v 'Tabarih ppv-'I265r8’; E.M., pp. h2:-5;/ YaXqubl^ III, p.202:;
A/"-////; " Mas1 u & i , X x . .//X\/,;7 V'/Zy? x/;7 ;/ X? ■' / ■
in which M u fta$im had done this was -somfe'what unique., . -*•//)?
The “use of/slow death with torture and mutilation which ; :r x//: 
was the. mark of his practice in this, aspect/had noypara- ; ■ - ;7 
. llel.before in.. Islamic, history and was contrary to the ’/'?777//;,/;,/
. teaching of Islam* .But having been Introduced? it had ; ./?/
consequences: It was to be the lot of soke of the N  r /
Abb as i'd Caliphs. , . ' ■-v ' X/z
The victorious return to Samarra from the c elebrated. /x i? 
.campaign-against Amorium-. was thus; marred by the events 7 //
■’ i • - ' ■/'?;' ?
that .followed it. ' Nor.was the. victory itself to produce ./ " XZ? 
/' internal stability in, the Caliphate or induce the would-be 7 '\?xx.
rebels' to heed their steps. Mu'ta^im was soon, to face a. 7 X . 
great revolt in the north east. 1 / Ax  7; ;?Z?7?z
t . .The levolt of Maziyar b. Qarin takes one back to ; 7 Z x
the north-eastern frontiers of the Caliphate♦ T h i s ; time/ Xx Z 
to the region of Tabaristan where the/same/geographical ./xTx/ ? 
cqndi’t i ons--“ whieft\ .me! t the Arab advance and facilitated the / . /. - xy? 
.revolt of. Babak in;the/region of Jibal prevailed. Maziyar / zZ7 
himself whs?one?of the local princes of the area.*'* When ; x  : X:
■ l;.:*v;^ or'--Abu 'Tdimnam!, s /famous poem on this, see,. Munfaqayat* pp.71X78*
2. Ya.1 qub i : Bui dan, pp.* 5 3“T ; Ibn I§fandiyar; Hi story o f Tabr I s-Z 
z z? X ; tanXxcby 7t 1H; ibn: al-Fakih::' Bui dan u. 509. /? /7/Z;X^,z/xVv
; /.: 3*7 Ibn Isf andiyar. - on. c11. > p. 1'47;: Inostranzev» Iranian' Influence 
7/ on Muslim Literature» pp * • 96-8; .Sadighi, Les Mouvements, pp• 
.60-2; SplilerY Gesehischte. bb. 63-77. Browne, Literary History* 
■ z;v \ jfv* 30, E*I.( 1) ,xMazyar. " - ,xM.x v7'z- x  . '-vxx
Ma'mun was -in"Marw pressing on with; His policy of 
/Isiamizationoa^ fraternisation with, the neighbouring
rulers, he was- able to win over the father of Maziyar.X 
;MasiyarVs:7 father on his side was keen to enlist- the I 
/.support .of?Maimun; against rival princes from this own.
family* It was/on the basis of this relati onship that 
Z ;Maziyar himself came profess Islam and secure the 
help7of,'Ma'into-itO named him Muhammad and called M m  z / Z/ Z 
'' the; ^Glleht. ;of /thn/Gbmmander of /the/ Be lievers *y ■ ' ; It V -' 
:1s said /that; Mpzlyar/used to c all hi ms elf "muwati” no t xX?.
: • "mawla11 -Z/the ally/,not the client - of 'the.; Commander
■ xxz-,.z x ;•//* 7: x '■ : - ‘ /Z x " .
of the; Believers * With the support? of .Ma * mun* ;- a:
'■/Maziy^^ of his /Region zin> jabaristan*/ '
\As such he cphtinued in the reign of M u 1 ta^im who, like
/ % Vmuii',lcegt''•'Hi.m;In*;hls place; not: so much for his loyalty f
, and services to, .the Gallphate/as for ’ the Zpractical reason
Zpf/the ;iack, dfZah alternative. (Both /Ma'.mun and; M u f ta$Im/
xhaH a; lot; to ;deal: with elsewhere.) /’/For/from the time x*
'z of7:-M'afiiiiunl -Mazly'ar was consolidating his. own-power and..
doing his/best to further the; Zoroastrian religion,and;.
stop the/.advance. of Islam.and loyal elements to the:Abbasid
. 1. Ya! qubi,/III, p./53r; Ibn al-Faqih; Bui dan,, p*309; -Ibri 
x yIgfandlyahy ob.cit.y p. 1U7♦ ■ ■ ':x; x .x/ ^
Caliphate in his own domain.^ In the reign of 
Muf'tgiL§im; the/gr.bblein was connected with his' pwn atti-r v-vX
tudexto the Tahirids in -.Khurasan. The consolidation
/been to the .liking of Mu'ta^imy w H q » having been i n 7-/' ' 7
estranged relations with 1 Abd>Allah h*-■ Tahir j at the time / X ; 
of M a’muhy did not fall to express his desire, to get rid x\xz 
of him when/the time came; ; Maziyar, ah well as h i s X  -y - 
alleged/collaborator Afshin, were aware of' this*2, /This ■ x/x 
is ;why -Maziyar;defied-- the practice of handing^.over the. 'Xx;//-; 
Khara j\ >  , revenue ~ zbd/Marw nndyseht /it-.'to/MuVtb^i-in. XZxXyX' 
directly.^ Mu'ta$im usedztoxsend/ibback^to/ the zz Z
Tahirids hut /t9bk£hb-actlbii,1 to remedy? the sit hat ion. , To 
preserve ' the estra^ement withput siding, with either - party ; 
played into,/his/policy - r'ather^/impb-sed*:oh;him, by the - //
situation X  of kqepihg both busy and w e a k * M a z i y a r  ,///?/ 
benefitted/ too• ’ z/The' differences between Camarra "and V  7...;/ 
Marw gaye him a chance to manoewrb;and? keeping? the? ; 7 xyxx 
Zfaharids weak ; furthered his/ultimate policy of hindering /
-the %Arab and I siamic influence from'hi s lands 9 as Khurasan
1. Ibn Ihfandlvar, on.ci.t*, History of .Tabarlsan, pp.l49~55;
/ ; T&bari9 p*i2.69; EvM* ?; p.86. Hbre one .sees some evidence; may 
,' / /indi cate ‘ that Maziyar /was in .league With. Babak.
;2*/Jabarir? p*1268; B . M * p .  85*/’ x ,  ' /  ,
31? Tabari,: p.l268;/E*M**/p.86.
\ V'.:was the source of both inVhisVtimely, 7 /ThCXTahirids 
y , V: could n ot r isk/an . open breach/;with either; Mu V ta§im; br/; :v:
X /XMaziylr-'aO that /Would givezf h a t  wpXa chance to //come7; ’y/vv 
V : 7 together? against them.y>'Their/poiic^Zwas;: ^  
y y yyahd .opportuni tie s/and to cont inue po ihtin^; ;odt Zto? Mu' ?t £t§ i m 
the? disloyalty- of? Maziyar to both religionZand. State. =
:/ The:?;news o f . Maziyar *s acbiyitiehZ:^^ * hadZbeeii
X-Z beaching;,Mu'faeim, and: ■liahpm:before hikxzf or quite: a 
z Z:;l6ng? iime^ ButyMaziyarXeVaded - ail charges against Zhlm- - 
Z..zxbcllyby defehdihg? his; actions andygiyihg substance to his 
y:xioyaltyZwheh in/doubt > zHenef ibing in the meantime from 
" vjthb;balance ; ofxbower and ? the?Zproblems Of the Caliphate,.2 
x. yyxZ:f’rVInZthe,? year 2^fv/.83gr9 boweveryZMaziyar^?ohqseyt07 / - 
; / /make his findlfandbpen .,breachZ:wfthv7the Caliphatef In 
yXi r e v e r t i ^  - bonie?/sources7shy? thatybeZwab;;7;' 7?;
: . ' ./insbigated by1; Af^Iii,7 the-favourite^ bpnimander^ of Mu Vta§?im* 
zzy.According toZtHbse sour c es . Afshin7,who knew: M u 1^ fa^ibiVs X7•’ 7 
;Z:ZattitudeZtq the? Tahirids , sndZcoyeted their? place, ;in. yZ-b X: 
?? jlhuras:5h kept instigating?ZMaziy ar, , on, theyg rounds of his?
: ;/Zsympathy,with his;7religion ?and asplrations, 7to?:reyolt.^:
1 *, Tubari?z/p.?/;i g W i ‘'S*M*;y/p*,9G'b;^
2•*•■ ibniv Isfandiyarj, History of Tabbristahv7uvibl; Taharil p .1270;
jEvMly '''PbZ86^7xyz777X7X''ZZ7 X:”7ZZ , ,T/h:■ 'Z: 7? Z/u ' Z^yyy
3. Tabarli?.pp.7’^lg68^ 9j?zE*'M*y. p*86; YalqUbly :III,. p.2b2?. ,-A7 "ZZ
Afshin - so the.sources say - who knew that the, 
Tahirids alone could not put down the revolt, hoped 
that he would he sent to put it down and in doing so 
he given the governorship of Khurasan.
Allying himself with the indigenous population 
against the Arahs and the Abna1 , with the poor wage- 
earners against the rich land-owners, with the tax­
payers against the tax-exempt - mostly merchants and 
citizens generally from Arab or Ahna1 stock - and
with the 2oroastrians against the Muslims Maziyar began
lhis revolt by forcing the people to pay homage to him.
To deter his possible opponents from taking action against 
him, he took hostages from amongst the suspect elements.
He then ordered his supporters to destroy the defences of
Q
the key cities, of the area like Amul, Sariya and Tamis.
1. Tabari, pp. 1269, 1273-4, 1278- E.M., pp., 86, 89-90, 93..
E.M., p.93, translates: as ”those who were liable to the 
land tax and those merchants, and citizens, who .were mot.” 
Tabari^s meaning is perhaps ” ... the taxed (i.e. who were 
actually paying, tax) and the tax-exempt from the merchants 
and citizens.” H.Ritter, Oriens V I . 1953, pp. 157-8, gives 
possible alternatives to some of E.M. translations of other 
parts* See also B. Lewis^BSOASj 17, p.184.
2. Tabari, p. 1275$ e .M., p.90; Ibn Isfahdiyar; History of 
Tabaristan, p.153.
Thereupon lie took to the mountains leaving it to some
of his followers to fortify themselves behind a wall
and some trenches which they made near Tamis in the
neighbourhood of Jur^ran. it was thus a combination
of religious,- political and geographical factors-which
lay behind Maziyar*s revolt. Of these perhaps the
most important was the economic factor. It was the
promises which he gave to the peasants to give to them
their masters* lands that swelled the ranks of his 
1
supporters. In.opposition to him stood those who were, 
economically in a good position. One also notes that all . 
along his policy was one of amassing as much wealth as he 
could get, a policy which was followed by Afshin too.
The gold and silver currency of the time did not lose its 
value with the change of any regime and was of great im­
portance in the commercial economy of the period. More 
to this was the question of the payment of the professional 
soldiers of the time who sold their services for direct 
cash payment.
The news of Maziyar*s actions soon reached Khurasan. 
Some of the people of Jur.Jan, fearing the fate pf others
1. Tabari, pp. 1278-9; E.M., pp. 92-h.
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“before them, fled to NIshapur to give the alarm to the 
Tahirids. Those in their turn despatched the news to 
M u ’tasim in Samarra. A combined attack was arranged. < 
fAbd Allah b. Tahir governor of Khurasan sent an army led 
by his uncle al-gasan b. al-3Jusa]n to attack from JurJan. 
Mu'taSim sent another army led by Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. 
Mus’ab to attack from Rayy$ nearly the same methods 
used against Babak were used here. Among the troops he 
sent, M u ftasim was careful to send the Tabaristani elements 
led by such men as al-]Jasan b. Qarin al-Tabari.**' These 
were better suited for the campaign for their knowledge of 
the. area. These two armies under the command of al-Hasah 
b. al-Hfasajn soon went into action.
Al-IJasan b. al-IJusajn having won initial victories 
against the rebels in the Jurjan area ?/as soon to capture 
Maziyar himself. This was done by getting in touch with 
the cousin or perhaps the brother of Maziyar, Qu^hiyar and
p
promising to make him the governor of the area. It is 
interesting to note that the Tahirids themselves suffered 
from those jealousies. With al-Hasan b. al-IJusayn in the 
Tahirid army there was Hayyan b. Jabala a client of ’Abd
^1. Tabari, p. 1276; E.M.,.p.91.
2. Tabari, p. 1288; E.M., p.100.
 ^  ^ C&. c*
Allah b. Tahir the governor of Khururu. This Hayyah did
his best to forestall al-Hasan in capturing Maziyar."^
The efforts which he made in this respect give one the
impression that it wajs not a mere rivalry between him
and'al-Hasan a s military commanders, but that Hayyan,
wais expressing hin his attitude a sort of rivalry which
existed between its master and al-Hagan. ■ - . '» .
Betrayed by some of his followers, as had been Babak, 
Maziyar was,at last caught in his mountain refuge. Al- 
Hasan b. al-Husayn had played upon, the internal miseries 
and personal aspirations of some of Maziyar*s family to 
reach that end. There was.not much of the fighting or 
the losses which happened in the case of Babak. Though 
the military side of the campaign had catered for such 
.eventualities, the main policy, of al-fjasan b. al-Husayn 
was to create division within Maziyar supporters, isolate 
him, and put an end to the revolt by capturing its leader. 
To facilitate that Maziyar was given promises ofLsafety 
for his person, his family and his belongings. He was 
then sent to Samarra to face,.the Caliph Mu*tasim.
1. Tabari, pp. 1283-5; E.M., pp. 96-8.
Tabari says that "Abd Allah,b. Tahir was keen to 
acquire the alleged letters of Afshin to Maziyar in which 
the former was said to have encouraged the latter to
rebellion. Having got them !Abd Allah had them safely
■ • 1 _
delivered to the. hands of Mu tasim. In Samarra Maziyar
was brought to trial before a tribunal in the Dar al-’&mma* 
There the chief interest was to get him to confirm the 
accusation of participation in the conspiracy levelled 
against Afshin.^ Afshin himself was by that time 
in prison on that charge. .Maziyar however did not 
support the charge, which however, ought not to have been 
required had the alleged letters existed. Maziyar was 
then whipped ^50 lashes, after which he drank some water 
and passed away in 225/839-l|0. His body was afterwards 
crucified by the side of that of Babak, an end which did
- *z
not fail to excite the imagination of some poets*
1. Tabari, p. 1298; E.M., p.106.
2. {abari, pp. 1303-11; E.M., p. 111-8. Here Tabari’s account 
confirms the allegation of the correspondence between Afshin 
and Maziyar. . But Ya*qubi’s account, Tarlkh III, p. 203,
does not* Nor does T'&^&Pi’s own account m  p. 1298; E.M.,
p. 107. ‘ _
3. Bustahi: Muntaqayat. p.88.* . . .
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Again the end of this successful campaign was
overshadowed by what succeeded it. With the end
of Maziyar the trial and death of A fshin was not long
in following. Afshin, called Ilaydar h. I£a*us, was
accused of connivance with Maziyar and Babak, earlier
of connivance with Makinjur one of his governors in
Ushrusana who led a revolt in the wake of that of 
• - ~ 1
Maziyar, of amassing wealth in Ushrusana for a future 
revolt, of defection from the Caliphate and.most of all, 
with entertaining and professing anti~Islamic beliefs*2 
He was then put on a level with Babak and Maziyar and 
even worse, owing to his position in relation to Mu* tasim. 
With the revolt of Maziyar and the accusations levelled 
against him in connection with.it together with his in­
tentions in his homelands he was not given the command 
against Maziyar, v/hieh he was thought to have seen as a
key to all lais plans. He was farther relieved of his
3duties in the guard of the Caliph* Then he was put in 
prison and brought to trial. . Here again the Tah^tiids came 
onto the scene, Afshin was reported to have heard Mu*tasim
1. Tabari, p. 1301, E.M., pp. 108-9.
2. Tabari, pp. 1308-13; K.M., pp. 11U~9.
3. Tabari, pp 1303; E.M., pp. 110.
express M s  intention to depose .the Tahirids from 
Khurasan* With his position; of favour- with M u ’ tasirri, a  
his ability and his suitability for the governorship, of 
Khurasan in case the .Tahirids; were to be replaced, he 
was said to have worked to that end*> He amassed wealth 
in Ushrusana to consolidate, his .position :there. He ' 
incited Maziya^ so that, he AfshTh, would be sent to put 
his rebellion down and then get. his way to the governor­
ship of Khurasan. Thus/ the version of Tabari. But v 
one is hot told how he could have achieved,that end..
Was it the possibility of addingvto'the famous vietory 
against Babak a victory .against Maziyar? If he had 
been in support.of Babak and was in league with Maziyar 
how did “he crush the former and contemplate suppressing 
the.latter? Was he really in league or eyen in sympathy 
with both or either of them?. Tabari*s version is in- 
consistent in' this-respect. He rnentions the Tetters .; 
sent to MQziyar but these t did! 'not: appear..in‘t  lie trial; 
of either AfshTn or Iylaziyar, for. Maziyar was asked to 
confess to their existence. In one place,. Tabari re ports 
say that Tfaziyar did not incriminate AfshTn in any
1. , Tabari, p. 1305>, B *M. .p*tI2*
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confession, in another he says they did* The plea ;
of Afshan to M u ftasim contained in Tabari shows that —
those accusations had no solid basis, ’ That plea
contains no request for a par do 4 but refutes; wicked.
• 2 'V' :;- 
charges and asks for justice and wise consideration,
c\ Indeed an earlier and more reliable source throws doubt
on the alleged relations between AfsjjiTn and Maziyar#^
This brings the matter down to the relations between
M u ftasim, AfshTn and the Tnhirids on one hand and to the• —— ,
possibility of AfshTn* s sympathies with Magian religion 
on the other* The collecting and sending of wealth
feo UsjbJfmsana should be seen in this light*
It was the Tahirids in Khurasan who observed his 
steps and reporting these to Mu*tas;im,. At the time of f
the revolt of M'aziyar which had alarmed M u ’tasira and 
drawn his attention to the seriousness of the situation 
in the East, the Tahirids had a chance to drive home 
their accusations against Afghan, In this they seemed
1, Tabari, pp, 1298, 1303-H; E.M.,pp,TQ7, 111-8.
2, Tabari, pp, 1315-6; E^vUpp.121-2* The T^hirids had the .
governorship of B aghdiad and continued to play an import- \ 
ant r81e in Iraq. ; ,
3, Ya1 qub 1, III, pp.202-3. *v;;
to have had supporters within M u ’tasim’s .close circle
" 1  * of men. Up to then Mu ’tasim was more on the side of
AfshTn, but then he had to take, the necessary: precautions*
AfshTn was not sent.to put down the revolt of Maziyar;
he was relieved of his guard duties and then kept in
prison pending $rial. £abari reports that before his
imprisonment, when he felt the change in-MuVtas;im,s.-r
attitude towards him, AfshTn planned to escape to Armenia
through which he could proceed to his homeland in Ushrusana
l1o execute this he planned to .invite Mu’tasim and his
favourite generals to a feast in which he would offer
them poisoned food and then flee. The plan did not
materialize, as AfshTn was betrayed by some of his own
men.
In the famous trial of AfshTn. which had all the
atmosphere of the Mihna of Ahmad b. Hanbal,before, the
most important charge levelled against him was his anti-
Islamic policy in Ushrusana coupled with his own anti-
IslamId practices and beliefs. For these his accusers
did not fail to produce some evidence. They brought some
2
men who box*e witness to the former charge. / Material
1. DTnawTri , Akhbar, p. 40*
2. See p.1196, <-r#h. Si i .
evidence was used in support of the latter. , AfshTn’s
house was searched, where some Buddhist idols and Magian
1
books were found* The charges of conspiracy with 
Maziyar were of no importance in relation to those*
AfshTn was indicted* He was kept in prison from which 
he sent his moving plea to M u ’ta&im. The plea was, met 
with no favourable reply. Instead AfshTn was sentenced 
to death. His, body fii*st hung before the gate of Bar 
al-fXmma, was then burnt into ashes ir, which were scattei*ed 
in the river Tigris* His son, the husband of a daughter 
of AshTnas, was duped by a plan which secured his arrival 
in Samaxrra* It was feared lest he should make some 
trouble when he learned of the fate of his father*
The affairs of Bab ale, Maziyar and AfshTn are important 
not only because they illustrate the ambitions of rebel 
leadei»s, but because they show the wealmessof the politicali
and military grip of the Caliphate on the eastern provinces, 
reveal the economic and administrative problems which lay 
behind these revolts, and point to the regional, ethnic 
and religious factors which stood in the face of Arabiza­
tion and Islamization. The slow process of Wala1 which
accompanied the spread of Islam and the .Arabs in the
first century of Islam had brought, on the whole to
those who were subjected to it, something near to
complete Islamization and Arabisation.  ^- This is perhaps
better illustrated in this period by the Taharids who,
despite their political ambitions, did not falter in.
their loyalty to Islam and to the .Caliphate* With the
1
Walla1 al-Istina1 *; which was the marlt of the Abbasid 
period and the spread of Islam east and north of 
Khurasan in this period, neither complete Islamization 
nor Arabisation were achieved* This is better shown 
in the career of Ivfaziyar who significantly chose to 
call himself muw'ali (ally) not mawfa (client) of the 
Commander of the Believers* The result was the political 
turmoil and unrest expressed in his revolt.
These revolts demonstrate also the rivalries which 
existed between such men as AfshTn, Maziyar and *Abd 
Allah b Tahir and the position of Mu’tasim in relation 
to them and their ambitions. The trial of AfshTn had 
moreover^ showed in some degree a rift between the men of 
the swords (the military commanders) and the men of the 
pen (the secretaries). AfshTn represented the former
■--- — HAvvLA
1. E • I. (l)., Q.v.. also A.AmTn, Buha,1 ,pp.37-43*
group; Muhammad b. fAbd al-Malik al-Zayyat the famous
secretary and poet and Ahmad b. Abi Duf*ad represented
the latter. It was the latter two who led the.
accusation and cross-examination of AfshTn in the trial.
Before this we have seen Ahmad b. Abi Du'Td also-on the
1opposite side of AfshTn. It was this group, with which 
’Abd Allah b. Tahir had some, connection, which threw 
its weight against AfshTn and secured his conviction..
It was this-group which stood behind the severe,,measures
2 ' ' ‘ / ! 
in the Mihna and having failed to carry through its
policies there had found an outlet for its intentions
in championing the cause of Islam and the Caliphate
in the trials of B*abak, Masiyar and AfshTn.
But these were not the only events which revealed
in their course the problems that faced Mu.Vtasim and
the Abbasid Caliphate. In the year that Mu*tasim ,had
started the campaign against Babak he had to send an
expedition to, quell the disturbances caused by a group
-  3
of dissidents, Known as al-Muhammira, in the Jibal region.
1. DTnawari; Alchbar, p. 401; T a nukhi ;al-garan ,11,p p.67-9•
2. see Chapter I above.
3* Tabari,, p.ll65;S.M.(2). Tabari here does not give the 
name but speaks of the Kfmrramite gro^up,followers of 
Babak,who caused Mu*tasim to send Ish*a<^  b. IbrahTm b.
, Mus’ab agdinst them. Yaf qubi ,Tarikh’,III ,p.!97 ,speaks of 
the same expedition as being sent against the Muharmnira 
who seem to have been connected with Babak1 s revolt,but 
were not quite the same. See E.M-.,p.595 n. 289.
These used to attack the caravan routes in the area 
and thereby threatened the safety of commercial-'-traffic 
and the security of the pilgrims to the Iiijaz. In this 
way they were motivated by economic reasons'like those of 
the Zutt but unlike the .Zutt they had the advantage of 
being on the frontiers and .were, always able to slip away 
into Byzantine territory. Like some of the supporters 
of Babak they fought with the Byzantine Emperor against 
the Arabs in his attack on Zapetra and in the campaign 
that-followed it. Similar to their disturbances were 
those of the Kurds in the Mosul region.
More important than these was perhaps the bid for.an
'Alid Caliphate led by the !Alid Muhammad b. al-$asim
— “C —  i
known as Sahib al-Ta|iqari in the year 219/834-5 and the
v:-, c >2 •
revolt of the Yemenite Alin Harh the Veiled One in&
Palestine in the year 227/841-2. one of the reasons for
the latter is interesting a s :it points, to some of the
excesses^ of. the Turkish soldiers of Mu'tasim and a.
-  3
practice already deplored by the Baghdadis. 'Neither of.
1. Tabari, j?p.1 1 6 5 - 6 .M.PP.3-4 *Abu al-Paraj jMaqatil al- 
• TallblyyTn., pp.376-82; a 1-Baghdadi ; a 1-Parq ba.yn al-Firaq
pp.* 22—3* •
2. rfabari , pp. 1319-21; E.M. , 124-5.
3. Tabari^ p*1219; B.M. ,124; see above Chapter IV, p.\2>5 •
these constituted a threat to the Galiphate nor was
difficult to suppress* The former was put. down by the
Tnhirids, the latter by a commahder of M u 1tasim, called
Rafiq al-Hadari. Happening within the Caliphate - ^
not on the borders or in the newly acquired areas - their
importance lies In their comparison with the other revolts
The common denominator of all was the economic factor,
especially as regards the ranlcs of the supporters of these
risings. While.one of the supporters of the Sahib
al-Taliqan was reported to have bluntly professed to 
> ' - ■ ■ ■  ■ , i
him that he was interested only in material gains,
the supporters of the fVeiled One1 were from amongst the
nomads and agrarian elements of Palestine who hoped
- 2 ’ - ' 
for material justice out of his uprising. 'This was in
common with the revolt of the Zutt, of Babak, of Maziyar
and indeed the supporters of, ’Abbas. It is interesting
to note here that according to the practice and theory
of the State, the nomads unlike the urbans had nothing.
from the Fay1 (Income) of the. S t a t e , a s  their names were
not in the pTwans* These two uprisings had in common
1 1 J .
1* AbS al-Faraj: Macjatil «p.377«
2. Tabari, p.1320 ,E*M^,pp.l24-5* ,
3. Ibn Qallam: al-Amwal «p*212.
with the others the religious aspect* But the differ- /
ence was that here they were not anti-Islam; but anti-*Abb*asid
The *Alid rebel - a Jarudite that is a fqllbwer of a section- 
of the.; Zaidites with marked Mu* tasilite tendencies ; * 1 
rose not so much on the claim of lineage^as on his claim
to bring about justice, equity and. the rule, of Islam*.
The. Veiled One rose in the anme of a 1 -Amr , b i i - M a 1 ruf .
; w-al-Bahy# *an al-Munkar (commending the Bight - and, forbidding
2 ■ •• " • • 
the Wrong*) . With both these uprisings the idea of the
Messiah, the Mahdi .prevailed* The Veiled One called
himself to some of his supported^ the Expected Sufyani. .
(Umyyad), the. cAiid\rebel was to some of1 his followers
the Expected ^ l|id -Saviour* . ' ‘ .
9  M u ftasi$ was able to put down all of these,minor
and major revolts* All the samej the result was not the
strengthening of either Galiph or Caliphate*. , In their ' 
different courses these events had shown the nature of ;r 
the Byzahtine-Abbasid relations, (the sack of Zapetra 
and Amorium), the problems of the Abbasid Caliphate in .
1# See p* o 0 •^.^,-ii*'’' "
2* Accepted as a duty, of every good Muslim, the principle
had been used in almost all revolts as their religious / 
basis and_as a slogan to rally .people round* > :
3* Pro-Umayyad feeling was/still strong in Syria. ;r - See •
above Ghap.I. Ibn 1Asaklr* Tarlkh Dimash^.I*pp* 6G4-5, ; ;
gives.some of the traditions connected with the Sufyani, 
Baladhuri, ffut&h III ,p*296 ,ref ers to revolt in Syria*, by 
an, Umayyad client*
the difficult frontier provinces in a vast empire 
(Beibak andMaziyar), the economic and social conditions 
which forced some of the elements to rise up against the 
State (the Zutt, the Kurds and others) and the internal 
political problems which caused the plots against the 
life of the Galiph or the State (fAbbas ans AfshTn)* ,
In all these were reflected the weakness of-the hold of. 
the State in the various regions, the slender tie of 
loyalty of; governors, commanders., as well as public 
to the Galiph or Caliphate at the time. The division 
between State as represented in the official organs,of 
the Caliphate of ciitil and military services, and the 
body of the rest, of the citizens, was a glaring fact.
At that time when the administration was,both inefficient 
weak and static, the Caliphate needed to emphasize its, 
raison d*Stre for both public and government alike*.
Hence there was the religious policy expressed in the 
Mihna, the trials of B*abak, rfaziyar and AfshTn. and the 
flourishing of the spirit of J i h a d as represented in 
M a ’mun’s and Mu* tasim* s attitudes :to the Byzantines.
This'was the crisis which was to find expression in the , ’ 
writings of Mawardi on the necessity of 'the Caliphate
1 '
sometime later.
One also notes that for Mu*tasim it was. only the
question of crushing the revolts that counted. The
end was the change of governors but not the remedying
of the situations that, caused the problems.. No change
of administration to cope with the situation was made.
This is also reflected in the attitude of the writers
who failed to see the real causes in the welter of
events they recorded. ^
The two groups which benefited, from these events
were the Tnhicids in Khurasan and the Turks in Samarra*
The Tahtrids’ had now a free hand in Khurasan with no
2
rival in the near provinces and with the power of the 
Caliph much reduced after the deaths of Maziyar and 
AfshTn. The Turkish generals, ever close to M u ’tasim, 
were by now, by that quick process of elimination, his
only.favourites and the only power in the army on which
v f _ _
he could depend. No wonder then that while Afshin*s sun
was setting that of Affshirias was reaching its zenith.
1. Cf. G-ibb: Studies «_p p v 151~64.
2. Ibn, al-NaciThi Buldan. P.319. here he reports the . death 
of Maziyar and adds that * Tabaristan was^conquered,.to 
be governed by *Abd Allah b. T'ahir and rJahir b *Abd
Allah after him.*!' *
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The same year which.saw the imprisonment of AfshTn,
/ p$r —*
saw Ays hi.has deputise for M u ’tasim when the latter went 
to al-Sinn. In the same year too, Mu*tasim had Ashinas 
put on and crowned* In the next year, 226/
840-1, AJ&irias went on pilgrimage, . He was given the 
governorship of every city he entered from Seimarra to
Mecca and Medina. His name was mentioned in the
' 2 
Friday sexmions.
While in the heart-lands of the Caliphate the age
of the Turkish generals had set,.in Khurasan the
ascendency of the Tahirid f a m i l i e s w a s  confirmed. In
North Africa, the Aghlabids, ruling from their capital
^airawan were even more firmly, established as a ruling
dynasty, than the ‘fahirids, , The family was strongly
entrenched in its position since the days of Harun
al-RashTd. Distant from the ruling province of Iraq,
the province of Ifrijiya, under the Aghlabids, was
independent but in name. In the reign of Mu*tasim the
governorship of the province passed from 2iyadatu Allah
b. IbrahTm to his brother al-Aghlab in the year 225/839-40
and from al-Aghlab to his son Abu al-!Abbas in the year
1, . Tabari, p.l302; E.M.,p,110.
Ibid. ,pp. 1318^9* , B.M. ,p, 123..
2 1 0
1 ■' .
..22/840-1 • It was a period in which; the Aghlabids
were engaged in a series of naval attacks on Spicily .
and on the. Byaantine fleet in its vicinity., /There
are reports, too, that they were defending the cause
of the Abbasid Caliphate against its enemies the Umayyads
of Spain and their, allies in N .;Africa* Yet there is
no mention of these in Tabari, Masludi or Ya’qubi under . •
the reign of M u ftasim nor of any other information that , '
shows the relation between Mu*tasim and hig governors
injfrigiya. (Even Ibn Khaldun says nothing about
these, under the reign of -MuHasim.)^ These were on
the whole interested in events which directly involved
the Galiph and his troops. And the Aghlabids did not
fall within these,
Syria, always a turbulent province under the Abbasids ^
with its pro-tXmayyad tendencies and with its nomadic
Arabs, was relatively quiet under Mu*tasim except for the
uprising of the Veiled One mentioned above, Following
that immediately after the death of M u ftasim, Syria faced
al-Yi/athiq with a serious revolt in his accession to the
1, Kamil,VI pp, 350-1, 369* -■*
2 . Ibid, - . v.
3., One may wonder whether Ibn'ai-AthTr would not have 
followed suit had it not been for his sense of be— ~ 
longing to a greater world, writing as he did under ■.->
the impact of the Crusaders* 1 " ,
Caliphate, The revolt made by the ^aisites in the
area of Damascus,, was quickly put down by the same troops
which put down the revolt of the; Veiled One,
Perhaps more important in dealing with these provinces
with the rise of the generals in mind, is the development
which took place in Egypt., Under M a fmun Egypt was -the. .
scene of a number of serious revolts in which Arabs and
2
Copts took part. In putting down these revolts
M u ’tasim and AfshTn were instrumental. In the reign
of M u ftasim the governorship of Egypt was first under
Haydar Hasp al-Sqghdi (the Soghdian) and after him
under his son al-Muaaffar who succeeded in the year
219/834-5* Both of them ruled as deputies of A shlrias.
What is more both Kindi and MacjrTzi report that Mu'tasim ;
had ordered Haydar to remove the names of the Arabs from
the registers of the Diwan in Egypt and stop paying
them the *Ata* - the payments which they used to have
4
from the state* This was done in 219/834-5 and was
5’ -r*resisted by the Arabs in vain, MagrXzi comments that
1, Kamil,VI,p.376, ’Ibar,III,p-.573. Jaba'ri does not 
mention this. '
2. Tabari, years 214-16; Ma^rTzi: Khitat I,pp.334-40;
al-Kindi, Kitab al-Wulsit,pp.185-7* T"
3 * al-Kindi , op.ci t . /p. 196T
4* Kindi: Kitab al-Wulat.pp.193-4.MacipTzi:Khitat .II,p.43* 
5* MagtrTai, op.cit. .p.45*
the period of good fortune for the .Arabs in Egypt
thus came* to an end andVthe armies of Egypt bedame
of the—Mawai~i the non-Arabs and the Hawaii since the time.
of MuVtasim* The importance of this phase in the
history of Egypt as an Abbasid province can hardly
be sufficiently emphasized. With the break between
the local Arab and Muslim elements in Egypt and its
Governors appointed from Iraq, the rule of the latter -
like that of the Galiph himself in Iraq - was, deprived of, -■*-
local support and dependent on foreign troops. ' With.
the appropriate help in Iraq, ambitious and far sighted
generals were in time to find their way to Egypt and
with sufficient support there were to establish their,
2
dynasties - as the1 Aghlabids and the Taharids had 
done. The one vital difference was that the soldiers 
in Egypt, as pointed out by MagrTzT were .of foreign 
origin, the same as with those of the Galiph in Iraq.- 
But this had yet to- happen. For the short reign of. 
Mu*tasim Egypt was on the whole quiet .after the year
1. Ibid. _
2.. E.I. (2).,s.v. Ahmad b. Tulun, E.I. (!) s.v., IkhshTdids
219/834-5* So was Yaman. Hijaz had for long 
remained so - hut for the Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, 
it had little or nothing to offer in the political 
turmoil of the age.1
1. The Mihna and the building of S"amarra ane ..treated, in 
Chapters I and IV respectively. Mu*tasim^s sacking 
of his Christian secretary al-Fadl b. Marwan is left 
out as this has been dealt with at length by.Sourdel. 
See his: Le V i s i m t  Abbasi&e. pp. 246-54. There 
are some references in some sources to Mu’tasimVs 
winning naval battles in the Indian Ocean against some 
Indian b a r g e s H o  sufficientjietails are given. 
Baladhuri: ffutuh.V.p.626; Mas*udi: TanbTh.p.355; Ibn 
al-FacpCh: Bui dan, p.53 *
The End o f the Reign
On Thursday the 19th of RabT1 ■ 19/6th of January 842 : 
Mu'tasim's reign came to a close* Early in the, morning 
/of that day he died. The difficulty met in trying to 
ascertain the date, of his birth, is not encountered, 
here. On this fateful and important date the.sources 
are all agreed. ,
For over a month, according to Tabari, Mu*tasim 
was suffering from a malady which beset him after beihg 
cupped (ihta.jaroa). On the evening'before his last d a y • 
he felt some improvement in his health. He;%she.d that, . 
the barge al-Zulal be prepared for an excursion, on the 
Tigris the following day. . ; In the barge he aslted. for 
a small quantity of wine while.listening to some verses'; 
sung to the accompaniment of a flute. (As usual,.f a t e , 
had it that the verses were sad and melancholic.) All 
the while he was weeping, sobbing and wiping, his tears.
1. A k m  Tamrnam.. Munta fflayat, p. 105: Ya1 qubi ,111 ,p.:204;
Idem ,33uIdan,p.39; Ibn gutaiba: MaTarif pp.226-7; 
DTnawarTV Akhbar «p. 401*: Tabari ,p. 1322; EvM.,- p.126;
Ha's *11di ,Vli'',p'.lK; idem': Tahblih .p.353Suyuti ,p. 133 ;
Ibn Kathir: Bidaya a p.295; a1-Muhabhar„p.42; ibn *Abd 
Rabbih;. 1 Iqd.III .p.55; cf. Chapter II, p. sfg ; Bar- - 
Habraeus, I,p.140, gives the year as 843*,E.M.,p.i26, 
gives the date of: that Thursday as the 18th/5th. Accord 
ing td Catteno2, Tables, it was; the. 19th/6th. ;
2. cf. Tabari: pp. 909-10.
He... returned..home;- befWe-tiay ' the./-wine he, ■
asked/for. About, two hours- af-tei?..midnight -.he-'jaiedf/'* /
He was buried in Samarra, inal-Jawsaa, one of , his1 /. V
■ - ' w  \  • i  / V - ‘. \  /  . "■ ' • - . ' / ' v ■ ■//•■.-
famous .palaces.:- The burial ceremony was/led by Ahmad / 
b,. Abi Pu1 ad according to iiTnawari and by,the Caliph*s '
. son and, successor according to others. r. ; . ?
His reign had, lasted for eight -years, /%ight>/m6hths -"/V. 
and a; couple of days according to .the Muslim,Calendar,
..eighth.years, three months and twenty-eight days according' - /
"to the Gregorian one.^ His age'oh his death was between.' ■ ? ;/ 
f ortyrsix ■ and. f orty-eight, a s t h e  date/ of-^.hisXbirth is \ . ;
uncertain.^// Although Tabari’s calculations, show that > . 
he did not reach, the ,;age of forty-eight , this . was; the , : v/‘ 
age a t . which the., sources including: Tabari himself, ;. ■ /■
usually report, that he died. ,. The reason f or /this1 whs ;  ^ I a 
- that number eight/ fitted well/ with /the name ai-Muthammaht /1' 
the eight sided, which was' attributed to him. It appears 
: that he was so1 cblled:>only after his death.' For this>// 'r>■.;•//
'-/ name the sources; give various reasons , ranging from the /
!• /Tabari , pp. 1322-3; E.M. ,ppi 126K7r Ya’ qubi,III,p.204; /./■
' Mas,'udi^VII,pil44. / ■ • , //,: • • • ' : /  , ■ -;/: \ ,/
2. Slhawari, Akhbar,p.401; fa * cfubi: o p. c ft. ,p.2Q4:;, al- / / ./
. ’ Muhabbar . p742 ; Ibn *Abd Rabbih; see p. 55vi*Tod.ilIl-i * / - /Nyv/ -_ ' 1   * * ■ 9 ,j .
. . 3*. :vP*5 8 ,n. 1 . The sources differ in ^ he?/number ;of the/;
, . days• The ,number /above is/oatc Plated/ to, includd; b o t h : / , 
days of,accession/and;death. /;./Tabari^s /'and/Mas’udl*^ •///
1 ... / versions- agree with this, f . - * ■•/■/, ■ ■' ,//;•;■' .. - ;-'aV/': / /:;'£
4. Tabari ,, pp. 1323-4; E.M.,pp.,,,126-8:; cf . Chbpter ,IIV:P* *■
dates of his birth, his accession, his death and his 
age, the length of his reign,"the number of his - 
children, his being the eighth Abbasid Caliph and of 
the eighth genei»ation of the descendants of al-fAbbas, 
to the number of his campaigns and conquests. ; In . 
most cases eight reasons were looked for but in al- 
Fakhri eleven are given.
He was described as a man of medium height, a graceful ''
strong and a well-built body, with a beautiful face, : ■
beautiful eyes, no grey hairs and a long beard. He was
said to be brave, generous, noble, h u m b l e v e n e r a b l e ,
amiable but when seized with anger did not care what he
did. Luxurious in his habits, he liked solid, buildings
and was free in spending on campaigns. Ibn Hamdun
reports that none was known to have been as alert in.,the
2 - 
field of war as IvluHasira. , , 1
So much was said about Mu'tasim. But the sources 
offer little, and then very casually, on him as a man 
and as a Caliph.-* In one place Jabari reports the story
1. p.^XG-n. i, The reason given for the name, including 
the length of his reign, his age and similar things which 
were noticed after his death, also suggest that it was , 
not "used during his 'lifetime*
2. Jabari,pp.1324-6; E.M. ,pp.127-30; Masfudi,VII,p.144 and 
VIII,p.302; idem: TanibTh.pp.353-5; al-Fakhri ,p•316;
Ibn A b  d Rabbi h : 11gd,111, pp•55-6 ;Bar Ilabraeus , I , p. 133 • , : ■ 
Abu: Tammam ,MuntagHya6,pp. 11-91;. 104-5* had some of his 
best poetry on M u Ttasim. .
3 . cf. E.M. ,pp. xvi-xvii.
of the elderly man who spoke to Mu*tasim in harsh 
words about the conduct of his troops and how the 
guards were about to stop the man but for the inter­
vention of M u ’tasim who listened to the former,s 
complaint and went away.' In another place he reports 
that while on the Byzantine campaign Mu*tasim and his 
companions had to cross a river. Mu*tasim stopped 
his companions and waded through the water to discover
the suitable place and thereby spared his.followers the
1 » »
dangers of the attempt. Mas’udi tells of the incident
when Mu*tasim came across an old man trying desperately
to put a load of hay on the back of his donkey. The
load had fallen in a muddy place and was too heavy for
the man to handle. Notwithstanding the dirt and the
weight, and to the man’s astonishment and gratitude,
2
M u 1tasim lifted it and put it .where it was wanted.
Tariukhi throws some light on Mu*tasim the father. He 
was keen that his .son Harun a 1-Wathi ft had a proper 
education but did not like to see him severely punished in, 
the course of it. Another, incident shows that Mu* tasimt
1. Tabari, pp. 1181, 1326; E.M.,pp. 17, 129*
2. Mas’udi,VII,pp.133-4.
1
was careful not to give al-Wathig too much to spend*.,
From the rS.le he played in the events of his reign, :
already described, his efficiency as a general, his
proneness to extreme anger, his luxurious habits and his .
, 2 
love for buildings could, be convincingly attested*
But, contrary to B. Marinfs judgment, Mu'tasim was not a
zealot; despite his being counted among the M u ’tazilite
- 3
leaders by Ibn al-Murtada,.
With M u1 tasim1 s death the first reign in that *Era 
of Isolation1 came, to an end*^ The accession of his 
eldest son liarun a 1-tfa thici followed, as a matter, of course 
without opposition or jubilation* Though there was hardly 
any mention of his having been nominated for the'Caliphate 
by his father, there were sufficient indications that he 
was meant to succeed. In a number of important,occasions ; 
he had deputized for his father,. , The absence of, a 
reference to nomination in the available sources is not a 
proof that it did not take place and even if the case was 
such it might have been due to the apparently unexpected
1. Tanukhi , Nishwar ,8 , pp. 13-4; Ibn al-!i\bbar, I1 tab ,p.59»’ 
2* See above Chapters IV and V._ ,v< ' :
3* E.M.jP.xvii; Ibn al-Murtada; Tabagat, pi123*
S, See Chapter IXX,p* and Chapter IV.
death of M u 1tasim.
*
: What is worthy of note is that the whole matter
was reported in a manner different from that of previous 
similar events in Bagh dad. A feeling of- distance and 
detachment prevailed. -With the moving of the capital to -1 
Samarra, succession appears to have become solely of local 
concern, arousing little or no* interest so long as it was 
not accompanied by troubles. What is more, the sources 
for the period v/ere distant and detached from Samarra, 
which neither then nor later became a cultural capital 
like Baghdad. Cairo, Damascus and others. The court was
no longer the centre of cultural development ,in Iraq.
1 ' - - f & - ■ ‘ - '
■The political decline of the Caliphate, like t h e .*withering: 
of the State* took place at a time when Islamic Civilization
- 2was reaching its peak. '
1. Tabari: pp. 1180, 1229., 1315; E.M. ,pp. 16,53,1&0; Kamil. . 
^I_.P*319^ fIbar II,p^257; cf.A.Chejni; Succession p.i til »
. Abu Tammam, Muntaciayat .p.89 .invoked. Mu* tasim to name*"
s; Wat hip. as successor in the same poem in wfiich the burning
of Afshin was celebrated. Di*bil, Muhtapayat .p. 124 . 
proclaims that Mu*tasim lived long enough to see that, 
homage was paid to Wat hi ft. This was said, in the last 
of .three verses recited oh the occasion of the death of 
the foxmier and the accession of the latter. Di*bil 
detested both of them. ; It is possible that the necessity 
of the poetic rnetije he used Wfeie-h produced the phrase 
which gives the impression, that homage'was in fact paid 
to fethiq in his father1 s reign;. . , /
2. of. Ivl'ez: Die Renaissance des Islams; B. Lewis: The Arabs \ 
in Hi st or y; G i b b : Interpretation.; Goitein; The R i s e .
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